Towards Solidarity

The use and abuse of concepts of compassion

Edited by
**Irène Herrmann
and Renata Latała**

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Introduction

Compassion in the context of democratisation and individualisation ? What the conceptual history of the notion says

Irène Herrmann

The traumatic events of the early 2020s, from the Covid-19 crisis to the war in Ukraine, were punctuated by calls for solidarity. Authorities in most countries of the world have been vigourous in encouraging their citizens to make efforts and accept sacrifices in order to protect others, even save them from illness or death.

While these exhortations were linked clearly to the health and military emergencies, they drew on a lexicon and semantic field that have been developed over a long period of time. Indeed, these invitations fit into the extremely broad and porous category of terms used to describe behaviour intended to help others, even where there is no obligation to do so (be it by law, force, or professional ethics). This particular impulse can also be found at the heart of the terms dedication, sacrifice, altruism, charity or other compassion. Compassion, classically seen as being the « consciousness of others' distress together with a desire to alleviate it[1] », encapsulates almost the entire concept. Its definition emphasises that the emotion provoked by the sight of others' distress is not passive, but leads people to (a desire to) act. Furthermore, it does not address the motives for this behaviour. This is why « compassion » will serve as an analytical umbrella concept in this work, although

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[1] Merriam Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/compassion, accessed 30 Decembre 2022.

admittedly the term retains a certain religious connotation consistent with the origin of most of these concepts[2].

All these « compassionate » words differ in several respects. The clearest difference lies undoubtedly in the degree of (dis)interest they assume, ranging from self-sacrifice, i.e., the negation of oneself, to solidarity, for which reciprocity is expected. They also vary according to the actual involvement they imply and the seriousness of the risk they entail, since the martyr faces certain death whereas the hero may remain unharmed. Their designation also depends on the scope of their action, and this is a key element in dissociating humanitarian work from so-called social works.

But beyond this proliferation, linked to distinct places where the cursor is placed in a space with multiple dimensions, these words share several common characteristics. Firstly, they all designate a human propensity to be concerned with one's neighbour. Moreover, they denote rather structured and enduring attitudes which in any case go beyond the simple compassionate emotion that is at their origin. And these behaviours are not understood in a neutral way, but are seen as desirable, without being obligatory. Several consequences follow from this observation.

The desirability of these actions links them inseparably to the notion of Good, and vice versa. Thus, by virtue of a circular logic, it is because they are valued that we find them good, and it is because we find them good that they are, almost tautologically, judged beneficial. They are therefore actions that are understood by reference to moral criteria, which imply assessments in terms of good and evil. Indeed, these notions figure prominently among the fundamental values of societies and individuals[3]. Yet these values, though essential, have not been explored to any great extent in their historical dimension[4].

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[2] Irène Herrmann, «Deconstructing the use of compassion and other moral concepts in politics », Pasi Ihalainen, Jani Marjanen (eds.), *Writing Conceptual Histories*, Bloomsbury, tbp.

[3] Justin F. Landy and Daniel M. Bartels, « An Empirically-Derived Taxonomy of Moral Concepts », *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,* published by the American Psychological Association, 2018, Vol. 147, No. 11, p. 1748–1761.

[4] Melissa A. Wheeler, Melanie J. McGrath, Nick Haslam, « Twentieth century morality : The rise and fall of moral concepts from 1900 to 2007 », *PLOS ONE*, 14(2), 2019, p. 2.

If these gestures are seen as generous, it is because they require efforts, even risks, which cannot be expected of everyone. Otherwise, they would not appear altruistic but simply normal. And this exceptionalism is so fundamental that it is the basis of the classical definition of dedication. For Olivier Christin, who sums up this classical understanding of the term, it is a question of individual commitments serving the general interest being « at once praiseworthy and unobjectionable, exemplary and [even!] almost inimitable[5] ». At the very least, what characterises this type of action is that it cannot and should not be done by everyone. In other words, such actions are rare and so mentioned more frequently than actually performed.

And this observation, in turn, makes it possible to understand the interest in analysing not these facts themselves but the way in which they are invoked and the reasons behind their enunciation — even if that means subsequent examination of the concrete effects of their discursive use. A questioning of the place and rhetorical function of words that are supposed to represent a society's most precious values amounts to an exploration of the ambitions and models it sets for itself, and to a grasping of its axiological configurations, as well as the conditions for achieving the ethical objectives thus formulated. In any case, it is to understand terms by investigating the different universes they subsume, i.e. to consider them as concepts and analyse them as such.

The history of concepts goes back several decades and is currently experiencing considerable growth[6]. Starting with the reflections of Reinhardt Koselleck and his most famous *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*[7], it has acquired a decisive place in the historical toolbox, allowing us to grasp in more detail how societies are

[5] Olivier Christin, *La cause des autres. Une histoire du dévouement politique,* Paris, PUF, 2021, p. 16 (our translation).

[6] Willibald Steinmetz and Michael Freeden, « Introduction. Conceptual History : Challenges, Conundrums, Complexities », Willibald Steinmetz, Michael Freeden, and Javier Fernández-Sebastián (eds), *Conceptual History in the European Space*, Oxford and New York, Breghahn, 2017, p. 1-46.

[7] Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck (Hrsg.) : *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, 8 tomes, Stuttgart, Klett-Cota, 1972–1997.

organised, and change. Today, it can be considered a significant sub-discipline, especially as it takes advantage of the technical facilities offered by the digitisation of sources[8] to shed additional light on such rapidly-developing fields as the history of emotions or transnational history. It is in this spirit that a Concepta Seminar[9], was some of whose results form the basis of this publication. On the one hand, the aim was to exploit and support the growing interest in conceptual history. On the other hand, the idea was for full benefit to be drawn from a particularly appropriate and interesting empirical case.

Not only does the use of concepts of compassion have an essential discursive dimension, but its synchronic and diachronic dimensions have not yet been truly explored[10]. The objective pursued here goes far beyond simply filling this gap. By deciphering these highly moral concepts, we can be effective in drawing up a hierarchy of compassionate virtues as they appear in the choice of terms used at a given time and place. And by understanding these configurations over time, we can understand how the values of dedicating oneself to others, and their « ranking », change over time.

Furthermore, this research has also offered an opportunity to answer a question clearly inspired by the early 2020s, and their repeated and insistent calls for solidarity. By following the trajectory of the concepts

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[8] Hugo Bonin, Pasi Ihalainen and Zachris Haaparinne, « Writing digital conceptual history of democracy », in *Writing Conceptual Histories*, op. cit.

[9] Workshop « Concepts of Dedication », University of Geneva, November 27, 2020, organized by Irène Herrmann and Renata Latała. I am very grateful to François Courvoisier who was a tremendous help in organising this seminar.

[10] There are of course exceptions. To quote quite a few, see : Tilman Mayer, « Freedom, Equality, Solidarity. Current Emphasis of Historical Concepts », *Politische Studien*, Vol.58(412), 2007, p. 35-43 ; Wolfgang Schmale, « European solidarity : a semantic history », *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire*, 24:6, 2017, p. 854-873 ; Irène Herrmann, « Humanitaire », in Olivier Christin (ed.), *Dictionnaire des concepts nomades en sciences humaines*, Paris, Métailié, 2010, p. 233-243 ; Zeno Franco, Kathy Blau, Philip Zimbardo, « Heroism : A Conceptual Analysis and Differentiation Between Heroic Action and Altruism », *Review of General Psychology*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2011, p. 99–113. About the concept of compassion, which is the most encompassing one, see : Paul Gilbert, ed., *Compassion, Concepts, Research and Applications*, 2017, Routledge : NY, esp. Gilbert P., « Compassion : definitions and controversies », ibid., p, 3–15 ; Max Stille, M., « Conceptualizing Compassion in Communication for Communication », *Contributions to the History of Concepts*, *11*(1), 2016, pp. 81-106.

of compassion over the last two centuries, we can ask ourselves about the destiny of ideals which promote concern for others even as the Western world is increasingly characterised by individualism; and secondly, we can wonder what the accommodations between two very dissimilar, not to say opposing, tendencies can teach us about the societies in which they have come about. The case studies in this volume provide a number of milestones. For the most part, its texts cover the modern period and even focus on (very) contemporary times, reflecting a current historical trend—which makes sense to find in a publication based on a research workshop. However, some of the papers hark back further, revealing significant developments that may help with answers to these questions.

Olivier Christin's text allows us to dive into the « prehistory » of this question. Of course, he does not focus on the ancient or Christian sources of the compassionate attitudes thus required[11]. Instead, his attention is drawn to the moment when the transition from philosophical-religious discourse to political reflection takes place, through... poetry. In these few pages, the historian offers a perfectly original interpretation of La Fontaine's fable « The Animals Sick of the Plague ». While most commentators understand this work as an expression of social injustice, the perspective is reversed here. The author makes a very convincing case that the donkey, representing the lowest strata of society, sacrifices itself deliberately for the survival of the other animals. In doing so, it does not bow to the law of the strongest but, on the contrary, performs a gesture of ultimate devotion previously reserved for the ruling classes. By being completed, furthermore, for the entire animal kingdom, his self sacrifice becomes a sign of political emancipation and announces a desire for democratisation.

This dual dynamic, in which the transition from an essentially ethical concern to political behaviour, coupled with the growing democratisation of societies, intensified over time and became particularly prevalent during the 19th and 20th centuries. Most of the papers here that follow are devoted to the beginning of the former

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[11] Alain Destexhe, *L'Humanitaire impossible, ou Deux siècles d'ambiguïté*, Paris, Armand Colin, 1993.

and the end of the latter. In the aftermath of the Enlightenment, the affirmation of citizenship and individual self-sacrifice were combined in the emergence of a rather special compassionate concept : education. Virgil Wibaut-Le Pallac shows how several pedagogues active during and just after the Napoleonic period used this notion to designate actually « working on oneself ». These men developed methods of moral accounting through which they tried to improve their own conduct and that of their pupils. This arithmetical exercise should allow a republican society, in which everyone knows their place, rights and above all duties, to function harmoniously.

It was probably not yet a question of democracy during the Sattelzeit, but of positioning in the public arena. This impression is in any case confirmed by an analysis of the support given to the Carlist cause at approximately the same time. The investigation by Andrés María Vicent indicates how part of the support for the deposed king and his ultra-conservative cause came from progressive European personalities. Behind the apparent contradiction inherent in this practice, the historian reveals a mental tropism that exposes the role played by gestures of devotion in a society in the process of gentrification. Until then, as the deliberate sacrifice made by La Fontaine's donkey shows, acts of self-sacrifice performed in the name of the community were typically reserved for the nobility. Therefore, to seize it is to insert one's gesture into a capitalist logic, and to affirm one's membership of the economic-political elites, whatever one's ideological profile.

Moreover, it was undoubtedly by virtue of a similar profit calculation that the Swiss authorities, then running the only democracy in Europe, thought they could ameliorate the weakness of their state, and assert its place on the international stage through the brandishing of a form of institutionalised aid to the victims of armed conflicts, even though it was not called humanitarian aid at the time. This crucial facet of Swiss foreign policy is then subsumed by the term solidarity, which demonstrates encompassing rhetorical properties. According to Irène Herrmann, the early and spectacular popularity of this latter concept of solidarity is explained by its spiral potentialities which, perhaps better than any other, allow for popular

participation in dedication, since solidarity ultimately requires little effort on the part of those who claim it.

This is all the more true given that it has contributed to the popularity of the term in other contexts. Around 1980, this notion seems to have been the most widely used of the vast corpus of concepts of compassion. In addition, or even thanks, to its malleability and porosity, it exhibits exceptional political qualities through its permitting of forms of emancipation and empowerment. As a new catalogue of human rights, mainly conceptualised and promoted by countries emerging from decolonisation in the 1970s and 1980s, and categorised as solidarity rights, it allows François Courvoisier to approach the history of human rights through the perspective of solidarity. He distinguishes the process leading to the elaboration of the content of this new catalogue of rights from the separate process by which they gained names. In particular, he questions the intentions and effects of the concept of solidarity being mobilised to qualify human rights more generally associated with the concept of freedom. He thus highlights the tension in the universalisation of moral principles that are at first sight *magnetic*, namely, so attractive/repulsive that they cannot be opposed[12].

On a national rather than international scale, the term solidarity has also proved appropriate for increasing citizen participation in public affairs. This is demonstrated by Renata Latała, who seeks to understand the phenomenon of solidarity as it was « thought » and experienced within the Solidarity movement, by analysing the discursive environment around which the ideal of solidarity is constructed. By placing her analysis in the political environment of the time of « real socialism » in Poland, and in line with 19th century's ideas, she shows how each experience of solidarity is understood in its specific context.

The empowerment abilities of the concept can even be seen in democratic countries, where welfare is usually managed by the state. Anna Derksen shows this in her study of the solidarity movements for people with disabilities that emerged in Sweden in the late 1970s.

In these pages, the author argues for a re-evaluation of the notion of self-interest and questions the widespread idea that self-interest is irrevocably opposed to altruism.

In the last text of this volume, organised in a classically chronological manner, Sandrine Maulini reveals an ultimate political utility of the term solidarity. By exploring the way in which Swiss authorities dealt with requests for compensation from victims of abusive and coercive measures, she highlights the advantages leaders were able to draw from this concept, for which a deliberate preference over the notion of justice was shown. The latter would not only have implied a rather rigorous assessment of the compensation to be granted according to the degree of damage suffered; above all, it would also have implied that the Swiss governments of the 2010s recognised the responsibility of their predecessors in taking measures that appear today to be totally unfair and unjustified. By declaring that they wanted to compensate these people out of solidarity, they abrogated responsibility of their own, given a use of the term making it incumbent upon the whole community.

All these contributions allow us to portray some notable developments. From a lexical point of view, a significant change can be observed. Indeed, while the papers devoted to the Ancien Régime, and even to the very first decades of the 19th century, show a certain diversity in the chosen vocabulary of compassion, those dealing with the end of that century, if not the following centuries, focus essentially on the notion of solidarity. This may, of course, be a matter of chance or a semantic adjustment, since the word solidarity long retained its strictly financial meaning, qualifying the collective bond of debtors in the repayment of a debt. One can also imagine that the current widespread use of the notion has encouraged researchers into taking a more specific look.

Nevertheless, its use accompanies and promotes political developments which mark the decades during which the term has been used increasingly, leaving no doubt that the linguistic shift observed in this book covers more general changes. In fact, the texts gathered here begin by showing a devotion of a religious nature. However, when used in the political context, self-sacrifice was an act reserved for the elites, to the extent that it even defines membership in the ruling spheres of

the City. And it is because of this close association between power and sacrifice that the appropriation of notions of dedication by those who are in principle subaltern can be seen as at least a partial attempt at taking over the management of the public good.

It is to counter this risk of an upheaval of the social order that some political thinkers undertake to popularise this attitude, whilst ensuring its deployment within a limited framework that leaves everyone in their place. In this context, the concept of solidarity begins to impose itself by force. It accentuates the democratisation that took place in societies at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries. Indeed, the notion of solidarity allows efforts required in favour of others to be reduced, and thus authorises the crumbling of a prerogative granted to those who count in politics.

Moreover, it is becoming commonplace for democratic states in the international arena. Whether in little Switzerland or huge Africa, the concept is put forward to ensure greater visibility on the world map, either by compensating for geopolitical weakness and material prosperity by showing universal generosity towards, perhaps, jealous and ill-intentioned countries ; or by demanding a certain equity in the way the planet's wealth is redistributed. But above all, solidarity marks developments in domestic politics. Primarily, it expresses the will of citizens to take a stand against the state. It sometimes involves investing in areas that are neglected by public authorities. In the most extreme cases, solidarity is used as a watchword to take all prerogatives back into one's own hands and show, once again, the desire of individuals to invest in the political field.

In recent years, a final reversal of the situation seems to have seen the state itself seize the term in order to free itself from the responsibilities that would otherwise fall to it in the name of individual responsibility. The logic of democratisation, betrayed and accentuated by the use of the concept of solidarity, would thus lead to an inversely proportional reduction in the burdens attributable to the public authorities. This is a far cry from noble and spectacular acts of sacrifice. Instead, citizens are required to make daily sacrifices. The course of the concepts of compassion in politics thus shows an evolution from elitist individualism to

mass individualism. This transformation is linked inextricably to a reduction in the sacrifices envisaged, but goes hand in hand with an increased degree of constraint, solidarity being relatively undemanding, but required willingly enough.

This fundamental contradiction helps to explain why concepts of compassion, and especially solidarity, are not necessarily followed. They are opposed to the freedom to take decisions and action that they reveal. Nevertheless, they continue to be brandished, and seen as rewarding values. This ultimate paradox undoubtedly reveals a certain void in terms of ethical offerings. Is democratisation not accompanied by a certain secularisation ? What could be more tempting, then, than to refer to concepts which, although clearly political, once drew their strength from the sacred ?

« The century of blind self-sacrifice and instinctive virtues is fast receding into the past »

Olivier Christin

It is well known that a key chapter of the second part of *Democracy in America* describes the dangers of individualism typical of democratic societies, but also the remedies that American society has developed through institutions, organizations and the doctrine of well-understood self-interest. Tocqueville ascribes the retreat of the most obvious forms of civic virtue and self-sacrifice in favour of the common good as the inevitable consequence of the equalization of conditions in democracy. Unlike aristocratic societies, in which everyone incessantly felt the force of social inequalities and therefore the need to justify one's rank, to obtain support or to provide it, and favour personal allegiances at the expense of ancestral links, the citizen of a democratic society tends to isolate himself from his peers and to seek instead « a small society for his own use ». Moreover, he generally « turns all his sentiments toward himself alone[1] ».

This decline in civic virtues is therefore inevitably linked to a deep transformation of the way individuals thought of themselves and conceived of their duties, together with a fading of ideals that usually favour good and useful habits and benefit familiar and common causes, as well as callings that are not too costly and the effects of which, measured by Tocqueville, even include poetry. Individualism, although « a considered and peaceful sentiment », would therefore

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[1] Chapter II. I quote from the translation *Democracy in America. English Edition.* Edited by Eduardo Nolla. Translated from the French by James T. Schleifer. (Indianapolis : Liberty Fund, 2012). Vol. 2, p. 882 and 888.

gradually dry « up only the source of public virtues » and the desire to get involved in the affairs of the City before jeopardizing « all others », at the risk of favouring in the end the emergence of a new form of despotism that is typical of democratic societies[2].

At first sight, Tocqueville seems to be turning the famous analysis that Montesquieu developed in the third book of the *Spirit of Laws* on its head. The latter had indeed established a binding relationship between some forms of government and certain forms of processes and passions and notably deemed that, in republics or democracies, the political principle or passion that should allow the regime to function and to endure over time was virtue: « in a popular state, one spring more is necessary, namely, *virtue*[3] ». The inversion operated by Tocqueville could therefore be surprising, if it did not rest on a very particular historical analysis, in terms of political morality and civic duty, that was designed to highlight what distinguishes the object of his book, American democracy, from aristocratic systems as well as ancient republics. To quote him : « When the world was led by a small number of powerful and rich individuals, the latter loved to form a sublime idea of the duties of man; they took pleasure in professing that it is glorious to forget self and that it is right [...] to do good without interest, just like God. That was the official doctrine of this time in the matter of morality ». A few pages later, Tocqueville refers once more to the aristocratic ethos of self-sacrifice and virtuous duty in Ancien Régime societies and the absolute selflessness of those who know how to forget themselves and their own interests in favour of superior values and goals, to conclude that in his day : « The century of blind devotions and instinctive virtues is already fleeing far from us[4] ».

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[2] Ibid, p. 882.

[3] I quote from *The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu* (London : T. Evans, 1777), 4 vols. Vol. 1, Book 3, III. On this, see Federico Bonzi, « L'honneur de l'*Esprit des Lois* : un principe mal compris ? », *Revue française d'histoire des idées politiques*, 2012, 1, pp. 51-60; Patrice Rolland, « De la vertu politique chez Montesquieu, ou l'inaccessible perfection », *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*, 2010, 88 (1), pp. 43-57. See also a crystal-clear exposition by Céline Spector, « La vertu politique comme principe de la démocratie. Robespierre lecteur de Montesquieu », in Michel Biard, Philippe Bourdin, Hervé Leuwers et al. (eds), *Vertu et politique. Les pratiques des législateurs (1789-2014)*, Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2015, p. 61-70.

[4] Ibid., p. 923.

Self-sacrifice in classical antiquity

Time is lacking here to delve in detail into the distinction between forms of government, motivations and passions that should guide individuals within them, or the distinction that Tocqueville derives from it : between virtue and interest or self-sacrifice and individualism ; and it is therefore not possible to demonstrate how he reaches the conclusion that his observations on American democracy confirm or nuance Montesquieu's analysis rather than contradict it altogether[5]. I should rather limit myself to attempt to understand what the ideas of blind or sublime self-sacrifice that Tocqueville weds so closely to aristocratic societies of the Old Regime actually mean and how what he refers to as « the duties of man » — the desire to do good beyond self-interest and opportunism, and the glory that is due to those who were capable of such self-sacrifice — compares with the moral actions that Montesquieu distinguishes from the theological or moral concept of virtue, and associates instead with the political affairs of society.

In order to avoid an accumulation of citations and authors, it is perhaps not illegitimate to consider, after Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thevenot[6], that the vocabulary of justification can be derived from a single author or text so long as the latter deploys its argument in the most thorough and explicit fashion, in an almost canonical manner. And it may be considered here that, in referring to the specific forms of self-giving in the societies of the Ancien Régime, Tocqueville has in mind precisely some of those canonical texts in which the virtues deemed necessary for those who intend to occupy a prominent position and play a role in the Res Publica were both expounded and

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[5] A fragment of *Democracy in America* that was not kept in the published version explains his thoughts on this point, based on a comparison between ancient republics and modern democracies — which allows him to discuss the famous quote by Montesquieu on virtue as a republican principle: unlike in Athens, Sparta or Rome, « in America, it is not virtue that is great, but it is temptation that is small, which amounts to the same. It is not selflessness that is great, but it is self-interest that is well understood, which almost amounts to the same once more. Montesquieu was therefore right ». Cited by Raymond Aaron, « Idées politiques et vision historique de Tocqueville », *Revue française de science politique*, 10th year, n°3, 1960, p. 509-526.

[6] Luc Boltanski, Laurent Thévenot, *De la justification. Les économies de la grandeur*, Paris, Gallimard, 1991.

put to the test of criticism. It is, of course, the moralists of the Grand Siècle who should be the focus of attention here, precisely because of the place in their reflections of critical considerations on the effects of the formation of modern court society, but also because of the influence they exerted on Tocqueville, who recent historiography has reminded us was also a « moralist[7] ». We know, moreover, that the moralists of the Grand Siècle were among his favourite readings[8].

One of the most significant and famous examples of such categories and terms being used to means-test critically and to describe virtuous behaviour, selflessness in favour of the good of others and disinterested altruism is without doubt the fable of the « Animals stricken with the Plague » by Jean de La Fontaine. Since its publication in 1678, at the apex of the personal reign of Louis XIV, it remains the most vocal denunciation and deconstruction of the vagaries of the immorality prevalent at court: from the triumph of flattery and cowardice through the inability of the powerful to act in accordance with the principles of aristocratic ethos of the Old Regime, of which they nonetheless professed to be the incarnation. In this regard it constitutes a turning point in the history of the description and definition of moral actions[9].

There are three reasons that can be invoked to justify this statement — which has nothing to do, by the way, with any parallel with the pandemic of Covid-19. The first resides in the scene-setting of the narrative and the exact nature of the society that it describes : an aristocratic society centred around a Lion, surrounded by animals that represent unequal protagonists. Those who enjoy the most obvious privileges, and indeed speak first at the request of the King, are predators and carnivores (a tiger, a bear, and a fox) ; the herbivore riffraff only speaks second, following exactly the contemporary representation of the inequalities and different statuses of the Old Regime. The second derives from the fable's plot: the animals are

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[7] Jean-Louis Benoit, *Tocqueville moraliste*, Paris, Honoré Champion, collection Romantisme et Modernités, 2004 ; Lucien Jaume, *Tocqueville et les sources aristo-cratiques de la liberté*, Paris, Fayard, 2008.

[8] Françoise Mélonio, « " Une sorte de Pascal politique " : Tocqueville et la littérature dé-mocratique », *Revue d'histoire littéraire de la France*, vol. 105, no. 2, 2005, p. 273-284.

[9] The tale of the « Animals stricken with the Plague » opens book VII of the second compilation of the *Fables*.

ill or are susceptible to becoming so ; God punishes them for their sins with the Plague, in agreement with the usual interpretations of pandemics as divine punishments. In order to assuage His wrath, the animals must therefore show contrition, and the guiltiest among them must sacrifice themselves for the good of them all. The third and final reason is even more significant: it concerns, as expected, the vocabulary used in the fable, which is exactly what draws Tocqueville's attention, being aware of its canonical nature. Indeed, the expression *dévouement* is used on three occasions, in a very particular way that is usually misunderstood nowadays and that English translations often obliterate entirely, either by choosing to ignore or mistranslate, using notably « devotion » for « self-sacrifice ». In the 1842 English translation, for instance, the Lion invites the other animals to a self-examination of their consciences, like himself, and to recognize their faults if they have committed any, in order to designate who will have to give himself up for the sake of the others, just as many examples of such voluntary sacrifice in dire circumstances are mentioned in the story :

> Let us our guiltiest beast resign,
> A sacrifice to wrath divine.
> Perhaps this offering, truly small,
> May gain the life and health of all.
> By history we find it noted
> That lives have been just so **devoted**[10]

After what passes for a form of deliberation, the animals of the fable then consider as a last resort that, to end the plague that threatens them all, only one of them should give himself up as a kind of sacrifice that will save the community. They settle on the need for a selfless act, freely and voluntarily consented, and at no point evoke the possibility of designating a scapegoat that would be sacrificed violently against its will[11]. The self-sacrifice that the donkey agrees to make is apparently perfectly consistent with a specific type of moral

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[10] Emphasis by the autor

[11] On this point, I thus disagree with the editors of the *Fables*, Paris, Gallimard, Collection de La Pleïade, 1991, when they describe the donkey as a scapegoat. For complete discussion of this, see Olivier Christin, *La cause des autres. Une histoire du dévouement politique*, Paris, PUF, 2021.

action, that of virtuous acts « above and beyond the call of duty », which are called in this respect supererogatory, or super-eminent, in the language of the seventeenth century. For instance, in 1610, Scipion Dupleix, philosopher, grammarian and member of the royal council, published his *Ethical or Moral Philosophy*, a whole chapter of which, in the seventh book, is devoted to the question of heroic virtues that go beyond simple moral virtues, and he describes them as « super-eminent », « much more excellent » than ordinary virtues and that they contain something « extraordinary that seem to exceed human courage and strength[12] ».

In the seventeenth century, La Fontaine's reference to specific historical exemplars would have been obvious to members of the elite, schooled as they were in the reading of the classics — especially since they lived in a society where artists routinely picked their subjects from antiquity's mythology and history and where a man of the world felt almost obligated to quote commonplaces from Greek and Latin authors in polite conversation. The fabulist indeed drew on famous narratives from historians, philosophers and orators from the first century BCE that, in the context of the Republic's crisis and its illusory restoration by Octavius-Augustus, had focused and partly made up perfect and idealised examples of civic heroes[13]. These narratives and speeches related the courage and abnegation of these brave and generous young noblemen who had chosen, at a critical moment, to sacrifice themselves voluntarily for the sake of Rome, its legions and freedom and so on. The most explicit examples are well known, and perhaps it is enough here to evoke just a number of these texts that raised these acts of altruistic self-sacrifice to the rank of models of civic courage, *Fortitudo* and virtue. Their exponents included most of the Christian authors such as Tertullian, St Augustine, and later Thomas Aquinas, who devoted

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[12] Scipion Dupleix, *L'Ethique ou Philosophie morale. Par m. Scipion Du Pleix, conseiller du roy & lieutenant particulier*, Paris, Simon Rigaud; quoted from the 1620 edition : p. 296.

[13] Mario Citroni, « *Res publica restituta* et la représentation du pouvoir augustéen dans l'œuvre d'Horace », in Frédéric Hurlet et Bernard Mineo (eds), *Le principat d'Auguste*, p. 245-266, Alain Deremetz, « La *Res publica restituta* dans l'œuvre de Virgile », Ibid., pp. 281-292 and Bernard Mineo, « La *Res publica restituta* livienne: un pari sur l'avenir » Ibid., p. 295-308.

to them a great deal of attention, all the while distinguishing them from the acts of the martyrs[14].

Livy, for instance, relates at length the sacrifice of the young Marcus Curtius who jumped on horseback into a fiery pit in the middle of the forum in order to extinguish the flames that threatened to engulf the city, as well as the consul Publius Decius Mus who, in 340 BCE, gave himself up to the infernal gods in order to save his legions and to ensure their victory against the enemies of Rome :

> That same year, whether owing to an earthquake or to some other violent force, it is said that the ground gave way, at about the middle of the Forum, and, sinking to an immeasurable depth, left a prodigious chasm. This gulf could not be filled with the earth which everyone brought and cast into it, until admonished by the gods, they began to inquire what it was that constituted the chief strength of the Roman People (…) Thereupon Marcus Curtius, a young soldier of great prowess, rebuked them, (…) for questioning whether any blessing were more Roman than arms and valour. (He) **devoted himself to death**. After which, mounted on a horse caparisoned with all possible splendour, he plunged fully armed into the gulf. *Ab Urbe Condita*, VII.6.

> Having uttered this prayer he (Publius Decius Mus) bade the lictors go to Titus Manlius and lose no time in announcing to his colleague that he had **devoted himself for the good of the army**. He then girded himself with the Gabinian cincture, and vaulting, armed, upon his horse, plunged into the thick of the enemy[15].

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[14] On the ritual of Roman *devotio* see Charles Guittard, « Tite-Live, Accius et le rituel de la *deuotio* » *Comptes rendus des séances de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, 128th year, N. 4, 1984. p. 581-600 and Hank S. Versnel, « Two Types of Roman *Deuotio* », *Mnemosyne*, Fourth series, vol. XXIX, fasc. LV, 1976, p. 368-410. There are also some useful remarks in Anton J. L. van Hooff, *From Autothanasia to Suicide: Self-killing in Classical Antiquity*, 1990, Routledge, 11 sept. 2002 and Danielle Porte, « Un pour tous.... », *Vita Latina*, N° 135, 1994, p. 2-6.

[15] *Ab Urbe Condita*, VIII.9-10. Emphasis by the autor.

These very same examples can be found, of course, in a number of other contemporary texts from the Augustan restoration, notably in Cicero who invokes several times the « men who voluntarily sacrificed their lives for the sake of the greater good, such as that of the motherland[16] », by Sallustius, or yet still in the poem *The Gnat*, long attributed to Virgil but whose authorship is now in dispute. The plot of the latter is very simple: a gnat, unfairly killed by a shepherd whom he had just saved from a poisonous snakebite, appears to him in a dream the following night and reminds him of the names of those who had saved Rome and whose sacrifice had been rewarded with the greatest honours, enumerating a list or catalogue of names that were often used in subsequent texts :

> Here brave Horatius, and the Fabian name
> And great Camillus, crown'd with deathless fame
> With these the Decii, and that youth, who gave
> His life, **devoted** to the gaping grave,
> His country's freedom and her name to save[17]

In the seventeenth century, indeed from the Renaissance onwards, these examples were held in high esteem and were regularly used by historians, philosophers, moralists and artists. In 1624, for instance, Denis Coppée, a notable from Huy, published a tragedy entitled *Portrait of faithfulness in Marcus Curtius* : the eponymous hero sacrificed himself to save the city from a chasm from which smoke arose and, in this instance, was spreading the Plague. A few years later, a *Roman History since the foundation of Rome*, another work by Scipion Dupleix, the author of the *Ethics* already mentioned, evoked once more Decius' patriotic sacrifice (he « gives himself up to the Manes ») and that of Marcus Curtius described as « a thing so prodigious… that it seems to come from a fable rather than history[18] ». In 1666, Laurent Le Brun's *Novus apparatus Virgilii poeticus* mentioned still the heroic acts of Marcus Curtius as « a

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[16] Cicero, *De la vieillesse*, chapters XII and XX (that mention Lucius Junus Brutus, the Decii, and Regulus); see also book I of the *Tusculanes*.

[17] *The Culex of Virgil*, Boston, Printed at the Emerald Press, by Belcher and Armstrong, 1807, p. 36.

[18] Scipion Dupleix, *Histoire Romaine depuis la Fondation de Rome*, Paris, Claude Sonnius, 1638, respectively p. 569 and p. 535.

young Roman teenager who **gave himself up** for the motherland ». The very same year, a lengthy epic poem by Nicolas Courtin was devoted to Charlemagne, who is portrayed as the founder of the French monarchy, and cites several examples of noble sacrifice of generals that seem closely modelled on tales from antiquity : in order to turn around the course of a battle that seemed lost, the brave Bernard recommended himself to God before throwing himself in the midst of the enemy troops (« He alone **sacrificed himself** and by his death / sought to inflect either fate or the Heavens »)[19].

But more to the point, one year before the publication of La Fontaine's fable, the *Cavaliere* Bernin made an equestrian statue of King Louis XIV for the gardens of Versailles : the King is not portrayed at the head of his armies, in search of glorious victory in battle, but in the attitude and with the smile of one who has already accomplished successfully the self-sacrifice that victory requires. We know that the statue did not please Louis XIV and it was modified and renamed by Girardon in 1687 to become *Marcus Curtius about to throw himself in the pit*, which demonstrates the familiarity between the seventeenth-century elites and heroes from antiquity : in the end, it is as if the modifications had allowed the Roman hero to take the King's place and to ape his glory rather than the other way around.

A reader of Cicero himself, it is not a coincidence if La Fontaine had chosen these very terms by which the sacrifice of the donkey to save the animals was legitimized, and in so doing ensured that his reference was intelligible to his intended audience. Everything points to an explicit reference to a Roman tradition that had been reinvigorated by the culture of the Renaissance, and to the glory of antique heroes that was the object of such fascination in European court society, and that Christianity had eventually accommodated to its moral theology. In order to assess the relative willingness of the animal court to accomplishing moral actions, La Fontaine drew on a lexical repertoire that drew from a large corpus of historical, moral and philosophical literature, as well as poetry and theatre,

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19 Nicolas Courtin, *Charlemagne ou le rétablissement de l'empire Romain, poème héroique*, Paris, 1666, p.137.

which his readership was certain to recognize—and this choice is all the more significant in that there are no other occurrences of the words *dévouer* or *dévouement* [altogether devotion, dedication, self-sacrifice] anywhere else in the *Fables*.

« For humanity's sake »

In order to fully understand the significance of La Fontaine's fable, it is necessary to first recall what the word *dévouement* truly means, to establish who was willing to sacrifice themselves, and why they were disposed to do so freely : in other words, to voluntarily sacrifice their health, their interests and their lives in order to come to the aid of others. And in so doing to understand how crucial this text is and how it constitutes a turning point, in terms of the vigour with which it critiques the nobiliary ethos and in its emphasis on the distinction between virtue and heroism : the donkey sacrifices himself without seeking glory or honours, his modest rank forbidding any chance of posthumous *fama*. But the terms of the fable also amount to a radical secularization and democratization of the notion of self-sacrifice for the sake of the common good : the donkey agrees to give himself up, not for the sake of the animals' salvation in the afterlife, but in order to ensure the survival of the animals here on earth. The fable of the « Animals stricken with the Plague » constitutes in this respect a point of no return, a rupture, that heralds the new forms of compassion and love for humanity's sake that grew in the eighteenth century and sheds light on Tocqueville's allusion mentioned at the beginning.

Another clue can be found in the overall chronology that the chapters of the second part of *Democracy in America* adopts : Tocqueville puts side by side the changes in the forms of self-sacrifice and the types of society or political systems, and he underlines more specifically the transition between acts of personal devotion to the monarch or prince, that were undoubtedly those of aristocratic societies, and altruistic actions undertaken for the sake of humanity or others generally, but in any case without any obligation or ties of loyalty in democratic societies that supposedly promote equality of conditions. According to him, in Ancien Regime society : « you scarcely think to lay down your life for the cause of humanity ; but you often sacrifice yourself

for certain men[20] ». The sacrifice of the donkey indicates in part this decisive turning point that I want to focus on : it is not accomplished in obedience to the king but for the sake of everyone.

To further elaborate on how this canonical text by La Fontaine constitutes a turning point in the way acts of self-sacrifice were envisaged, and how it marks the birth of modern ways of envisaging charity and solidarity towards others — in short, dedication to the welfare of one's common humanity — it is necessary to focus on three of its characteristics.

On one hand, the fable of the stricken animals is a scathing critique of the court and its practises[21]. It really denounces the pusillanimity of the courtiers who flatter the king, the Lion, but also the inability of the latter to rise to the occasion and to act as his rank dictates, as a sacrificial king, imitator of Christ who died for the Salvation of mankind. The donkey's selfless act and virtue is therefore completely at odds with his social standing, but also by the same token, with glory. This dissonance is a dismissal of the aristocratic ethos that Tocqueville had evoked and that he argued was the motivation behind sublime virtuous acts. La Fontaine suggests that it is possible for everyone, whatever their social status or condition, to show that they are capable of self-denial, courage, magnanimity and to accomplish exemplary acts, precisely without seeking honour or applause from their peers. Virtue is not a quest for glory. It is here inseparable from selflessness and leads to the preference for the common good over self-interest.

On the other hand, one can note that this decoupling of virtuous behaviour from mundane glory leads to the inversion of social hierarchies. The one who sacrifices himself is at the bottom of the social hierarchy in terms of both condition and consideration : he is « a scurvy wretch », he is the last to talk and does so awkwardly, and

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[20] *Democracy in America. English Edition*. Edited by Eduardo Nolla. Translated from the French by James T. Schleifer. (Indianapolis : Liberty Fund, 2012). Vol. 2., Part Two, Chapter 2 « On individualism in democratic countries ».

[21] I am following here Marc Fumaroli's demonstration found in his preface of La Fontaine, *Fables et contes* ; André Versaille ed., Paris, Robert Laffont, 2017 : the fables are « engaged in a subdued polemic against the official world of devices, and against the monopoly of the Royal State that uses mythology and heroic allegories to camouflage the real motives behind its policies ».

he is the butt of the other animals' frank contempt. And yet he shows himself capable of both being virtuous and acting accordingly. The least of the animals — the fool that is unable to speak, flatter or lie — turns out to be the only one capable of concern for the common good and of sacrificing his own self-interest to it. He is the only one to rise to the occasion in the face of the perils that threaten the whole community, and he is brave enough to voluntarily sacrifice himself, not through fear or obedience or because he wants to please the King, but for the good of all the animals.

Finally, it is important to consider the cause or the end for which the donkey chooses to sacrifice himself, especially given the theme that concerns us all here. We have seen that not only does the donkey not sacrifice himself because of personal ties of loyalty to a sovereign or because his rank demands it, but neither does he do it either for his spiritual or religious salvation or the one of the other animals. Even if his goal is to assuage the wrath of God, at no point does the issue of prayer or hope to go to paradise come up. The donkey does not act as a saint or a martyr would : he is not persecuted by a tyrant or asked to renounce his faith, but his self-sacrifice is chosen freely. The fable, in this regard, makes it plainly clear that this is not a case of martyrdom. Moreover, it is to save the earthly city that the donkey sacrifices himself and, to be more precise, it is for those who are his peers, animals like himself who together make up their society. By evoking acts of self-sacrifice from the distant past and rekindling interest in antique civic heroism in a Christian and monarchical context, the fable accomplishes a veritable tour de force that confers it a canonical status: it combines the abandonment, if not the « demolition », of noble and military forms of heroism[22], together with a democratization of the ability to act exemplarily for the common good—all the while praising the virtue that rests in accomplishing sacrifices for the sake of one's peers and recognizing that animals (and humans) share a common destiny irrespective of their rank or condition. The donkey's sacrifice saves the bear, the fox or the lion indifferently, despite themselves or at least in spite of their lack of gratitude and unjust treatment.

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[22] This turn of phrase is from Paul Bénichou, *Morales du grand siècle*, Paris, Gallimard, 1948.

We can now return to Tocqueville's remark in *Democracy in America* in which he opposes modes of aristocratic self-sacrifice—for the sake of some men—to the modern forms of compassion and solidarity—for the sake of all mankind. It is obviously not a question here of making La Fontaine's fable the direct source of Tocqueville, of opposing morality (for oneself) and politics (for all), but of underlining the significance of the reversal operated by Tocqueville to mark the difference between Old Regime societies (monarchical, aristocratic or oligarchic) and modern democratic societies in the manufacture of causes and, at the same time, in the forms of self-sacrifice to the duties towards others that can or must be carried out there. As a matter of fact, it becomes apparent that this distinction was a *topos* of the historical science of the nineteenth century, a convenient way of describing social relations, types of solidarity, loyalty and engagement depending on the nature of the political regime. Only a few years later, Victor Duruy's *History of the Romans from the earliest times* mentions the « voluntary sacrifice » and the « redemption of the people » through the sacrifice of Marcus Curtius or Decius, by contrast with the « sacrifice of man for the sake of mankind » discussed further on. For him, they constitute on both hands the « essential principle of the feudal system » and the « sacrifice of the citizen for the good of the Graeco-Roman city », respectively[23]. The same turn of phrase can be found in the depiction of Roman Gaul that is given in Antonin Roche's work and is characterized by specific « morals » that combine individual independence with the « sacrifice of man for the sake of mankind[24] ». But even if they share this opposition, neither Roche nor Duruy pursue the same theoretical objectives as Tocqueville does. The later alone seeks to understand what becomes of the forms of self-sacrifice for the sake of others in modern democracies, in which equality of conditions favour the feeling that « the man who lives in democratic countries […] is equal to each » of the other men and therefore of a sense of common humanity[25].

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[23] I quote from the 1857 edition, Paris, Hachette, of État du Monde Romain vers le temps de la Fondation de l'Empire, p. 126.

[24] *Histoire de France, depuis les temps les plus reculés:* Volume one, *Moyen âge*, Paris, 1867, p. 26. The same definition of feudalism as « the self-sacrifice of one man to another » can be found in « L'histoire militaire des Neuchâtelois », *Musée neuchâtelois : recueil d'histoire nationale et d'archéologie : organe de la Société d'histoire du canton de Neuchâtel*, Volume 3, 1865, p. 149; and in Gustave Hubault and Émile Marguerin, *Histoire de France depuis les origines de la Nation jusqu'en 1815*, Paris, 1859, p. 126.

[25] *Democracy in America. English Edition*. op.cit., Vol. 2. First Part, Chapter 2 « Of the Principal Source of Beliefs among Democratic Peoples ».

Tocqueville alone sees in the sacrifice « for humanity's sake » a principle of engagement of the citizen of democratic nations that accomplish supererogatory moral acts as a way for them to compensate the tendency of all to « view everything only in terms of himself alone and to prefer himself to everything[26] » —a way, in short, to bring back into democratic thinking the preoccupations of morality. It is not a coincidence if the term « humanitarian » began to circulate with the meaning that is now our own, combining within the modern concept of « cause » both the civic sacrifice of classical antiquity together with what the Enlightenment considered a just contribution to the happiness of all mankind[27].

To trace the transformation of the term *dévouement* [as devotion, commitment and self-sacrifice] back to Tocqueville, therefore, is not paramount to falling prey to facile interpretations or philological fallacies. Especially since, in the extract mentioned above, he explicitly picked the word *dévouement* with respect to the canonical definitions of the gift of one's person at a time of great peril, which had been given by the classical authors of the first century BCE and had become quasi-unavoidable in any discussion of civic virtue. On the contrary, drawing from conceptual history as well as historical semantics and literary history allows us to understand the question discussed in Tocqueville's chapters and what it owes to the rejuvenating of the Roman *exempla virtutis* and the rapprochement between virtue and *Res Publica* that the Enlightenment operated in defining « humanity » as a concept. His question, simply put, is: what kind of voluntary moral acts can the citizens of modern democracies accomplish when they are first and foremost preoccupied by the pursuit of their own self-interests ? His lexicological and theoretical choices precisely point to what defines, in a democratic context, particular kinds of virtuous acts that cannot be prescribed in the name of duty but are nonetheless praiseworthy : citizens act disinterestedly and are inspired by a love for justice and the desire to contribute to the happiness and well-being of others, their peers and humanity in general. In so doing, they make difficult choices and

[26] Ibid., Vol. 2, Part Two, Chapter 2 « On individualism in democratic countries ».
[27] Yves Lavoinne, *L'humanitaire et les médias*, Presses Universitaires Lyon, 2002, notably p. 9-11; see also the chronology used by Irène Herrmann, *L'humanitaire en questions : réflexions autour de l'histoire du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge*, Paris, Les Éditions du Cerf, 2018.

take risks that are costly to them and, as such, are paramount to self-sacrifice, especially since they are pursued for the sake of anonymous strangers that are remote, literally « others » that they do not know personally but that they make part of their own civic or political agenda[28]. To conclude, therefore, Tocqueville provides us with no less than the first definition of actions that together form what we would recognize today as humanitarian engagement.

[28] There is a rich bibliography about supererogatory acts and self-sacrifice as the motivation behind new forms of militant activism. See also on this subject Olivier Christin, *La cause des autres. Une histoire du dévouement politique,* Paris, PUF, 2021 ; Some suggestions can be found in Michael Maniates, John M. Meyer (eds), *The Environmental Politics of Sacrifice*, MIT Press, 2010, particularly in their common introduction « Must we sacrifice ? Confronting the politics of sacrifice in an ecologically full world ». Interesting remarks in Jacques Rancière, « La cause de l'autre », *Lignes*, 1997, n°30, p. 36-49.

François-Marc-Louis Naville's moral accounting : Education, sense of duty and dedication to society in Geneva at the beginning of the 19th century

Virgil Wibaut-Le Pallac

Il faut habituer l'enfant à entrer en lui-même et à s'observer. Ainsi, en apprenant à se connaître et en acquérant quelque idée du jeu des passions, des qualités qui constituent le caractère, des moyens de modifier ses dispositions intérieures, il se mettra à même de travailler avec fruit à devenir meilleur[1].

By the end of the 18th century, Switzerland had begun to reform its system of public education. Even though some experiences and methods were developed before the 1790s, it was from this date that the cantons took serious steps to improve its educational system in order to educate the masses, turning them into citizens. During the Helvetic Republic (1798-1803), the minister of arts and education, Philipp Albert Stapfer, attempted to substantially modify the education system of the country with the help of Johann Heinrich

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[1] « The child must be accustomed to enter into himself and observe himself. Thus, by learning to know himself and by acquiring some idea of the interplay of passions, of the qualities which constitute character, of the means of modifying his inner dispositions, he will be in a position to work fruitfully to become better », François-Marc-Louis Naville, 1832, p. 60.

Pestalozzi and Father Grégoire Girard, among others[2]. Both these pedagogues implemented the system of mutual education in Switzerland and stressed the importance of civic instruction. Stapfer's pedagogical project ended in 1803, when the Act of Mediation transformed the Helvetic Republic into a Federal state, thus marking the end of a centralised and unified system of public instruction in the country. However, many reformers continued to pursue their reform projects more locally.

Many of these reformers, heirs to the Enlightenment, sought ways to perfect human beings morally, intellectually, and physically through education[3]. The mutual system of teaching was the most prominent of these. Originating in India and developed in England by Andrew Bell and Joseph Lancaster, it was adopted in France by the *Société d'instruction primaire*, and in Switzerland by Johann Pestalozzi in Yverdon, Father Grégoire Girard in Fribourg, and Philipp Emanuel von Fellenberg in Hofwyl[4]. One of its distinctive features was that one teacher could educate many children at once. He would rely on monitors, i.e. children teaching their fellow students, and on a strict discipline. Its main goal was to perfect children by giving them the basic knowledge to be autonomous and to achieve happiness. This goal could not be obtained without teachers constantly addressing pupils' moral character. Indeed, the dedication to the formation of character in school became the means by which the goal of social improvement and citizenship was attained.

When Geneva was integrated as the 22nd canton of Switzerland in 1814, the mutual system of education was already well established,

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[2] Cf. Alexandre Fontaine, *Aux heures suisses de l'école républicaine : un siècle de transferts culturels et de déclinaisons pédagogiques dans l'espace franco-romand*, Paris, Demopolis, 2015, p. 184 ; Biancamaria Fontana, *La république helvétique. Laboratoire de la Suisse moderne*, Lausanne, Presses polytechniques et universitaires, 2020.

[3] Fritz-Peter Hager, « Education, instruction et pédagogie ». In, Michel Delon (dir.), *Dictionnaire européen des Lumières*, Paris, PUF, 1997, p. 371-373; Sylvie Moret Petrini, *Pratiques éducatives familiales et écriture du for privé en Suisse romande (1750-1850)*, Thèse de doctorat, Lausanne, 2016, p. 8-13.

[4] For the history of the mutual system of teaching, cf. Fontaine, *Aux heures suisses de l'école républicaine*, op. cit. ; Sylviane Tinembart, Edward Pahud, *Une innovation pédagogique. Le cas de l'enseignement mutuel aux XIXᵉ siècle*, Neuchâtel, Editions Livreo-Alphil, 2019.

thanks to the work of the scientist Marc-Auguste Pictet. In what follows, we shall examine how François-Marc-Louis Naville conceptualised education as a moral (i.e. ethical and religious) process of dedication to the nation. This chapter shall add new elements on the history of pedagogical systems and, more specifically, on the history of the mutual system in Switzerland.

François-Marc-Louis Naville was a Genevan pedagogue and pastor who founded a young boys' institute in Vernier in 1819. He is best known as the driving force behind the publication of the manuscripts of the French philosopher Pierre Maine de Biran. He died before he could see this project completed : it was left to his son to finish the work[5]. Also well-known is his friendship with the Swiss pedagogue Father Grégoire Girard who was an important influence on Naville's teaching method. Until recently, little attention has been paid to the personal diaries he kept during large parts of his pedagogical career, from 1807 until 1829. As a pedagogue, he was as much concerned with his own personal moral perfection (which was both an ethical and a religious duty) as with that of his pupils and used tools of moral accounting to achieve his objectives[6]. He also used these tools to keep track of the moral character of his pupils in Vernier since, as he explained in his book on public education published in 1832[7], personal improvement *ipso facto* leads to social improvement. Later, in 1839, he published a memoir for the *Société Genevoise d'Utilité Publique* (SGUP) in which he proposed a similar method in order to instil a patriotic sentiment in students and create a sense of duty for the development of a nation[8].

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[5] Pierre Maine de Biran, *Œuvres inédites*, Paris, Dezobry E. Magdeleine, 1859.
[6] Harro Maas, « Monitoring the self : François-Marc-Louis Naville and his moral tables », *History of Science*, Vol. 58(2), 2020, p. 117-141; Maas, Harro. « True Grid : Three Case Studies of Moral Accounting », *East Asian Science, Technology and Society : An International Journal*, n° 14(2), 2020, p. 309-330 ; Moret Petrini, *Pratiques éducatives familiales*, op. cit.
[7] François-Marc-Louis Naville, *De l'éducation publique considérée dans ses rapports avec le développement des facultés, la marche progressive de la civilisation et les besoins actuels de la France*, Paris, Audin, 1832.
[8] François-Marc-Louis Naville, *Mémoire en réponse à la question suivante proposée par la Société Genevoise d'Utilité Publique : Quels moyens pourrait-on employer dans l'enseignement public pour développer dans les élèves l'amour de la patrie suisse ?*, Genève, Imprimerie E. Pelletier, 1839.

Why would the moral education of children necessarily benefit the nation and the general welfare? How does Naville understand the link between the individual and the social spheres ?

I shall defend the hypothesis that education instils a moral sense of duty and dedication in the individual to participate actively in shaping the common good in three sections. Part one analyses Naville's conception of education in his writings. This initiation into Naville's work will help to understand why he developed and used tools of moral accounting to obtain moral perfection for himself and for his students. I shall argue that moral accounting tools can be understood as practical means of self-education. Part two demonstrates that Naville's moral accounting tools, and their use in pedagogical settings, explain how a moral education was an ethical and a religious education of the self, conceived as a process of dedication to God's plan, i.e. the progress of civilisation. Part three explores the practical application of such an education in the Institute of Vernier and explains how they were intended to produce citizens dedicated to society.

Progress, control, and education

Since the integration of the Republic of Geneva as the 22nd canton of Switzerland in 1814, the Geneva elites inaugurated a « helvétisation » process through festivities, philanthropic societies and education[9]. In 1839, Naville submitted a contribution to a competition organised by the SGUP[10] for an essay on the subject of how education could contribute to forming a patriotic national feeling. In his essay, Naville wrote that he could not conceive of how « what is commendable for individuals would not be commendable for nations[11] », thus suggesting a strong link between the moral improvement of the self and the creation of a patriotic sense of duty in the individual. Through education, a child would contract a moral

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[9] Irène Herrmann, *Genève, entre République et canton. Les vicissitudes d'une intégration nationale (1814-1846)*, Genève, Editions passé présent, 2003, p. 360-365.
[10] Société genevoise d'utilité publique.
[11] Naville, *Mémoire*, op. cit., p. 10 : « Je ne comprendrais pas comment ce qui est louable pour les individus ne le serait pas pour les nations ».

obligation to improve his personal self and to actively participate in the perfection of the nation: the better he becomes, the better his chances to help general progress. How did Naville conceptualise education as the link between the self and society ?

Naville ended his pastoral career in Chancy in 1817 to dedicate himself to the education of his eldest son Jean-Louis[12]. In 1819, he decided to create an institute for young boys, first in Chancy, then, shortly after, in Vernier, a small village close to the city of Geneva. The Navilles were an old family of Geneva (accepted into the Bourgeoisie in 1506) and were part of the religious and political intelligentsia of the town[13]. In line with his social position, Naville intended the school to be a small and restricted institute, limited to twenty-five young boys from the best families of Geneva. Some of them were the children of Naville's friends such as Emile Juventin. It was not very surprising that a protestant pastor should create a school for young boys, since in Geneva education was primarily a matter of religion. Outside of the *Collège* and the *Académie*, both founded in 1559 by Calvin, very few schools existed. The *Collège* provided primary instruction, while the *Académie* served for higher education[14]. It was for that reason that the *Société pour l'instruction religieuse de la jeunesse* established three Lancasterian schools in Geneva, more specifically, in Saint-Gervais, la Grenette, and Saint-Antoine, respectively, in 1817, 1819, and 1822[15].

In his *De l'éducation publique*, Naville developed his conception of education and practical teaching methods based on the mutual method of teaching. Education had to develop the intellectual, physical, and moral faculties of the individual through a practical

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[12] Naville explains in detail why he decided to stop his ecclesiastical career in his pastoral journal. Cf. AEG, Archives of the Naville family. Naville XIII-B 1.2/7a-b, *Journal de pastorat.*

[13] Herrmann, *Genève, entre République et canton*, op. cit., p. 35.

[14] Marco Marcacci, *Histoire de l'Université de Genève : 1559-1986*, Genève, Université de Genève, 1987.

[15] Christian Müller, « L'enseignement mutuel à Genève ou l'histoire de l'échec d'une innovation pédagogique en contexte : l'école de Saint-Gervais, 1815-1850 », *Paedagogica Historica*, Vol. 41, N° 1&2, 2005, p. 95-117, p. 102 ; Gabriel Mützenberg, *Genève 1830 : Restauration de l'école*, Lausanne, Editions du Grand-pont, 1974, p. 174.

approach in order to achieve or accelerate the march of civilisation[16]. It ought to « satisfy the needs of man, seen from the dual standpoint of being sensitive and being moral[17] », and it also needed to be of general utility[18]. Education went beyond the simple framework of instruction, for it had to be complete : « If it is important to give children knowledge, it is even more important to develop their faculties; it is on this development that the perfection of man essentially depends. [...] His faculties are the first element of his happiness[19] ». For Naville, perfectibility was an essence given by God, but educating oneself was also a social and a political concern. The individual, who is the member of a republic or a monarchy, has both political rights and duties :

> The man who belongs to a society organised for the general good must, even if he is not called upon to perform any public function in his country, have some idea of the constitution by which he is governed, and which is the guarantee of his rest and liberty ; *he must grasp the bases of this order by virtue of which a partial and momentary sacrifice to the common good becomes, for the very person who makes it, a reason for security and a permanent cause of well-being,* [...] embracing, to the fullest extent, *the duties imposed by the title of citizen*[20].

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[16] The complete title of Naville's book is : *De l'éducation publique considérée dans ses rapports avec le développement des facultés, la marche progressive de la civilisation et les besoins actuels de la France*.

[17] Naville, D*e l'éducation publique*, op. cit., p. 19 : « satisfaire aux besoins de l'homme, envisagés sous le double rapport d'être sensible et d'être moral » [all translations from French to English have been completed by the author].

[18] Ibid., p. 9.

[19] Ibid., p. 52 : « [s]'il importe de donner aux enfans [sic] des connaissances, il importe encore plus de développer leurs facultés ; c'est de ce développement que dépend essentiellement la perfection de l'homme. [...] ses facultés sont le premier élément de son bonheur ».

[20] Ibid., p. 27-28 : « L'homme qui appartient à une société organisée en vue du bien général doit, lors même qu'il n'est appelé à remplir dans son pays aucune fonction publique, avoir quelque idée de la constitution par laquelle il est régi, et qui est la garantie de son repos et de sa liberté ; *il doit saisir les bases de cet ordre en vertu duquel un sacrifice partiel et momentané au bien commun devient, pour celui même qui le fait, un motif de sécurité et une cause permanente de bien-être,* [...] embrasser, dans toute leur étendue, *les devoirs qu'impose le titre de citoyen* » (my highlighting). Also, cf. Ibid., p. 10.

Therefore, education must prepare the child to embrace its role as a citizen. To that purpose, Naville added the development of patriotic sentiments to his education system. Naville's definition of patriotism centred on three points[21]. Firstly, he established the love for the country's geography, its countryside, its rivers, its mountains, and so on. Secondly, he expanded this love to the population and the history of the nation. Geography and history were two key subjects in the education of young patriotic children. The third principle of patriotic love was « the political life, the role that one is called upon to play in the administration of the country. One becomes attached by habit, by self-esteem and by a sense of duty to the things one is involved in[22] ». This attachment to a patriotic education can be explained by the will of the Genevan elite to be fully integrated into their new nation. It also underlines, once again, the emphasis on the political value of education.

Nonetheless, even though the development of the child's faculties should lead him to emancipation as a human being and a citizen, there was no question of social mobility[23]. Indeed, Naville conceived of an education for the rich classes and an education for the poor classes that should enable everyone to develop within his social environment. Naville speaks of a « ladder of social utility » defined by nature, i.e. by God, where the rich classes must govern the poor classes and society. Those destined to rule ought to be intellectually and morally irreproachable : they had to live up to their social position. There was therefore a social hierarchy determined by the nature and usefulness of the individual :

> The common needs of mankind are modified according to the social position and expected career of individuals. There is a certain degree of education and development of faculties which all men have a strong interest in acquiring, just as there are also limits beyond which the self-evident interest of certain

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[21] Naville, *Mémoire*, op. cit.

[22] Ibid., p. 30 : « la vie politique, le rôle que l'on est appelé à jouer dans l'administration du pays. On s'attache par habitude, par amour-propre et par le sentiment du devoir aux choses dont on s'occupe ».

[23] Naville, *De l'éducation publique*, op. cit., p. 33, for instance.

classes prescribes that their intellectual culture should not be developed[24].

This does not prevent the farmer or the worker from accessing education and achieving happiness. However, it would be dangerous for them, and therefore for society, to overstep what they are destined for, thereby creating their own misfortune. Furthermore, it seemed essential to Naville that these lower classes should not be left ignorant, otherwise they could be subjected to those who hold knowledge or claim to hold it, which is an additional risk of revolt and revolution. Therefore, Naville tries to state a middle ground between emancipation and subjection, called autonomy[25]. This can be demonstrated by the traumatic events of the French Revolution in Switzerland.

Naville lived through the French Revolution ; his uncle François-André Gallatin-Naville, member of the *Conseil*, had been judged by a revolutionary tribunal and executed in 1794. Naville also experienced the invasion of Geneva by the French armies, its occupation and integration to the French territory (Geneva became part of the *Département du Léman* from 1798 until 1813) and its liberation by Austrian troops[26]. All these events were traumatic for the Genevan people at large, not just the elite[27]. Naville wrote about the Revolution :

> Once, shaken by an anarchy of opinions which shook all beliefs, torn by a revolution which left such painful traces, then intoxi-

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[24] Ibid., 1832, p. 9 : « Les besoins communs à l'humanité se modifient d'après la position sociale et la carrière présumées des individus. Il est un certain degré d'instruction et de développement des facultés que tous les hommes ont un intérêt puissant à acquérir, comme il est aussi des limites au-delà desquelles l'intérêt bien entendu de certaines classes prescrit de ne pas porter leur culture intellectuelle ». Also, cf. Ibidem, p. 39 : « Mais la providence a mis elle-même ici-bas des bornes au développement intellectuel de la masse des hommes; et de l'inégalité des esprits, il résultera dans les progrès des élèves une différence qui devra décider du choix de leur vocation ».

[25] Ibid., p. 34.

[26] In his pastoral journal, Naville mentions at multiple times that the privations due to the conscription and the presence of the Austrian troops were hard to bear for the population of Chancy. Cf. AEG, Archives of the Naville family. Naville XIII-B 1.2/7b, *Journal Pastoral*.

[27] Herrmann, *Genève entre République et canton*, op. cit., p. 60 *;* Müller, « L'enseignement mutuel à Genève », art. cit., p. 101.

cated by a glory which it has imprinted in bloody characters in all the lands where its banners have flown; now confronted with a host of memories and interests which conspire to hinder her in the new paths in which civilisation has led her, and in which the heroic population of her capital [Paris] has maintained her, she demands from public education the guarantees which alone can ensure her rest and her true glory. It asks that fixed principles of conduct, love of order, mutual tolerance and the firm intention of sacrificing to the general good the interests and resentments which might divide them are deeply imprinted in the hearts of its citizens[28].

The vocabulary Naville employed described the French Revolution of 1789 in the harshest terms. The revolutionary armies left pain and blood in their wake everywhere they went. Even the liberation was a difficult moment for the city[29]. But it was not just the military aspect that was terrible: Geneva lost its independence and autonomy in 1798 and could not regain it. To avoid any future revolution, Naville saw only one solution : public instruction as the guarantee of the social order determined by God. The individual had limited faculties binding him to a social class, to a specific trade. To educate the masses meant to improve their moral feelings and behaviour as well as their basic knowledge, so that they could remain in their social condition. Through their perfection, their work would improve and the whole of society could benefit from it. However, it was not simply by improving the instruction of the masses that this result could be

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[28] Naville, *De l'éducation publique*, op. cit., p. 8-9 : « Naguère, bouleversée par une anarchie d'opinions qui a ébranlé toutes les croyances, déchirée par une révolution qui a laissé des traces si douloureuses, puis enivrée d'une gloire qu'elle a imprimée en caractères de sang dans toutes les contrées où ont flotté ses étendards ; maintenant en butte à une foule de souvenirs et d'intérêts qui conspirent pour l'entraver dans les voies nouvelles où la civilisation l'a conduite, et où la population héroïque de sa capitale l'a maintenue, elle réclame de l'instruction publique les garanties qui seules peuvent assurer son repos et sa véritable gloire. Elle lui demande d'imprimer profondément dans le cœur de ses citoyens des principes fixes de conduite, l'amour de l'ordre, une tolérance mutuelle, et la ferme intention de sacrifier au bien général les intérêts et les ressentimens [sic] qui pourraient les diviser » ; see also, Ibid., p. 242-243.
[29] Herrmann, *Genève entre République et canton*, op. cit., p. 113-116.

expected, but by a complete education which could be summarised as : « the means to give pupils the habit and the taste for work[30] ».

Finally, the overall well-being of society depended on the personal happiness of the individual, i.e. a stable order, a quiet society without even the thought of revolution. In fact, Naville considered happiness to be not just a personal accomplishment, but the very foundation of the order of society. The « political regeneration[31] » Naville talks about was nothing more than a very conservative view of society. This could be attained through an education that would allow the progress and the emancipation of the individual strictly within very specific limitations — intellectual and social. Thus, education needed to provide for the personal development of the individual and a better understanding of his needs, while at the same time making him sufficiently aware of the multiple stakes of life in society and of the progress of civilisation, so that he might be able to put himself at the service of general well-being. This way, education had to teach the children how to « enter into himself and to observe himself[32] ».

Moral accounting and self-perfection

Even though educating the masses was important, educating oneself was primordial. Indeed, the autonomy and the emancipation of the individual Naville discussed in his book on education were not just the expected results of public instruction, they were also the means. Education must provide a guide to children to govern their lives, making themselves their own teachers, responsible for their well-being. The mutual system of education, very liberal in its conception[33], was already a good way to place the children in a responsible position towards their fellow students and themselves. In fact, they could be selected to become monitors, i.e. assistants to the teacher, giving lessons to the other children or, for example, they

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[30] Naville, *De l'éducation publique*, op. cit., p. 4 : « les moyens de donner aux élèves l'habitude et le goût du travail ».
[31] Ibid., p. 243.
[32] Ibid., p. 60 : « entrer en lui-même et à s'observer ».
[33] Fontaine, *Aux heures suisses de l'école républicaine*, op. cit., p. 42 ; Tinembart, *Une innovation pédagogique*, op. cit., p. 156.

could be in charge of school tribunals[34]. Naville added a different tool for the self-tuition of the child: moral accounting. Both moral accounting and education were tools to create good habits, both necessitated a good self-analysis and helped to acquire moral perfection and therefore happiness.

In a manuscript[35], probably used for a lecture in his institute, Naville explained what he thought moral perfection was. The manuscript began with the following sentence : « It is by fulfilling our duties that we can make ourselves pleasing to God and acquire eternal happiness. Among these duties is the work of perfection, which, moreover, is the guarantee of the other [duties][36] ». He explained more precisely his thoughts in one of his many manuscripts on morality : « Morality has principles, the source of our duties. The principles are within us, prepared by the Creator in our souls, independently of any external motive[37] ». Therefore, for Naville, moral perfection was an ethical and a religious duty which only a deep and truthful self-knowledge could fulfil[38]. However, it was not selfish, since duties to God included also benevolence, a key concept for Naville[39]. He described benevolence [*bienveillance*] as « an inclination to want the greatest good for those around us[40] ». Moral perfection must be acquired by oneself, but not in isolation. Rather, through moral perfection, Naville also meant helping one's neighbour: « by the feeling of *benevolence*. The usefulness we can bring to others is proportionate to the development of our own faculties[41] ». The better one's self, the more one could help others and fulfil the duty to serve God's plan, i.e.

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[34] Fontaine, *Aux heures suisses de l'école républicaine*, op. cit., p. 36.

[35] AEG, Archives of the Naville family. Naville XIII-B 3.21/6a, *Perfectionnement moral*.

[36] Ibid., « *C'est par l'accomplissement de nos devoirs que nous pouvons nous rendre agréables à Dieu et acquérir le bonheur éternel. Entre ces devoirs est le travail de perfectionnement, lequel d'ailleurs est la garantie des autres* » [underlined by Naville].

[37] BGE, fonds François-Marc-Louis Naville, Ms. fr. 5590 fol. 7 : « La morale a des principes, source de nos devoir. Les principes son ten nous, prepares par le Créateur dans nos âmes, indépendamment de tout motif extérieur ».

[38] Naville, *De l'éducation publique*, op. cit., p.60.

[39] Maas, « Monitoring the self », art. cit., p. 138.

[40] Cf. BGE, Ms. fr. 5590, fol. 7 : « penchant à vouloir le plus grand bien de ceux qui nous entourent ».

[41] AEG, Archives of the Naville family. Naville XIII-B 3.21/6a, fol 3. : « par le sentiment de la *bienveillance*. L'utilité dont nous pouvons être aux autres se proportionne au développement de nos facultés » [underlined by Naville].

fulfil one's duties to imitate God and to work for the progress of the well-being of human society. In other words, one should be devoted to God and dedicated to society.

Naville's endorsement of the Lancasterian system coincided with implementing a specific tool he first used for himself to improve his moral, intellectual, and physical faculties : Marc-Antoine Jullien's moral thermometer or *Biomètre*. Marc-Antoine Jullien was a French pedagogue and initiator of « comparative education » in the first half of the 19th century[42]. He was much influenced by the Swiss pedagogues Johan Heinrich Pestalozzi and Philip Emmanuel von Fellenberg, for whom monitoring systems were an important element of their pedagogical reform programs. In 1808, following his work on education[43], he published a small book entitled *Essai sur l'emploi du tems* [*sic*] *ou méthode qui a pour objet de bien régler l'emploi du tems*[44]. In his introduction he explained he had developed the *Biomètre*[45] when he was in the revolutionary army, and he intended it for the education of his own children. Stimulated by its positive reception, even outside of France, Jullien produced further publications on his *Biomètre*, either in separate works (such as his *Horaire ou Thermomètre d'emploi du tems*[46]) or in increasingly lengthy versions of his original essay[47]. Actually, the *Biomètre* was only a small part of Jullien's system of education, for he suggested using a *Mémorial analytique*, a sort of personal diary where the user could describe his

[42] On the life of Marc-Antoine Jullien, cf. Marie-Claude Delieuvin, *Marc-Antoine Jullien, de Paris, 1775-1848 : théoriser et organiser l'éducation*, Paris, l'Harmattan, 2003 ; Pierre Vargas, « L'héritage de Marc-Antoine Jullien, de Paris à Moscou », *Annales historiques de la Révolution française*, n° 301, 1995, p. 409-431.

[43] Marc-Antoine Julien, *Essai général d'éducation physique, morale et intellectuelle, suivi d'un plan d'éducation-pratique pour l'enfance, l'adolescence et la* jeunesse, Paris, Didot, 1808.

[44] Marc-Antoine Jullien, *Essai sur une méthode qui a pour objet de bien régler l'emploi du tems, premier moyen d'être heureux : à l'usage des jeunes gens de l'âge de 16 à 25 ans : extrait d'un travail général, plus étendu, sur l'éducation*, Paris, Didot Firmin, 1808.

[45] For an explanation of how Jullien's *Biomètre* works, see Philippe Lejeune, « Marc-Antoine Jullien : Controlling time », in Arianne Baggerman, Rudolf Dekker, Michael Mascuch (ed.), *Controlling time and shaping the self*, Leiden, Brill, 2011, p. 95-119.

[46] Marc-Antoine Jullien, *Mémorial Horaire ou Thermomètre d'Emploi du Tems*, Milan, Imprimerie royale, 1813.

[47] Marc-Antoine Jullien, *Essai sur l'emploi du temps ou méthode qui a pour objet de bien régler l'emploi du temps, premier moyen d'être heureux : destiné spécialement à l'usage des jeunes gens de 15 à 25 ans*, Paris, Dondey-Dupré, 1824.

days at any length, and an *Agenda general* divided into six booklets for every aspect of one's life[48]. The *Biomètre* served only as summary. It offered all the information necessary for the governance of one's life in a glance. In one chart, the individual could see if he spent too much time in the theatre or if he slept too much, so he knew where he had to correct himself. Therefore, moral accounting was a tool for a new kind of self-governance, i.e. an instrument of self-cultivation, aiding ethical behaviour by establishing good habits of introspection.

How François-Marc-Louis Naville and Marc-Antoine Jullien came to know each other is unclear, but according to their correspondence[49], they met in Chancy in 1817, during the tour Jullien made to complete his book on comparative education in Switzerland. He stayed at Naville's house for a while, and there they may have talked about education and morality. In a letter dated 12th July 1817[50], he asked for Naville's help in describing the elementary schools in Geneva. He also gave him a *Biomètre* with all the instructions needed for its use.

Naville modified and somewhat complicated Jullien's *Biomètre*, which concentrated on the physical, moral, intellectual, and social categories of one's personal life. In the years 1819-1820 he used an elaborated version that also included anagogical and pastoral categories[51]. Each of the major categories was subdivided into a certain number of columns. Each of them corresponded to a specific activity, for a total of fifty-one columns. For example, column 4 was for « *sommeil* », sleep, whereas column 15 was for « *Allemand* », learning German. Each row represented a day of the month, and each chart covered two full weeks. Naville filled in the boxes with the amount of time he spent on each activity. We can see in column 4 for « *sommeil* » that Naville indicated on 1st January that he slept for seven hours. If we were to do the maths for 1st January, we would see that Naville used all of the twenty-four hours of the day available to him. In addition, there are boxes that are filled in with symbols, letters or even a short sentence, such as columns 9, 12, 26, 32, 37, 44, and 51 « *r* » (it might stand for « *résultat* », result,

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[48] Lejeune, « Marc-Antoine Jullien », art. cit., p. 98.
[49] Three personal letters are kept in : BGE, fonds François-Marc-Louis Naville, CH BGE - Ms. fr. 5534, f. 96-100.
[50] Ibid., f. 96-97.
[51] AEG, Archives of the Naville family. Naville XIII B-1.2/10, *Agenda moral 1819-1820*.

or for « *retard* », being late) ending every category, or the final columns 49 « *exa* » for « *examen moral* », moral examination, and 50 « *H* » for « *historique* », review. The column « *r* » is filled in with four letters — *p*, *b*, *m*, and *o* — which indicated if a task was completed, partly completed, not completed, or not completed because of external causes[52]. The column « *exa* » probably had the same purpose as the column « *r* » but stood for the whole day instead. Finally, the column « *H* » was used to recall any important event occurred during the day.

For his tables to function as a moral compass, Naville had to fix temporal goals and fill in the grid to see if he was right on course. He had different agendas helping him to set his objectives. As to precisely how he filled in the chart, we must assume that he had a notebook and a portable clock along with him. As a protestant pastor, he was much concerned about the use of his time, for he considered it as the most precious gift given by God[53]. The *Biomètre* allowed Naville to ensure that the twenty-four hours of the day were fully devoted to his moral perfection. If they were not, at least he could see at a glance where he had to improve himself.

In contrast to Jullien, who was mostly concerned with an economic way of keeping track of his time, Naville rejected the thought of the political economists of his time for he considered that they were only promoting self-love[54]. He developed moral accounting tools in order to help him fulfil his duties towards God : moral perfection as the basis for civilisation :

> With regard to feelings and conduct, let us hasten to pay a glowing tribute to a civilisation which is growing under the tutelary guidance of the Christian religion. It perfects social sense, it tends to make reason, which unites men, prevails over the prejudices that divide them, the feeling of humanity over

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[52] Maas, « Monitoring the self », art. cit., p. 136.

[53] Max Engammare, *L'ordre du temps. L'invention de la ponctualité au XVIème siècle*, Genève, Droz, 2004.

[54] Maas, « Monitoring the self », art. cit., p. 138; Naville, *De l'éducation publique*, op. cit., p. 14.

partial affections, and thus to accomplish, in an essential respect, the holy work of the Gospel[55].

Consequently, Naville educated his pupils religiously and morally so as to make them good citizens promoting the « work of the Gospel ».

Moral education at Vernier

In his institute in Vernier, Naville used the Lancasterian mutual system of education and his moral tables to facilitate the physical, intellectual, and moral education of his young students. Instead of teaching hundreds of poor people, he had charge of twenty-five children from the elite Genevan families. This limited number of pupils allowed Naville to maintain a strong discipline and a strict control over the children's behaviour as well as an orientation to religious and moral education : « Happy is the child whose education is under the tutelary guidance of these touching inspirations, in whose soul the so-called secular studies serve to develop a knowledge of God and duty and a true attachment to all things honest[56] ».

As explained above, the mutual system of teaching allowed the teacher to rely on advanced students who could teach the other children, the monitors. Hence, the lessons were not vertical but rather horizontal, encouraging dialogue between pupils, guided by the teacher. Reflection and judgement were considered superior to mere memory. The system also promoted the autonomy and emancipation of the young children by giving them, within the walls of the school, legislative or executive prerogatives[57]. In the

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[55] Naville, *De l'éducation publique*, op. cit., p. 13 : « Sous le rapport des sentimens [sic] et de la conduite, hâtons-nous d'abord de rendre un éclatant hommage à une civilisation qui grandit sous la direction tutélaire de la religion chrétienne. Elle perfectionne le sens social, elle tend à faire prédominer la raison, qui unit les hommes, sur les préjugés qui les divisent, le sentiment de l'humanité sur les affections partiales, et à accomplir ainsi, sous un rapport essentiel, l'œuvre sainte de l'évangile ».

[56] Ibid., p. 51 : « Heureux l'enfant dont l'éducation se fait sous la direction tutélaire de ces inspirations touchantes, dans l'âme duquel les études qu'on nomme profanes servent à développer la connaissance de Dieu et du devoir, et un véritable attachement à toutes les choses honnêtes ! ».

[57] Tinembart, *Une innovation pédagogique*, op. cit.

Vernier Institute, for instance, a « *Conseil des élèves* » enacted all the laws and the regulation of the school. It constituted one third of the pupils[58]. Moreover, there was a tribunal composed of three children in charge of punishing bad behaviour, or sometimes, the student's bad results. Fines were the common punishment and half the money collected served to finance a « *Société de bienfaisance* » directed by Naville. The other half served to finance scholarly trips. Responsibility, autonomy and discipline worked hand-in-hand in Naville's educational system. The Institute worked as a precursor to civic life to instil citizenship into the young children.

To complement his system, Naville kept track of the morality and results of every single child he was in charge of. In addition to his religious teaching, which consisted of various sermons given by Naville and a course on biblical history, Naville kept moral registers of which two remain in his archives, for the years 1819[59] and 1820[60]. Every child had a weekly evaluation of his character and behaviour which was logged in the moral registry because Naville considered behaviour to be an exterior sign of morality[61]. It is a chart that registers every fault for every category listed horizontally for the student Desgouttes. For example, in the column « *bab* ». (which stands for « *babillage* » in French or « chitchat » in English) it is noted that Desgouttes chatted twice during the week of 8th March. If the pupil's conduct was sufficiently adequate, and his work good enough, he would receive a « *bonne* », a reward. These weekly evaluations allowed Naville to keep track of the amelioration or the degradation of the student's moral character. As for the use of time, Naville produced precise schedules for every classroom.

These moral registers also mentioned a daily « *grabeau moral* » that was discussed in communal settings every trimester. There is not much information on how these meetings were conducted. We assume each student had to talk about his « *grabeau* » and was submitted to the general judgement of the class. These « *grabeaux* »

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[58] AEG, Archives of the Naville family. Naville Inst. 1.21/1a, *Recueil des lois et règlements de l'institut de Vernier.*
[59] AEG, Archives of the Naville family. Naville Inst. 1.21/5, *Registres moraux 1819.*
[60] AEG, Archives of the Naville family. Naville Inst. 1.21/6, *Registres moraux 1820.*
[61] AEG, Archives of the Naville family. Naville Inst. 1.1/6a, *Sur l'Institut Vernier*, p. 26.

were an old tradition of the Genevan educational system. It was already in place in the 18th century in the *Académie* and the *Collège*. They were the equivalent of the present-day school reports and were written by the teacher on every student. The professor registered acquisition of knowledge, behaviour, and possible profit the Geneva Republic could hope to receive from each pupil[62]. It was also a political tradition, since, in Geneva, it had the sense of voting. Littré's dictionary notes that the word came from the old French term « *grabeler* », which meant to examine, to review. It was used as a form of evaluation of the political members of the various Councils in Geneva[63].

Unfortunately, so far, I have not found any « *grabeau moral* » in the Institute's archives. In a presentation of the teaching method applied in the Vernier Institute, Naville mentioned that pupils had to practice self-examination of their moral character when they arrived at the Institute in order to discover their main passion[64]. This moral examination allowed the pupil to understand what had to be improved, but it was his personal duty to find how to achieve this. We may conjecture that Naville's usage of the *grabeau* differed from the other educational establishments in Geneva. It might be of a similar use as the *Biomètre*, i.e. registering the moral, intellectual, physical and social faculties of the student. Nevertheless, we do not know what was registered and how. It could have been the use of time for each category and activity, or it could have been used as a diary. What is certain is that the Vernier Institute served to educate the future citizen by making him aware of both his civic duties and his moral obligations towards himself and others.

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[62] Moret Petrini, *Pratiques éducatives familiales*, op. cit., p. 87 and p. 210.

[63] Emile Littré, *Dictionnaire de la langue française*, Paris, Typographie Lahure, p. 1907, « grabeau » ; see also Louis Gauchat, Jules Jeanjaquet, Ernest Tappolet, *Glossaire des patois de la Suisse romande*, Genève, Droz, 1924, Tome VIII, p. 569, « grabeau ».

[64] AEG, Archives of the Naville family. Naville Inst. 1.1/6a, *Sur l'institut Vernier*, p. 26-28.

Conclusion

Through the analysis of the work of François-Marc-Louis Naville, we have tried to move towards to an understanding of education as a process of dedication in Geneva in the beginning of the 19th century. The peculiar moral accounting system Naville used in his diaries was a specific tool for self-education, using charts for the purpose of physical, intellectual, and moral self-improvement. However, it was not a selfish endeavour, since self-improvement was the necessary basis for the progress of civilisation, for guiding humanity to happiness. Thus, although this article surveys a case study from the beginning of the 19th century, I believe it represents the tip of the iceberg of a political and social scheme for the restoration movements in Switzerland which utilised public education as a form of dedication to society.

Progressing civilisation was a moral, in the sense of ethical and religious, duty imposed by God. The negative impact of the French Revolution also made it a political duty.

Naville considered public education to be the fundamental link between the individual and social spheres, between morality and politics. To attain political regeneration, it was important that education achieved intellectual, physical, and moral improvement in the students by guiding them towards adopting good habits of introspection. Furthermore, education in the Vernier Institute prepared the young Genevan elite pupils for their civic duties. Public education was therefore intended to teach self-instruction to create benevolent citizens devoted to the general well-being.

Solidarity and charity around early Carlism (1833-1845)

Andrés María Vicent[1]

The most recent historiography of the age of revolutions (1750-1850) often uses the word « solidarity[2] ». This phenomenon is linked to the fact that this scholarship is at pains to write history without a national(istic) perspective. Transnational communities are one of the favourite objects of this literature. The modern meaning of solidarity refers to the social virtue that seeks the good of others, based on a sympathy in which there exists a sense of unity beyond an apparent separation. In the case of these transnational communities, it was a solidarity that existed beyond nations[3]. The outcome of this perspective has been very fruitful. For instance, following this scholarship, it is clear that there are a number of reasons to state that the Italian Risorgimento was not only Italian. It is just one among the many topics that have been « transnationalised » or « globalised » in recent times[4]. The connection, friendship, alliance, empathy, sympathy and collaboration among revolutionaries all over the world

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[1] This text was presented, written, and submitted when the author was Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute. In the timespan between its submission and the final corrections and publication, his employer and first affiliation has become the Universidad de Salamanca as María Zambrano Fellow. Contact : andres. vicent@usal.es

[2] Some examples : Gabriel Paquette, *Imperial Portugal in the Age of Revolutions, The Luso-Brazilian World, c. 1770-1850.* Cambridge : University Press, 2013. p. 6, 8, 106, 142, 232, 264, 306, 312 ; Juan Luis Simal, « Letters from Spain : The 1820 Revolution and the Liberal International » in Maurizio Isabella and Konstantina Zanou (eds.), *Mediterranean Diasporas. Politics and Ideas in the Long 19th Century*, Specifically : p. 26, 32 and 36.

[3] Carol C. Gould, « Transnational Solidarities », *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 38/1 (2007), p. 148-164.

[4] Maurizio Isabella, *Risorgimento in exile. The Italian refugees and the liberal international*¸ Oxford : OUP, 2009.

is frequently designated as « solidarity », « political solidarity » or « revolutionary solidarity ». However, the term « solidarity » is not very abundant in contemporary sources. The term started its conquest of the public speaking with the French Revolution and by the middle of the nineteenth century was already quite established in the political vocabulary[5]. Yet, other words were employed more often to express those engagements. For example, Italian revolutionaries used to speak about the Greek revolution with the vocabulary related to family. The concept of « fraternity » was more popular than solidarity, and frequently both were used together[6].

In these pages, I focus on early Carlism. Like many other political cultures of the time, Carlists benefited from an array of foreign commitments and contributions that were explained with a rhetoric of dedication. The text is divided into five parts. Firstly, I will summarise « early Carlism » and what it was. Secondly, I offer some thoughts about the engagement of various monarchies with the Carlists. In the third part, I deal with the popular subscriptions published in France to help Carlist refugees. Next, I briefly explain the military volunteerism of some foreigners in the Carlist army. Finally, I provide a concluding summary and emphasise why it is worth considering the dedications regarding Carlism.

Early Carlism from a European perspective (1833-1845)

In 1833, a civil war broke out in Spain. This war is now remembered as the First Carlist War (1833-1840)[7]. The *casus belli* was succession to the Spanish throne. The death of the king Fernando VII had led to a political division similar to that in Portugal (1828) and France (1830). The king's daughter Isabel was supported by the liberals and some among the Royalist reformers, whereas her uncle Carlos stood for the counterrevolutionaries. Thus, Carlism was a Spanish Legitimism. In spite of its commonalities with other European legitimisms, it had

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5   Wolfgang Schmale, « European solidarity : a semantic history », *European Review of History*, 24 (2017), p. 854-888.
6   Isabella, *Risorgimento in exil,* op. cit., p. 89-91.
7   Mark Lawrence, *Spain's First Carlist War*, London : Palgrave, 2015.

some specific roots. Carlism was also one of the consequences of the dissolution of the Catholic Monarchy, a dissolution completed precisely during this war. A clear milestone was the parliamentary agreement to proceed to the recognition of the independence of the American territories by the Spanish monarchy in 1836 ; the most visible fruit of this dissolution was the emergence of a series of new nation-states. We can regard Spain as the last of these new nation-states. In this sense, the First Carlist War was the war through which Spanish liberals achieved the independence of the Spanish national sovereignty from the Catholic Monarchy. The Carlists, instead, were the partisans for the continuity of the old monarchy. This monarchy was not only a political regime, but also a global power and an alternative cultural community to commercial empires. However, if we can state that the Catholic Monarchy expired during the First Carlist War, it is difficult to sustain that such an empire still thrived in 1833 : most of their territories were de facto politically separated, and essential reforms in line with the Napoleonic model had already been implemented in the previous decade[8].

Since 1808, when the French army entered the Iberian Peninsula, the Catholic Monarchy no longer played a role in international politics. Precisely because of its refusal to accept this new subordinated position, Spain was the only country not to sign the treaty of Vienna in 1815. This reluctance to join the Vienna agreement was not the only exceptional behaviour of Spain on the international stage.

In the years before the First Carlist War, there were two issues that were constantly mentioned in relation to the Spanish monarchy, when comparing it to the rest of post-revolutionary Europe : amnesty and debt. This double question was related to the Liberals that were in power from 1820 to 1823. After their defeat in 1823, they were politically persecuted and their financial engagements abroad, the sovereign debt that they had commercialised, were repudiated by the absolutist government of Fernando VII. The two topics were highly connected : the forgiveness of former enemies and the acceptance of their spending.

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[8] Jean-Philippe Luis, *L'utopie réactionnaire. Épuration et modernisation de l'État dans l'Espagne de la fin de l'Ancien Régime (1823-1834),* Madrid : Casa de Velázquez, 2003. Juan Pro, *La construcción del estado en España. Una historia del siglo XIX*, Madrid : Alianza, 2019.

The coveted amnesty inspired a discourse that excluded Spain from European civilisation, something that had already been defended in many texts during the Enlightenment. The acceptance of the debt followed the same path to a certain extent, as stated in a booklet published in London : « the Spanish Government, and the Spanish Loans form the only exception[9] ». This conversation did not only take place amongst foreigners. The exile of Liberals and Bonapartists from Spain resulted in a deep *tête-à-tête* regarding political and economic systems in other countries. Beyond intellectual influence, exile created a political and financial network which was very influential during the war[10]. Even before the war, some conspiracies to invade Spain and restore liberalism were paid for by unpaid creditors. Cabinets and bankers in Britain and France supported Isabel, partly because the repayment of debt relied on her success[11].

Spain was seen as a risk to the equilibrium resulting from the Congress of Vienna in 1815. From 1820 to 1833, Spain threatened that system of security twice, firstly with a liberal revolution, secondly with a legitimist rebellion. In 1820, the Spanish liberal revolution was replicated in Portugal, Naples and Piedmont. A new French invasion put an end to Spanish liberalism in 1823. The preliminaries to this intervention followed the rhetoric and protocols initiated in Vienna. The Carlist rebellion of 1833 was contemplated again as a matter of European security in which economic and geopolitical interests were at stake. However, European politics had shifted in 1830, thanks to the July revolution, which involved a division among the former partners of the Vienna agreement. During the First Carlist War, this division was evoked thousands of times in Spain and abroad. On the one side were the so-called « powers of the north » (Austria, Prussia and Russia) and

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[9] *A Word on the Spanish Córtes Loans and the claims of the bondholders.* London : James Ridway, 1833, p. 6. Juan Pan-Montojo and J. L. Simal, « Exil, finances et construction de l'État : les libéraux et joséphins espagnols (1813-1851) », *Revue d'histoire du XIXe siècle* 53, 2016. p. 59-77.

[10] *Spain, its government and policy, its loans and resources considered, with reference to the claims of its foreign creditors*, London, Ridway, 1839. p. 2.

[11] Juan Luis Simal, « *Strange means of Governing* : The Spanish Restoration in European Perspective (1813-1820) », *Journal of Modern European History,* 15 (2017), p. 197-220. Juan Luis Simal and Darina Martykanova, « Ferdinand and the Sultan. The Metaphor of the Turk and the Crisis of the Spanish Monarchy in the Early Nineteenth Century », *Contributions to the History of Concepts,* 10/1 (2015), p. 1-26.

the « maritime powers » of Britain and France were on the other. The former were regarded as proponents of a royalist Europe, while the latter as the promoters of parliamentary monarchies[12]. In this division, civil strife in Spain was perceived as a sort of proxy war.

The European press paid a great deal of attention to the Spanish conflict ; financial and political interests were at issue. Furthermore, European readers had been introduced to Spanish affairs during the Peninsular War. Stories of « guerrillas » and romantic memoirs of British and French combatants were very popular[13]. The Spanish revolutionary regime of 1820, its defeat and subsequent exile, had reignited the interest of this public. Legitimist uprisings had also taken place in France and Portugal on the eve of the Carlist rebellion, so « the royalists of every country » were also paying particular attention to the situation in Spain[14]. This array of reasons converted the First Carlist War into a European question[15].

Carlists succeeded in controlling the mountain and rural areas of an important part of the Basque Provinces and Navarre, and a few small areas of Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon. They tried to expand this small and fragmentary kingdom to other regions of the peninsula by organising military expeditions, which led Carlist troops around Spain. In 1837, the greatest expedition was headed by Don Carlos himself and was intended to end the war. However, this attempt to conquer Madrid or to reach an agreement with a section of the Isabelites failed. Guerrilla warfare was the main military strategy of Carlists and, thanks to their geographical distribution, they were usually identified with the Basque Provinces and Navarre. At some point, Carlists assumed the defence of the Basque and Navarrese franchises, the territorial law, as a part

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[12] Roger Bullen, « The Great Powers and the Iberian Peninsula, 1815-1848 » in Alan Sked (ed.), *Europe's Balance of Power, 1815-1848*, London, Macmillan, 1979. p. 122-144.

[13] Matilda Greig, *Dead men telling tales. Napoleonic War Veterans and the Military Memoir Industry, 1808-1914*, Oxford, UP, 2021. Especially, Chapter 3.

[14] The quote was used by several Legitimist authors. It can be found in Alfred Nettement, *Exposition royaliste (1789-1842)*, Paris, Bureau de la Mode, 1842 ; or specifically referred to Spain in : Armand de Durfort, *Révélations d'un militaire français sur les agraviados d'Espagne ou sont dévoilés les véritables causes de l'insurrection de la Catalogne en 1827*, Paris, Levavasseur, 1829. p. 123.

[15] Holly Case, *The age of questions*. Princeton University Press, 2018.

of their political project. Apart from this, one of the core features of Carlism was its identification with the ultramontane clergy being the majority of the Catholic Church, which maintained loyalty to Rome, instead of national governments, and refused to adopt liberalism. This identification was even greater after the successive massacres of clergymen in a few of the cities, in 1834 and 1835, and the abolition of religious orders and confiscations of all the ecclesiastical properties by the liberal government in 1836.

Royal donations

The quest for money was a persistent goal for Carlists from the very beginning of the conflict. There were several funding sources in the small and changing territory that they controlled : suddenly imposed taxes, the savings of the churches and the forced contributions in lands and goods from the population. However, they never considered that these funds would be enough. Key figures of « Royalist Europe » were approached in the first weeks of the war. In some cases, royalists came to them ; the Duke of Blacas, minister of Charles X, for example, approached Carlist envoys with funding projects. Beyond these possible collaborations there were other participants in this economic effort: bankers and financial agents.

One of these agents was a man called Tassin de Messilly. Thanks to his previous career as a commercial agent for the Spanish royal family, he received a mission from Don Carlos himself : the publication and sale of a loan on his behalf. Tassin did not succeed. He was arrested by the French police before publishing the loan in the Paris market. However, he had already sent copies of the share titles to those European courts that might support Don Carlos. Attached to these titles he added a statement in order to persuade these courts to contribute to his loan[16]. This statement signed by Tassin in May 1834, is extremely interesting. Tassin addressed the kings as the potential readers of his text and the potential investors in his loan. His request was a political reflection that included

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[16] All quotes from this point to the next footnote come from Tessin de Messilly's text that can be found at AT-Oesterreich Staat Archiv/Hof-Haus StA StAbt Spanien/ Diplomatische Korrespondenz/ 175/ 1/Fols. 99-104.

considerations on both the constitutional evolution of Europe and the geopolitics behind these changes.

Tassin stated that the kings were the cornerstone of society ; they supported institutions, law and good people. Because of this, everyone had a debt of « love, service and obedience » to them. Not only did the kings have their role to play in this reciprocal engagement, but they also had other duties. Those duties were « the solidarity (*solidarité)* of crowns and the maintenance of social order ». Tassin followed his reasoning with a particular idea. In his view, if royalty became individualist, this selfishness would pass on to the society, which would lead to the « fall of thrones and, often, the disappearance of the nations ». He completed this argument with a historical reference to Louis XVI and the French Revolution. Of course, on that point, being individualist meant refusing to help Don Carlos of Spain.

In addition to this consideration of the duties of royalty, Tassin drew a map of Europe in which Britain was trying to expand its business, whereas the July Monarchy's sole aim was its own survival through the creation of similar governments around France. It could not be expected that any banker would want to help Don Carlos, because bankers were supposed to be the main support of Isabel and the liberal party's primary support. The defeat of Don Carlos, with the victory of the liberal party, would involve the extension of « industrialism » which was already more powerful in France than ever before. Bankers were fearful of any potential Carlist triumph because they knew that they risked losing their business in a regime of such a « probity ».

Beyond the honesty of Tassin's words, he was putting an interesting paradox on the table — that foreign debt was the better way to fight against the « commercial society ». Tassin's appeal for credit was a failure, but this line of reasoning was repeated many times during the war. Carlists asked for financial aid — in the form of a loan — in order to fight against financiers. This sort of collaboration was at odds with the selfish logic of the market. The courts of the northern powers — Austria, Prussia and Russia — should invest in Don Carlos' venture for political and moral reasons, instead of economic interest.

Geopolitics seems to have been the main motivation of these courts ; however, Tassin's discourse highlighted the struggle in Spain as a clash of civilizations in which individualism might conquer another country. Royal solidarity had to rescue the mere idea of solidarity which was in danger of disappearing as a result of the expansion of this « industrialism » promoted by bankers and traders. In other words, Tassin's text was warning against the expansion of capitalism. Such a worry can be seen as contradictory, because he was a commercial agent, and he was selling shares in a loan.

Despite Tassin's failure, there were several Carlist loans published in London, Paris and Amsterdam. They met with success, but only a very partial success, when they abandoned this moral discourse and presented these loans as business opportunities. Whether Tassin's intention was straightforward or not, he was witnessing an epochal transformation. Capitalism was rising with such a force that even its supposed enemies had no option other than to learn its codes and use its tools.

Interestingly, Tassin used the word « solidarity », but this word was quite unknown in Spain. It was not added to dictionaries until the second half of the nineteenth century. Neither was it very common in the press. In the newspaper archive held in the National Library of Spain, there are only fifty-five occurrences of the term « solidarity » from 1833 to 1845, and many of these are translations from French texts. Notably, one of the instances of the word « solidarity » is part of a homily delivered by the French priest Lacordaire in Notre Dame de Paris[17]. Indeed, it was in French and it was from those years when « solidarity » evolved from its legal meaning in contract law to its social connotation. It was also in France where many Catholics were becoming increasingly concerned about the rise of capitalism[18]. The very origin of this new meaning was intimately linked with the overwhelming individualism that the capitalist economy and liberal society were bringing about[19]. Tassin seemed to be aware of the geopolitics behind this turning point,

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[17] « Sermón del P. Lacordaire en la metropolitana iglesia de Ntra. Sra. De París », *El Católico*, 9/3/1841, p. 1.

[18] Carol E. Harrison, *Romantic Catholics. France's Postrevolutionary Generation in Search of a Modern Faith*, Ithaca and New York, Cornell University Press, 2014.

[19] Sven-Eric Liedman, « Solidarity : a conceptual history », *Eurozine* 16 (2002), p. 1-16.

and the Iberian Peninsula was the new battlefield for this critical battle between « solidarity » and « individualism ». Tassin's political discourse is shocking because he was just a financial agent. However, it shared a certain common sense about the Spanish war. Isabel's potential victory was generally agreed to be the victory of the market, but the hypothetical victory of Don Carlos was rarely perceived as the victory of « solidarity ». Instead, the terms « religion » and « legitimacy » were the words often invoked in this respect.

Although this royal collaboration through a loan did not work, some European monarchies contributed to the Carlist cause with significant sums of money. The Austrian chancellor, Clemens von Metternich, interceded on behalf of Don Carlos at the courts of Prussia, Russia, the Netherlands, Piemonte, Lucca and Modena. All these monarchies transferred thousands of francs to Don Carlos's court during the war. What was the word used to designate these donations ? In the nineteenth century the diplomatic language was French, and the French word repeated many times in the dispatches about the donations to Don Carlos was « secours ». The English equivalent to this word, succour, is less common than the Spanish and Italian versions, « socorro » and « soccorso », which keep the same meaning that is not expressed well in translation with the word « help ». « Secours » is an urgent and ultimate help. It is quite telling that the Catholic organisation called in some countries *Caritas* is known in France as *Secours Catholique.*

Beyond the geopolitical bet on Don Carlos, the language used in relation to these donations of money referred mainly to the notion of family. Kings must take care of their fellow monarchs. This discourse relied greatly on the revolutionary events of the previous decades. Kings all over Europe had suffered revolutions, exile and even decapitation. The aristocratic accent and repressive measures of the Restoration stemmed from fear born in the days of revolution. The echoes of this feeling in the « secours » provided to Don Carlos were particularly clear in the years after his defeat. The Prince of Metternich, the most influential figure in European politics at the time, shared this concern about the fate of thrones. His personal will was the only source of income for Don Carlos during his difficult exile in France from 1839 to 1847 after the Carlist defeat.

Public subscriptions

Thousands of Carlists went into exile from 1839 to 1840. Most of them remained in France[20]. Like the Spanish Bonapartists in 1814, these Carlists enjoyed a system of public subsidies for refugees. Apart from helping the refugees, this system also had a purpose in terms of public order, because it fixed this unreliable population to the places of payment, dissuading them from undertaking criminal activities. At the same time, this payment made it easier to force these refugees to stay away from the most dangerous regions : the Spanish border and the regions with a significant Legitimist community. However, this aid was diminished gradually and, following some amnesties, was almost completely suppressed. The word used for this subvention was again *secours*.

At the same time as this public « secours », the Legitimist press organised a « list » of subscriptions in favour of the Spanish Carlists all over France. There were several initiatives very connected to the official aid, like the « secours aux espagnols réfugiés » proposed by a committee in Lyon, which connected the need for funds to the suspension of the public aid one month before[21]. However, the main subscription started at the very beginning of the Carlist exile. Seventy-nine local committees collected a huge amount of money over three years. More than ten newspapers participated in the call for funds. This dedication was quite diverse from the others. Royal donations were a secret affair, carefully but unsuccessfully hidden by their promoters. The public support for Carlist refugees was impersonal and cold. Conversely, these subscriptions were first and foremost public « lists ». Hundreds of names were accumulated over three years for all to see. In the first edition of this list, the consequences of this public exhibition were evident at a glance. The first name in the first list was none other than Viscount René de Chateaubriand, the *prima donna* of the Legitimist world in 1839[22].

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[20] Sophie Firmino, *Les réfugiés carlistes en France de 1833 à 1843*, Thèse de doctorat. Université François Rabelais Tours 2000. *passim*.

[21] *Secours aux espagnols réfugiés*, Rennes, Mme de Caila, neé Frout, 1841.

[22] The main list was published in one of the most relevant periodical publications, *La Mode*, of the Legitimist world : *La Mode*, 28 /9/1839.

Presented with an emotional discourse focused on the wretched conditions of the Carlist refugees, these lists were both a mechanism for self-promotion and a tool of mobilisation for the Legitimist party. A number of the donors opted for a pseudonym, but these were the minority. There were, at least, three main factors laying behind this peculiar role of the « secours » to the Carlists. Firstly, the public and popular nature of modern politics which have made the newspaper the main instrument of political sociability. This was particularly true in rural France and for a semi-illegal party ; for them, politics happened in the newspapers[23]. Secondly, the self-made aristocratic identity of French Legitimism. From the Restoration onwards, the aristocratic identity became an essential feature of the Legitimist world. This accent in the aristocratic way of life ran concurrently with the nobility's loss of juridical foundations. Legitimism was increasingly associated with a certain high society. These circles were not the milieu of the richest people, but the milieu of the people who advocated most consciously for social distinction. Thirdly, these lists were a powerful political exhibition. It was a bold declaration against the July Monarchy—all these people standing in public next to their Spanish enemies. In addition to all these reasons, the lists also gathered a significant amount of money. The amounts given by each individual were also public. Despite the militant Catholicity of these donors, these secours had little in common with the traditional virtue of charity. Moreover, they also had nothing to do with the public support of the French state for these refugees. The very essence of these subscriptions was their private nature. In a certain sense, it is worth questioning to whom these « secours » were addressed : to the poor and unfortunate Carlist exiles ? or to the Legitimist party for want of a cause to fight ?

This Legitimist solidarity contrasts with the Papal support of Carlist refugees in Rome. The Pope hosted dozens of Carlists from the last years of the war. The Papal administration did not hesitate to use the word « charity » in every document produced in order to record the amounts of money and the names of the beneficiaries[24]. It is worth

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[23] Alain-Jean Tudesq, *Les grands notables en France (1840-1849). Étude historique d'une psychologie sociale*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1964, p. 201-202.

[24] Archivio degli Affari Eclesiastici Straordinari /S. II Spagna -56/236/Fol. 95.

noting that the official subsidies given to Carlists by the French authorities never used this word. It was a word also hard to find in the Legitimist writings regarding the public subscriptions. Conversely, the Papal aid was almost secret as corresponds to a political regime without press freedom. Regardless of the lack of publicity, there was a difference between the orthodox virtue of charity and the modern feeling of solidarity. The former was God's love transmitted by grace to the believers who love each other with a force that was not of their own capacity. Solidarity was purely human, modern and sentimental. In a word, Romantic.

Foreign volunteers

Various young foreign men joined the Carlist army during the war. It is easy to see a certain classification among these European volunteers. An important part of this group were French legitimists who had been vanquished in the rebellion led by the Duchess of Berry on the eve of the Spanish conflict. Among them, some had already fought in the Portuguese Civil War. These vassals of every legitimate king were probably the most indisputable example of Legitimist solidarity in the terms often pointed out in the Liberal and Revolutionary cases. However, many reasons lay behind these military deployments. It has been argued for other cases of foreign enlistment that the need to carve out a masculine identity, that is to say, to « become a man », was also a decisive motivation for these men in the very middle of the Romantic era[25]. In fact, this is highly visible in the war memoirs that several of them wrote after their days in Spain[26]. However, I think that the dedication to the Carlist cause is exceptional in a particular way to the other military engagements abroad of the time. Again, it has to do with the aristocratic identity of Legitimism.

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[25] Lucy Riall, « Men at War : Masculinity and Military Ideals in the Risorgimento », In: Silvana Patriarca, Lucy Riall. (eds) *The Risorgimento Revisited*. London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 152-170.

[26] Among others : Charles Frederick Henningsen, *The most striking events of a twelve-month's campaign with Zumalacarregui, in Navarre and the Basque provinces*. (In two vols.), London, John Murray, 1836.

In addition to the war's contribution to this masculine education of the war, Don Carlos' war also offered these men an opportunity with respect to their aristocratic identity. In the early nineteenth century, aristocracy was in a huge crisis. But it was also a fashion. The infrastructure of nobility had been suppressed, so the superstructure was greatly exaggerated. Not only the heirs of noble households, but also self-made men went to Spain seeking a chivalric adventure and distinguished honours. The memoirs published in English, French and German about their war with the Carlists clearly demonstrate their Romanticism. This can be summarised by highlighting the key role that their hearts played in their narratives as an *ultima ratio*. Their hearts are frequently mentioned at the beginning of these books while their participation in the war appears as an emotional event.

Why did Carlism appeal to these sorts of people ? Setting aside the Legitimists who were committed to the entire series of counterrevolutionary upheavals, Carlism seemed to be just another « great cause[27] ». Indeed, revolutionary wars also attracted members of the aristocracy, such as Lord Byron himself, who famously took part in the Greek rebellion. However, Carlism was not only a cause appreciated only by the aristocracy, but was also a cause loved by the advocates of the continuity of a stylish aristocracy. The distinctive element of Carlism was its apparent link to the old state of things. Serving a king on the battlefield seemed an adequate task for a young noble. It was at a time when Walter Scott's novels were meeting with success. Paradoxically, this effort to become aristocrats was rather an individual endeavour. This solidarity was an episode, a tool, and a strategy in the building of their self-identities.

Conclusion

In my view, the solidarities deployed in favour of Spanish Carlism, royal donations, public subscriptions, and military volunteerism faced a paradox. On the one hand, they were intended to help Carlists because they were perceived as a last line of resistance against the

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[27] George L. Mosse, *Fallen soldiers. Reshaping the memory of the World Wars*, Oxford University Press, 1994.

expansion of liberalism. However, the sheer idea of solidarity was deeply rooted in modern values. The modernity of counterrevolution has often been argued by pointing out its political practices. The concept of solidarity and the material practices linked to it were as modern as these practices. Interestingly, the Pope was the only one who preferred to be charitable rather than « solidaire ».

The resolution of the First Carlist War can be seen as a triumph of capitalism. Not only because the Isabelite victory granted the liberal revolution that took place during the war, but also because it put a definitive end to the most conspicuous alternative to commercial empires : the Catholic Monarchy. It is worth noting which sorts of dedication were gathered with regard to Carlism and it seems that most of them were driven by the values that were not foreign to the logics of capitalism[28].

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[28] Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests : Political Arguments for Capitalism before its triumph*, Princeton University Press, 1977.

Tolerance, humanitarism and solidarity : The conceptual triggers behind the moralisation of politics in Switzerland (mid-19th to late 20th centuries)[1]

Irène Herrmann

The early 2020s have been witnessing several overlapping crises. The Covid pandemic and then the Russian military intervention in Ukraine gave rise to protean fears. In the West, in particular, these events have stimulated insistent calls for solidarity, both from the public sector and from private organisations. The use of such compassionate arguments to help solve global problems may be surprising, but it is not new. In the early 1980s, for example, solidarity was a concept and a practice claimed not only by supporters of the USSR and the USA, but also by non-aligned and neutral countries. Indeed, Switzerland was not insensitive to this slogan, as Bern's foreign policy was formed under this banner throughout the Cold War, and even after it[2].

However, this simple observation raises many questions. First, as the Confederation likes to present itself as the country of humanitarianism, two charitable attitudes form the basis of Switzerland's foreign relations. It may therefore be wondered how these virtues interact with each other, and why these generous

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[1]   A first version of this text was presented at the colloquium; it was revised extensively and was the subject of a lecture given on 27th April 2022. I am very grateful to the people whose comments helped me improve it and write the article published here.
[2]   Claude Altermatt, *La politique étrangère de la Suisse pendant la Guerre froide*, Lausanne, EPFL Press, 2003.

attitudes usually found in the private sphere are hear displayed on the international scene. Secondly, this official predilection for compassionate behaviour is developing in a country that claims to be the « cradle of modern democracy », by virtue of the personal responsibility of its citizens[3]. This begs a question as to of how the imperative to take care of oneself combines with the watchwords of humanitarianism and solidarity, which imply this task being taken on for others.

This conundrum leads to a third, much broader and more clearly conceptual issue. It is a fact that relevant notions, illustrated here by solidarity and humanitarianism, are generally associated with the capital « Good ». In other words, they are not evaluated on a rational scale, distinguishing the true from the false on the basis of information or even external evidence, but belong to the moral domain, which classically, albeit very variously, distinguishes between the good and the evil on the basis of feelings or even emotions[4]. One may then ask how and why a reliance on moral judgments becomes tempting for citizens, who have long been accustomed to being involved in the *res publica,* and who enjoy a generally high level of education — high enough anyway to be able to understand the sometimes-complex issues at stake in political situations. Or, put another way, why is the moral position of the authorities, who often feel obliged to indicate that their action is fair and good, suddenly examined, and even regarded as indispensable to accepting political decisions ?

All these questions deserve some clarification. The fact that they are rooted in specific situations and nonetheless seem to recur regularly legitimises the use of history. And in this framework, given the importance of the terms used, they require the use of conceptual

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[3] Jussi Kurunmäki and Irène Herrmann, « Birthplaces of Democracy. The Rhetoric of Democratic Tradition in Switzerland and Sweden », in Jussi Kurunmäki, Jeppe Nevers, Henk te Velde (eds.), *Democracy in Modern Europe, a Conceptual History*, New-Yok, Oxford, Berghahn, 2018, p. 88-112.

[4] Laurent Bachler, « Philosophie et psychologie : la question du jugement moral », in Laurent Bègue (dir.), *Psychologie du jugement moral. Textes fondamentaux et concepts,* Dunod, 2013, p. 197-227.

history[5]. This article is based on concepts and their successive importance in Swiss political discourse. A first exploration of the notion of tolerance, which accompanied the evolution of Swiss democratisation, especially at the end of the 19th century will yield to a focus on the humanitarianism, that marked the Confederation's domestic and foreign policy decisively, as , the period up to the Second World War is addressed. Finally, the article will deal with solidarity, and move forward to the end of the 20th century and even the beginning of the 21st. Each of these parts will start with a brief historiographical account, followed by an event-based and then conceptual presentation, as concluded by an analysis of the rhetorical functioning of the concept deciphered.

The overall aim here is to understand why, in certain cases, the expression of compassion gives rise to political attitudes that go far beyond the immediate and fleeting generosity that any individual may wish to exercise when faced with a person or situation requiring help ; whether the form taken entails of solidarity, humanitarianism, or simply tolerance.

Tolerance, an inconsistent concept at the end of the 19th century

Few fail to notice the longevity of the Swiss republican system, which dates back to the Middle Ages, or its subsequent transformation into a representative and finally direct democracy[6]. The first researchers to explore the genesis of this development were often men committed to the consolidation of the Swiss nation-state, who, from the end of the 19th century onwards, sought to present the democratisation of political institutions as a glorious development leading the country towards

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[5] On the methodological advantages of conceptual history, see Pasi Ihailanen and Jani Marjanen, « Introduction », in Pasi Ihalainen and Jani Marjanen (eds.), *Writing Conceptual Histories*, London, Bloomsbury, forthcoming.

[6] Ernst Tremp, François Walter : « Histoire », in *Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse (DHS)*, 17.02.2015 version. Online : https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/008271/2015-02-17/, accessed 28 July 2022.

ever greater freedom[7]. This interpretation is perfectly understandable. On the one hand, it anchors the country in a specificity likely to reinforce Swiss exceptionalism. On the other hand, it is based on undeniable historical elements, for no one would deny that, since the middle of the 19th century, Swiss male citizens[8] have enjoyed the most extensive political rights in Europe, if not the world.

Nevertheless, the reasons for which these incredible prerogatives were granted, and therefore the spirit in which they were received and exercised, differ significantly from the ubiquitous march towards « progress ». To be convinced of this, it is sufficient to remember that in 1848, that is to say at the moment when the men of this country received the right to elect their representatives and to decide on the constitution, there were only 10,000 francs left in the federal coffers — in other words, almost nothing[9]. This means that the country was extremely poor. And, far from it being a temporary incongruity, this destitution is typical of the situation in which the cantons found themselves for centuries. Poverty, which is part of the history of the Swiss territory, permeates common behaviour and institutions. It pushed the authorities to adopt a « small shopkeepers » attitude which they would never (ever[10] ?) abandon. A fundamental disunity was also added to this poverty which was still endemic at the time. The Confederation had just emerged from a civil war, the Sonderbund[11].

These different circumstances made the region particularly weak and vulnerable. In this tense context, it was necessary to find solutions that would strengthen the national fabric even as it did

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[7] The most famous representative of this school is probably Johannes Dierauer (1842-1920) with his Masterpiece : *Geschichte der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft,* in five volumes, published between 1887 and 1917.

[8] On the close links between the early granting of democratic rights to men and the slow acquisition of the same rights by women, see Irène Herrmann, « Le suffrage féminin à Genève. Eclairage et hypothèses », *60 ans seulement ! L'histoire du suffrage féminin en affiches*, Genève, Ville de Genève, 2020, p. 58-65. This article is available at : https://www.geneve.ch/sites/default/files/2020-06/brochure-60-ans-droit-vote-femmes-2020-ville-de-geneve.pdf, accessed 27 July 2022.

[9] Irène Herrmann, *Les cicatrices du passé*, Berne, Peter Lang, 2006, p. 112.

[10] See Irène Herrmann, « Les arcanes de la neutralité suisse », in Claude Quétel (dir.), *La Seconde Guerre mondiale vue d'ailleurs*, Paris, Buchet Chastel, 2022, p. 187-200.

[11] Joachim Remak, *A Very Civil War : The Swiss Sonderbund War Of 1847*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1993.

not cost the ruling elites too much. One of the answers to this crucial dual problem was the establishment of a democratic system that was incredibly extensive for its time[12]. On the one hand, the state that was built on the ruins of the aforesaid civil war was not powerful enough to impose its will without the participation of the population. The latter was thus required to exercise, on its own, the constraint that the councillors were incapable of imposing. On the other hand, by presenting the representative system as a worthy successor to other more traditional forms of political decision-making, such as the Landsgemeinde, the authorities created a historical continuity with the defeated cantons and thus allowed for a faster reconciliation of the inhabitants among themselves[13].

Seen in this light, the democratisation of the country appears an effective recipe by which to support the building of a new nation, even as it looked like a potentially dangerous remedy. Indeed, voters may always have faced the temptation to use their rights « unreasonably », i.e. in ways not suiting those who gave them to them; or worse, may seek to take advantage of them to continue their internal disagreements. It is on such a basis that the democratic system thus established is surrounded by several effective safeguards, ranging from the complexity of the institutional machinery to the exacerbation of a mythical history that everyone must live up to[14]. These long-lasting elements are well known[15]. What is less well known is the regular use of different complementary concepts.

[12] Alfred Kölz, *Histoire constitutionnelle de la Suisse moderne. Ses fondements idéologiques et son évolution institutionnelle dans le contexte européen, de la fin de l'Ancien Régime à 1848*, Berne : Stämpfli and Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2006, p. 609 *et sq.*

[13] Andreas Suter, « Direkte Demokratie - historische Reflexionen zur aktuellen Debatte », an epilogue in : Benjamin Adler, *Die Entstehung der direkten Demokratie. Das Beispiel der Landsgemeinde Schwyz 1789-1866*, Zurich, NZZ Verlag, 2006, p. 219 *et sq.*

[14] Irène Herrmann, « Провал 'успешного дела' ? Использование истории и злоупотребление ею в швейцарском политическом дискурсе » [L'échec d'une *success story* ? Usages et mésusages de l'histoire dans le discours politique suisse], in Irina Saveleva et Andrej Poletaev (dir.), Феномен прошлого [*The Phenomenon of the Past*], Moscow, Издательский дом ГУ–ВШЭ, 2005, p. 316–336.

[15] On the (ab)use of history, see Guy Marchal, *Schweizer Gebrauchsgeschichte: Geschichtsbilder, Mythenbildung und nationale Identität*, Bâle, Schwabe Verlag, 2006 esp. p. 19-253 ; on the multiplicity of political mechanisms used to persuade citizens, see : Irène Herrmann, « Introduction sous l'angle Suisse », *Façonner les comportements citoyens / Die Fabrikation staatsbürgerlichen Verhaltens in Revue suisse d'Histoire*, 2011/1, p. 4-21.

Even as the exaltation of freedom is used to make the Swiss proud of their prerogatives, they are anyway told to be responsible. Interestingly, they are not begged to control themselves, but are told that they do so « naturally ». Finally, with a view to the return of fratricidal unrest being prevented, the authorities draw out the concept of tolerance[16]. Over time, this notion underwent dual development. On the one hand, towards the end of the 17th century, it had moved from a negative connotation, stemming from the idea of concession, to a much more positive and proactive meaning, which made it the equivalent of generous benevolence towards others. On the other hand, and correlatively, a term once essentially reserved for the religious gained progressively in breadth, seeming to encompass an ever-wider spectrum of domains[17] so as to reach the characteristics now advocated by UNESCO : « Tolerance is harmony […] that makes peace possible[18] ».

Tolerance was thus an attitude requiring a certain amount of effort on the part of the person who claimed it in order to ensure the good of the neighbour. As such, it is legitimate to consider it a moral imperative of individual generosity applied to collective behaviour. The end of the 19th century was punctuated by appeals, disseminated in public speeches, government writings or public education manuals, to ensure that « harmony in difference » reigned, as in the way Federal Councillor Numa Droz appealed to young pupils of Canton de Vaud in 1885. In his text he claimed :

> Tolerance is first and foremost a deep respect for the rights and freedoms of others, but it is also the result of a feeling of benevolence for one's neighbour. Without tolerance, people cannot live happily. If tolerance does not exist in individuals and groups, the nation is constantly in turmoil and unrest. We must be able to accept the opinions, political and religious beliefs of

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[16] The following is based largely on : Irène Herrmann, « Les fluctuations de la tolérance politique en Suisse (1848-1945) », in Simone de Reyff, Michel Viègnes and Jean Rime (dir.), *Les frontières de la tolérance*, Neuchâtel, Alphil—Presses universitaires suisses, 2013, p. 149-160.

[17] Alain Rey, *Dictionnaire historique de la langue française*, Paris, Dictionnaires Le Robert, 1998, t. III, p. 3840.

[18] https://en.unesco.org/about-us/legal-affairs/declaration-principles-tolerance, accessed 28 July 2022.

others; we must, in all circumstances of life, act according to this Gospel saying.... Do for others what you want them to do for you[19].

This excerpt not only gives an overview of the objectives of tolerance, but also points to its limits. With these words, the magistrate clearly pleads for Swiss cohesion, but he does so by revealing the malfunctioning of the concept he is putting forward. First of all, his very understanding of that is rooted in an assumed Christian specificity, and thus carries with it a real potential for (anti-Judaic) discrimination—less than a decade before the first initiative to be voted on in Switzerland attested to the antisemitism of the majority of the population[20]. Secondly and most importantly, the male audience he addresses and the national goal he assigns to his words automatically exclude all those who do not belong to the « Swiss Homeland », thus pointing indirectly to the gender-related[21] and xenophobic[22] prejudices on which the Swiss democratic system was based. Tolerance may be a compassionate concept ; but it is one but it is riddled with internal contradictions that make it fragile and ultimately ineffective. Swiss democracy, relying on the obligation of tolerance, was nonetheless and obviously constructed by excluding Jews, women and, almost by definition, foreigners.

This inefficiency may be seen as the translation into political and social reality of well-known philosophical-moral contradictions that boiled down to the extent to which tolerance should tolerate

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[19] « La tolérance est en premier lieu le respect profond des droits et des libertés d'autrui, mais elle résulte aussi d'un sentiment de bienveillance pour le prochain. Sans tolérance, les hommes ne peuvent vivre heureux. Si la tolérance n'existe pas chez les individus et dans les groupes, la nation est constamment agitée et troublée. Il faut savoir supporter les opinions, les croyances politiques et religieuses d'autrui; il faut, dans toutes circonstances de la vie, agir suivant cette parole d'Evangile […]. » Toutes les choses que vous voulez que les autres vous fassent, faites-les leur aussi de même » (Numa Droz, *Manuel d'Instruction civique...*, Lausanne, 1885, p. 59. My translation.)

[20] Sibylle Horanyi, *Das Schlächtverbot zwischen Tierschutz und Religionsfreiheit : Eine Güterabwägung und interdisziplinäre Darstellung von Lösungsansätzen*, Basel, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2004.

[21] Brigitte Studer, *La conquête d'un droit. Le suffrage féminin en Suisse (1848-1971)*, Neuchâtel, Alphil, 2021 ; id. and Judith Wyttenbach, *Frauenstimmrecht. Historische und rechtliche Entwicklungen 1848–1971*, Zurich, Hier + jetzt, 2021.

[22] Thomas Buomberger, *Kampf gegen unerwünschte Fremde. Von James Schwarzenbach bis Christoph Blocher*, Zurich, Orell Füssli, 2004.

intolerance[23]. The solution found in Switzerland gives an impression of incoherence only further reinforced by an embarrassing semantic phenomenon : contrary to what its meaning might suggest, tolerance is highly polarised, as everything that is not tolerant is considered intolerant. In other words, there is no neutral space between the concept and its counter-concept. This feature accentuates the glaring discrepancies between the enunciation and application of the concept, and even in its very expression. Thus, by not respecting its own instruction of tolerance, the state seems to be intolerant. As a result, tolerance can be seen as a contradictory concept and can hence be labelled inconsistent.

This label helps us understand why tolerance has subsequently been used so infrequently, with the exception of the period of Nazism, which was obviously a striking and accepted counter-concept. It is therefore easier to understand why the authorities resorted to other concepts in parallel, which had a more powerful political impact, both internally and externally. The most emblematic of these is undoubtedly humanitarianism.

Humanitarianism as a magnetic concept (first half of the 20th century)

Most research on humanitarianism began at the beginning of the 21st century, when this altruistic activity was (re)gaining international recognition. Indeed, most historians who have tackled this topic have done so out of admiration for such a generous ideal. To a certain extent, they are joining much older studies devoted to the development of the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC]. For a long time, these authors had the distinction of coming from the institution they were describing, ensuring difficulty with any adoption of the « objectivity », namely the critical distance, necessary for a scientist. In fact, these works are either of the

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[23] Rainer Forst, « Toleration », *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/toleration/>, accessed 29 July 2022.

depressed pamphlet or dazzled panegyric types, more often the latter.[24].

However, given that humanitarianism is one of the oldest foundations of modern Swiss politics, it seems more fruitful to understand it as such, i.e. as a tool of government and realpolitik. It is worth remembering that the Confederation of the last third of the 19th century, fresh from the Sonderbund war, was still vulnerable. In a Europe plagued by violent nationalist outbursts, causing wars and redefining territories, this endemic weakness was worrying not only internally, as already seen, but also and above all externally[25]. Of course, the authorities could reassure themselves by remembering that the Great Powers of the continent had guaranteed their country's perpetual neutrality, and that they would come to its defence in the event of aggression. But around 1870, several events undermined this possible optimism. At that time, Bern had the opportunity to see that it could only rely on itself when it came to protection from a foreign invasion.

This painful awareness provoked several different responses. In addition to the consolidation of national cohesion through the extension of democratic rights already mentioned, the Confederation supported a tiny, newly-created organisation: the Society for Aid to Wounded Soldiers, soon to be called the International Committee of the Red Cross[26]. Supporting the work of these five Genevans, whose aim was to stimulate the creation of societies to help the wounded on the battlefield, was a way of making neutrality useful. Indeed, unlike the Belgian neutrality, for example, which could be seen as cowardly, Switzerland's disengagement needed to be made to look valuable to the aggressors. The message was clear : there is no point in attacking us, because we are the ones taking care of the victims of your unfortunate warmongering. It has been with this

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[24] Irène Herrmann, « Humanitaire », Olivier Christin (dir.), *Dictionnaire des concepts nomades en sciences humaines*, Paris, Editions Métailié, 2010, p. 233-243.

[25] Regina Wecker, « Neuer Staat—neue Gesellschaftt. Bundesstaat und Industrialisie-rung », in Georg Kreis (dir.), *Die Geschichte der Schweiz*, Basel, Schwabec, 2014, p. 453 *et sq.*

[26] Irène Herrmann, *L'humanitaire en questions. Réflexions autour de l'histoire de la Croix-Rouge*, Paris, Editions du Cerf, 2018, Chapter I.

goal of international survival in mind that the Confederation has committed to the promotion of the ideals of the Red Cross, and to the development of International Humanitarian Law[27].

This policy quickly gave rise to numerous amalgamations which became clear during the First World War. Up until the turning point of the Great War, roughly at the end of 1916, the authorities informed their neighbours that their country was neutral, and that it was therefore able to provide humanitarian services. After this date, there was a significant reversal in the discourse. The leaders had arrived at the explanation that it was because the Swiss population was « naturally humanitarian » that the Swiss state had become neutral[28]. This was, of course, completely false[29], but it illustrates perfectly the place taken by this type of argument, not only in the relationship with foreign countries, but also in internal communication. In this double respect, humanitarianism has constituted both a formidable defensive weapon and a ferment of national identity. Its status as an incredibly effective rhetorical tool can therefore come as no surprise.

This phenomenon is all the more remarkable given that the equivalence between the work of the ICRC and the term humanitarian was not yet fully established as people still spoke of charity or generosity[30]. Nevertheless, the analytical concept of humanitarianism was deeply rooted in people's minds[31]. It is even

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[27] « Eine "Genferei" als Grundlage eidgenössischer Identität ? Der Bund und die Naturalisierung der Ideale des Internationalen Komitees vom Roten Kreuz », in Miriam Baumeister, Thomas Brückner, Patrick Sonnak (dir.), *Wo liegt die humanitäre Schweiz ? Eine Spurensuche in 10 Episoden*, Campus Verlag, 2018, p. 65-80.

[28] Cédric Cotter and Irène Herrmann, « Les dynamiques de la rhétorique humanitaire : Suisse, Etats-Unis, autres neutres », *Relations Internationales*, n° 159, 2014/4, pp. 49-67.

[29] Cédric Cotter, *(s')Aider pour survivre. Action humanitaire et neutralité suisse pendant la Première Guerre mondiale*, Genève : Editions Georg, 2017.

[30] The members of the ICRC themselves were fond of referring to their humanitarian activity as « oeuvre », namely : work, services, charity and artwork... (https://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais-anglais/%C5%93uvre/55336) accessed 29 July 2022.

[31] By analytical concept, we mean all the ideas behind a term which today is humanitarian(ism), whatever the words used to designate it at the time may have been.

incredibly attractive, so much so that it can be described as magnetic[32]. This power of attraction is linked to its important moral charge, which provides an unambiguous association between this organised aid for the victims of combat and the notion of Good. Unlike tolerance, the counter-concept is not immediate, and therefore leaves a large space in which to accommodate attitudes that, while not anti-humanitarian, are simply not humanitarian. This room for manoeuvre was perhaps decisive. In any case, brandishing the concept of humanitarianism in a political arena is particularly profitable : unless it is blatantly incompatible with the objective being pursued, it is a guarantee of success — as exemplified tellingly by the expression « humanitarian intervention », which counterintuitively but successfully manages to combine two opposite concepts, and hence makes war seem acceptable for the sake of victims[33].

Humanitarianism is not the only magnetic concept which, by allowing for personification of moral values, prompts an audience to identify with it, and thus facilitates reactions to it. This is also the case with human rights. However, the most effective magnetic concepts are not those that attract, but those that repel – such as Nazism or, in another register, paedophilia. In this case, it is obviously not a question of claiming these notions, but of accusing one's opponents of adhering to them. In principle, any such criticism can be used to disqualify an opponent, and to have any proposal made by him or her rejected. One of the most formidable tactics in this regard is to use these concepts of absolute evil to denigrate an attitude that is seen as the capital Good. The more absolute this Good is, the less virulent the (magnetic) reproach needs to be, as the fall will remain dizzying.

Such was the misfortune of the ICRC. Placed on a pedestal during the World Wars, and especially during the Second World War, it was

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[32] Irène Herrmann, « From polemical topics to magnetic concepts : humanitarianism and anti-Semitism in Switzerland », in *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Volume 15, Issue 1, 2010, p.51- 68 ; id, *L'humanitaire en questions*, Chapter IV.

[33] See, for instance, Taylor B. Seybolt, « Humanitarian Intervention and International Security », *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. 22 Dec. 2017 ; https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-217, Accessed 30 July 2022.

blamed bitterly afterwards. The horrifying discovery of the Death Camps and the immeasurable number of Soviet victims reminded the world that the cruellest inhumanity is part of humanity. Faced with this unbearable fact, the victors of the Second World War preferred to accuse international moral authorities of not having been able to stop these atrocities. The Vatican[34] and the ICRC were used as outlets. Humanitarians were accused of having deliberately played into the hands of the Nazis. The negative magnetic concept condemns the positive magnetic concept to impotence—at least in the global arena[35]. It was in the context of this condemnation that the Swiss authorities, whose image was anything but glowing at the time, decided to adopt a substantially different altruistic imperative, namely, that of solidarity.

Solidarity, a « spiral » concept, until the end of the Cold War

At the Swiss level, there is less literature on solidarity than on humanitarianism[36]. There are probably several reasons for this. On the one hand, solidarity is commonly mobilised by actors outside Switzerland. Many French people claim to be the originators of the practice, going back to Léon Bourgeois's solidarism[37]. European solidarity has also given rise to an abundant and prolific literature[38]. On the other hand, and more importantly, solidarity is often seen as a (very) left-wing ideal, alien to Swiss tradition. Indeed, international solidarity was a banner for the Eastern bloc in its relations with the

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[34] Cf. Project : Quand les archives pacelliennes s'ouvrent à l'histoire, https://histoire-sociale.cnrs.fr/la-recherche/programmes/archives-pacelliennes/.

[35] Whereas a positive magnetic concept trumps a negative « normal » concept, such as war... as explained *supra*.

[36] Georg Kreis, « Eidgenössische Solidarität in Geschichte und Gegenwart », *Vorgeschichten zur Gegenwart*, t. 1, Basel, Schwabe, 2003, p. 553-569; Catherine Schümperli, *La politique suisse de solidarité internationale : de la coopération au développement global*. Lausanne, Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes, 2007. Beatrice Schumacher (dir.), *Un devoir librement consenti: l'idée et l'action philanthropiques en Suisse de 1800 à nos jours*, Zurich, NZZ Verlag, 2010.

[37] Marie-Claude Blais, « L'idée de solidarité a une histoire », *Sciences humaines*, n°223, February 2011 or id., *La solidarité. Histoire d'une idée,* Paris, Gallimard, 2007.

[38] For instance: Nathalie Kragiannis (dir.), *European Solidarity*, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2007 ; *Revue européenne d'histoire*, 24:6, 2017 ; Steinar Stjernø, *Solidarity in Europe. The History of an Idea*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

oppressed peoples and/or proletarians in the world[39]. In this context, it is easy to forget that, during the Cold War, there was a lively social-democratic solidarity in the Swiss Confederation

This was in fact dictated by the strong criticism levelled at Bern at the end of the Second World War. The most incriminatory aspect at the time was neutrality. Traditionally, the aggressors felt they were at a disadvantage versus the opposing side. But there were also more well-founded attacks on the financial policy conducted in favour of the Reich. This criticism was all the more serious as it was made by the victors who had control over the organisation of the international arena after the war. In order to avoid being ostracised as an ally of Germany, the Confederation not only had to show that it was neutral but also had to prove that its neutrality was not just a matter of self-interest until the other countries had finished fighting for the principles that the Swiss also claimed[40].

When the fighting was over and the new order was being established, the Federal Councillor for Foreign Affairs, Max Petitpierre, set about restoring the country's image. To this end, he decided to show that the controversial concept of neutrality was not selfish but fundamentally generous. He therefore added the principle of solidarity to it[41]. In his work, solidarity is rarely defined as such. If we look at the sources, we understand that it subsumes the altruistic activities that disengagement had encouraged during the conflict. Broadly speaking, it covers what has been called good offices : representing foreign interests and organising arbitration procedures. But it also included humanitarian works, including those of the Red Cross. In 1973, the Government declared that « Humanitarian aid and development cooperation each constitute a different aspect of the

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[39] For instance : Kasper Braskén, *The International Workers' Relief, Communism, and Transnational Solidarity : Willi Münzenberg in Weimar Germany*, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2015, p. 20 ; see also: Holger Weiss (ed.), *International Communism and Transnational Solidarity: Radical Networks, Mass Movements and Global Politics, 1919–1939*, Leiden, Brill, 2016.

[40] Claude Altermatt, op. cit.

[41] Hans-Ulrich Jost, « Origines, interprétations et usages de la neutralité helvétique », *Matériaux pour l'histoire de notre temps* 93, 2009, p. 12.

same particularly dynamic sector of our solidarity policy[42] ». There was thus a continuity between the pre- and post-Second World War foreign policies, both emphasising the generosity that would be permitted by the country's ongoing neutrality.

This course of action appealed both to foreign leaders caught up in the Cold War and to the people. The Swiss government, confident in the strength of this double imperative[43] of neutrality and solidarity, therefore proposed, in 1986, that the Confederation be integrated into the United Nations. The aim was to maintain the country's political and, above all, military disengagement, while allowing for fuller participation in the international solidarity effort that the UN was trying to put into practice. Under Swiss law, this question pertaining to the country's membership in collective security organisations had to be put to the vote. To Bern's great surprise, this suggestion was rejected overwhelmingly at the ballot box. Most commentaries, at the time and later, underlined the role played by neutrality : the Swiss were so attached to this principle, to which they believed they owed the good fortune of having escaped two World Wars, that they were wary of any decision that might alter its scope in any way. However, given that the authorities had taken all the necessary precautions of which they were aware to avoid this problem, it can be said that the popular reticence was mainly about solidarity or, rather, about the differences it presents with the more traditional concept of humanitarianism[44].

Firstly, humanitarian aid is inherently discretionary. While belligerent states are obliged to respect international law, those not involved in the conflict and assisting the victims necessarily have a wide margin

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[42] L'aide humanitaire et la coopération au développement constituent chacune pour leur part un aspect différent d'un même secteur particulièrement dynamique de notre politique de solidarité (« Message du Conseil fédéral à l'Assemblée fédérale à l'appui d'un projet de loi sur la coopération au développement et l'aide humanitaire internationales », *Feuille fédérale* 1973, vol. I., 1973, p. 839).

[43] «Message concernant l'entrée de la Suisse à l'Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU)» *Feuille fédérale* 1982, vol. I, 1982, p. 505-702.

[44] Irène Herrmann and Renata Latała, « Conflicting Solidarities. Switzerland in the early 1980s », in *Jahrbuch Praktische Philosophie in globarer Perspektive*, Bd. 5 (Schwerpunkt : Solidarität am Scheideweg)/ *Yearbook Practical Philosophy in a Global Perspective* 5 (Focus : Solidarity at the Crossroads), 2021, p. 112-136.

of manoeuvre as to whom should be assisted. In fact, the ICRC, for example, is taking in more and more categories of victims, which means that in its early days it was not helping many people. Secondly, human suffering always exceeds the possibilities available to relieve it. In other words, humanitarians have to triage[45]. But above all, they also have the option of not intervening at all, and it is in this non-compulsory choice, voluntary without being necessarily obligatory, that the beauty of the gesture resides, as a link between humanitarianism and goodness is forged.

However, contrary to what one might think, solidarity is much more mutual, as illustrated by its semantic evolution. From a lexicographical point of view, the term itself comes from the Latin legal notion of solidus, indicating the collective responsibility of debtors towards a single creditor[46]. In the 19th century, when the term became widespread, it was mainly used by the left, which applied it either to the social bond to describe the supposed union between members of the same nation, or to designate the bond between proletarians to influence their struggle against the bosses — even in Switzerland[47]. From then on, solidarity took on the general meaning it still has today, whereby the reference is to the feeling of « reciprocal dependence within a group of people [... leading] man to behave as if he were directly confronted with the problem of others, without which the future of the group (and therefore his own) could be compromised[48] ».

[45] Norbert Götz and Irène Herrmann, « Universalism in Emergency Aid before and after 1970 : Ambivalences and Contradictions », in Pasi Ihalainen and Antero Holmila (dir.), *Nationalism and Internationalism Intertwined : A European History of Concepts beyond the Nation State*, New York, Berghahn, 2022, p. 247-269, https://www.academia.edu/74227473/Universalism_in_Emergency_Aid_before_and_after_1970_Ambivalences_and_Contradictions.

[46] « Solidarité », *Dictionnaire historique...* op. cit., t. III, p. 3546.

[47] Empirical observation made on the data available on e-newspaperarchives.ch and archivesletemps.ch.

[48] «[L]e sentiment de responsabilité et [la] dépendance réciproque au sein d'un groupe de personnes qui conduit l'homme à se comporter comme s'il était directement confronté au problème des autres, sans quoi, c'est l'avenir du groupe (donc le sien) qui pourrait être compromis» (notably in : Saïd Hamdouni, « Le système commercial international et la solidarité internationale », in : Maryvonne Hécquard-Théron (dir.), *Solidarité(s). Perspectives juridiques*, Toulouse, 2009, p. 208).

In 1986, the Swiss did not want compulsory aid from an international organisation over which they had no control. In the purest humanitarian tradition, they saw relief as a discretionary activity, commendable precisely because it was not compulsory. Secondly, solidarity can, but should not, be a collective or even state enterprise, as is humanitarian aid, which requires a lot of resources to be effective. This specificity has practical and conceptual consequences. It reinforced the Swiss people's lack of interest in the UN, as they saw no reason to depend on an institution to carry out a practice they could complete at home, almost literally. For solidarity requires little more than its own enunciation to exist. Better still, its scope can vary without any real change to its moral impact. One can thus claim to be in solidarity with the world, a social class, a country, or even one's own family, without this notable difference in scope implying a change in the term.

The peculiarities of the term give it a particular discursive power which can be described as a spiral. This term not only evokes the screw and its helical, possibly infinite grooves, but also recalls vicious circles from which there is no escape. At first sight, solidarity seems to be a classical magnetic concept, as everyone may consider it commendable to be in solidarity. However, as it is up to each individual to assess the evidence and, above all, the spectrum of his or her solidarity, there is little advantage to be gained from emphasising it or, on the contrary, denying it. In positive cases, the screw can be loosened at will, making its use somewhat unstoppable, but simultaneously « hypomagnetic ». On the other hand, this rhetorical tool is even more powerful in cases where the moral charge is negative. The examples of madness or conspiracy are convincing here, since these are two accusations that cannot be dismissed : a person accused of being insane will be considered even more insane if he or she claims to be sane ; a person accused of plotting will not be able to defend himself or herself by saying that there is no evidence to support it, because he or she will be told that the plot is particularly well constructed[49].

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[49] For a concrete example, see the works of Daniel Artho on the Swiss General Strike of 1918.

Actually, this specific mechanism should render spiral concepts ineffective, as they evade any production of proof. Insofar as mere stating of them produces their existence, they prove nothing. Yet, in spite of this propensity to « run on empty », spiral concepts, especially negative ones, seem readily considered as particularly powerful, « hypermagnetic » concepts[50]. This tendency may be linked to a fundamental misunderstanding of how they work. Conversely, but not necessarily contradictorily, it may be an indication and the outcome of a perfect fit with the political conditions in which they occur; i.e. to correspond to a certain attraction to (over)simplification and the Manichean explanation of the world or, to put it less categorically, to an interpretation of an essentially moral type which thus begins to unravel the nagging enigma of why and when populations feel the need and the desire to refer to moral considerations, of which concepts of compassion are one of the major levers.

Conclusion

In general terms, the past 150 years have brought growing appropriation by citizens of concepts of compassion. In the 19th century, the authorities enjoined them to be tolerant, but this prescription was drowned out by other imperatives, and the level of attractiveness was reduced by the work required, and by the unconvincing way in which the authorities themselves applied the watchword of tolerance. On the other hand, humanitarianism gained much wider acceptance. It is true that it requires less effort from individuals who may feel naturally good simply because they belong to a country, the birthplace of the Red Cross. This state of mind did even more to determine their adherence to the concept of solidarity, which is presented as an official policy that everyone could also exercise at his or her own level in order to feel a better human being.

This brief overview provides some answers to the questions raised in the Introduction. First of all, this evolution has impacted upon the way in which these different moral qualities have been perceived and

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[50] Irène Herrmann, « Caring for Others ? Concepts of Compassion in Politics », in *Writing Conceptual Histories...*, op. cit.

put into practice. Indeed, the watchword of tolerance has facilitated the acceptance of humanitarianism by presenting a moral virtue, self-denial — namely, the voluntary renunciation of the achievement of legitimate satisfaction — as a form of democratic political quality. As for humanitarianism, it facilitated the shift from self-denial to (in principle, disinterested) dedication, by accentuating the gap between the helper and the helped or, even more decisively, the optionality of the gesture of help. This easy generosity thus provides for a feeling of superiority. And it is clearly in this discretionary perspective that the Swiss have taken up solidarity. Their refusal to join the UN reflected their humanitarian misunderstanding of the reciprocity and equality that are supposed to be the bedrock of the concept of solidarity. Thus, to answer the first question, it can be argued that the different forms adopted by the gift of self are interrelated. Better still, they are dependent on the circumstances in which they are deployed. In other words, these highly moral qualities that we like to think of as absolute are neither timeless nor universal, but clearly influenced by the time and (national) space in which they are expressed.

This observation sustains a vigorous underlining of the apparent paradox of a country, Switzerland, that simultaneously extols the official concern of each citizen for others and the care of that same citizen for himself, two attitudes presented as the guarantors of the maintenance of democracy. Several elements explain this apparently contradictory phenomenon, and provide some answers to the second question. Firstly, the insistence on individual responsibility is quite compatible with the imperative of solidarity and, above all, with its « spiral » powers. But secondly, and more importantly, the deeply discretionary character of Swiss compassion gives it a decisive role as a means of personal valorisation. Helping others, when one has chosen to do so, is a noble action. In a democracy, this operation easily takes on the appearance of social distinction, and allows the bourgeois, or even the proletarians, to attest to their nobility, however republican they may be. It is therefore a means of elevation which, in the absence of a real aristocracy, takes on additional value in an egalitarian country.

However, these outbursts of « morality », which can be traced back to the use and recovery of altruistic imperatives, are not constant, but

experience peaks in popularity whose rhythm and dynamics begged the third and most encompassing question. Presented as national protection, these bouts of « morality » are often spotted at the beginning of an international crisis. Alternatively, they correspond readily to periods of increased prosperity. These laudable concerns are thus combined harmoniously with the possibility of economic gain. They also coincide regularly with the consolidation of a relatively new ruling class, reflecting a desire for change to be anchored in new or renewed values. Finally, in a more counter-intuitive way, these bouts of morality signal a saturation of knowledge (possibilities) : when overwhelmed with information, it sometimes seems easier to stick to one's emotions and one's personal impression of right and wrong.

Tolerance, humanitarianism and solidarity thus chime regularly with a desire for self-preservation, social recognition or intellectual laziness/incapacity. However, and this is the ultimate contradiction, these highly self-interested reasons do not necessarily reduce the significance of the acts performed... as the attitudes of the early 1980s and 2020s have shown.

Solidarity rights : The conflictual universalisation of human rights through the lens of the Banjul Charter

François Courvoisier[1]

1981. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopts a Charter on human rights which is ratified by the majority of its member states five years later. The continental organisation, created in the aftermath of African independence to promote unity and cooperation between the continent's young states, follows the tradition of the inter-American and European continental organisations, which were planed to serve as a regional relay for the UN and its various agencies.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, or Banjul Charter, like the Pan-American Declaration of Human Rights and Duties or the European Convention on Human Rights, establishes a catalogue of principles intended to govern relations between individuals, communities and states. Like its predecessors, it seeks to promote the fundamental values common to all humanity, compiled by the victorious nations at the end of the Second World War in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).

Exploring the process of human rights promotion as organised by the UN through the lens of the Banjul Charter reveals a surprising paradox : the non-universality, or at least the contested universality,

of the concept of human rights which is widely and officially described as universal.

The inter-African reflections and debates that led to the establishment of the African Charter reveal numerous tensions related to the very definition of what the notion of human rights represents and includes. The result was the adoption of a series of new rights, consisting of the right to development, the right to peace and the right to a healthy environment, which are in line with the right to self-determination, and come on top of the civil and political rights and the economic, social and cultural rights which have been established and equitably recognised by the international community since the adoption of the two Covenants of 1966, each of which is devoted to a type of right[2].

The African Charter, through its adoption process and its content, can thus not only be considered as a declaration of faith by nations just emerging from colonialism and wishing to influence the ever-changing world order, but it also reveals the most contemporary aspirations in terms of living together on a global scale, integrating considerations and constraints hitherto neglected in the previous international conventions devoted to human rights.

These innovations, announced and stated as *Peoples' rights* in the very title of the Banjul Charter, are grouped together in a new category or generation of human rights under the name of *solidarity rights*[3].

Although the international context and post-colonial motivations that give rise to these new rights explain their appearance as one of the key issues in the evolution of the world order, and although the concept of solidarity fits perfectly with their content, this explains neither this new categorisation, nor this new qualification.

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[2] https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights and https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-economic-social-and-cultural-rights, accessed 11 June 2022.

[3] Regarding the classification of human rights into generations : see Karel Vasak, *The international dimensions of Human Rights*, Paris, UNESCO, 1982.

The use of a strong, even magnetic concept, *solidarity*, to define another strong and already institutionalised concept, *human rights*, does not happen by chance. It is the result of a contested theory[4], promoted by European jurists through the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)[5] and UNESCO.

The generational categorisation of human rights is a largely outdated essentialist reading[6]. Conceptual history methods[7] allow for a less radical analysis and a more relevant understanding of the human rights conceptualised in the 1970s. They allow for an analysis of innovations and developments in human rights beyond a purely theoretical categorisation or an artificial periodisation. By using the notion of *uneven temporal development*, the emergence of so-called *solidarity rights* can be considered as a *period of crisis* in the history of human rights, freeing us from a purely linear and segregated history. They correspond to the African and Third World *moment* in the evolution of the concept of human rights, i.e. their « non-simultaneous » contribution to a « simultaneous » global notion.

The motivations, intentions and effects of the mobilisation of the concept of solidarity to qualify what was then presented as a new category or generation of human rights, offers a new and decentred reading of the emergence of new principles and new priorities carried by the countries of the Global South which were reflected from the last quarter of the 20th century onwards in the adoption of new rules of international law[8].

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[4] Steven L. B. Jensen, « Mettre fin à la théorie des trois générations de droits humains », in *OpenGlobalRights*, 2017, https://www.openglobalrights.org/putting-to-rest-the-three-generations-theory-of-human-rights/?lang=French, accessed 9 October 2020.

[5] The International Commission of Jurists is an NGO established in 1952 in Geneva by an international group of jurists to promote the rule of law on a global scale.

[6] Lynn Hunt, *L'invention des Droits de l'Homme. Histoire, Psychologie et Politique*, Genève, Markus Haller, 2013. Valentine Zuber, *Le culte des droits de l'homme*, Paris, Gallimard, 2014. Jessica Stites Mor, (ed.), *Human Rights and Transnational Solidarity in Cold War Latin America*, Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press, 2013, p. 120-142. Jack Donnelly, « Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights », in *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 6, n°4, 1984, p. 400-419. Jack Donnelly, *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice*, New York, Cornell University Press, 2006. Jan Eckel, Samual Moyn, *The Breakthrough. Human Rights in the 1970s*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014.

[7] See the works of the philosopher Ernst Simon Bloch and of the historian Reinhard Koselleck regarding the « simultaneity of the non-simultaneous ».

[8] Philippe Cullet, *Droits de solidarité en droit international*, Genève, 1993.

The present contribution focuses on the twofold process of the evolution of the content on the one hand and the container, on the other, which the concept of human rights encompasses. It seeks to distinguish and understand these two parallel and distinct phenomena in order to identify the sometimes divergent stakes of the actors involved and to analyse the effects, positive or otherwise, of the container on its content.

The Banjul Charter : Human rights, yes ! But which ones ?[9]

The relative universality of human rights

Quick research into the theories and history of human rights is sufficient to reveal a certain lack of consensus when it comes to defining human rights with more precision or implementing them on a global scale. If the concept is largely spread as a synonym for fundamental values and core principles, its actual content can vary among areas, cultures, ideologies or history. This paradox — the non-universality of universal human rights — came out in 1948 when the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* was drafted and adopted by the United Nations. Two main diverging messianic ideologies were competing to spread their point of view and their values to inspire as much as possible the new post-war world order under construction.

On one side, the Western doctrine highlights the fundamental freedoms of the individuals against arbitrary forms of governance. This *natural law* — « universal and unalterable » — corresponds to « all the rights that each individual possesses by virtue of belonging to humanity[10] ». Inspired by the philosophy of the Enlightenment, it stems from the American and the French Revolutions at the end of the 18th century and is materialised in founding texts such as the *French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen* (1789) or the

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[9] Reference to a central question raised during the African Charter redaction and adoption process : see Kéba M'Baye, OAU archives, HR/Liberia/1979/BP.2, p. 14.

[10] https://www.dictionnaire-juridique.com/definition/droit-naturel.php, accessed 22 November 2021 and translated by DeepL.

American Bill of Rights (1791). Placing the individual (namely the *Man* and the *Citizen*) and its *liberty* at the centre of the reflection, they inspire the Western Constitutions and model the nation-building process throughout the 19th century. As a synonym of social progress and modernity, the state guarantee of these basic rights becomes the best way towards democracy and development. They are today described as the *civil and political rights*[11] and are the subject of a Covenant enshrined by the UN in 1966[12].

Facing the class system's inequalities persisting within Western nations, as well as the unfairness of their colonialist policies, Marxist critique advances a theory of alternative values and principles based on the concept of *equality* for everyone, even beyond borders. In the early 20th century, the Mexican[13] and Russian Revolutions echoed and spread this alternative ecumenicity, embracing a collective vision of human rights[14]. This *positive law*, established and guaranteed by the State, corresponds to « the law in force, [...] resulting from the law and case law, [...] which is modified according to the evolution of morals ». It is today referred to as the *social, economic, and cultural rights*, consecrated by their own dedicated Covenant of 1966[15].

Human rights therefore constitute a fertile ground for the ideological rivalry between Western universalism and Eastern internationalism. Chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, the drafting committee of the Universal Declaration was composed of nine members representing various parts of the world[16] in order to « reflect more than simply Western

[11] Such as the right to property, the freedom of thought, of opinion and of association.

[12] UN, *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* New York, 16th December 1966.

[13] Cruz Melchor Eya Ncham, *Développement et droits de l'homme en Afrique*, Paris, Publisud, 1992, p. 61-62 : he mentions in particular art. 3, art. 27 and art. 123 of the Mexican Constitution of the 5th February 1917.

[14] Such as the right to work, the right to social security, or the right to education.

[15] UN, *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* New York, December 16, 1966.

[16] United States, represented by Eleanor Roosevelt as mentioned ; Australia by William Roy Hodgson (1892-1958); France by René Cassin (1887-1976) ; Canada by John Peters Humphrey (1905-1980), first Director of the United Nations Division of Human Rights since 1946 ; Lebanon by Charles Habib Malik; China by Peng-Chun Chang categorically opposed to any religious reference ; United Kingdom by trade unionist and Labour Party politician Charles Dukes (1881-1948) ; Soviet Union by Alexander E. Bogomolov and Chile by Hernan Santa Cruz, both defending social and economic rights.

ideas »[17]. Like the UN Charter a few years before, the final text contained only a « reasonably detailed but by no means exhaustive list of human rights and fundamental freedoms »[18], leaving space for the largest worldwide adhesion possible. Eight Eastern nations abstained from voting for the Universal Declaration in 1948, considering that *social, economic and cultural rights* were neglected in the document. It took twenty years for the UN bodies to balance both visions of human rights equally, as finally shown in 1966 by the adoption of the two International Covenants mentioned above.

Strengthened by the recognition of its principles by both blocs, the UN's mission is more than ever to promote these values throughout the world and particularly in the new states that have emerged from decolonisation.

A process of universalisation favoured by the context

The international context only favours the UN mission. In the last quarter of the 20th century, human rights took centre stage everywhere in the North. Jimmy Carter was elected President of the United States of America in 1977. His mandate marked a turning point in the American doctrine in terms of international relations. Foreign policy was re-oriented towards human rights, democratic values and the elimination of poverty. The struggle against communism was not only a question of political influence anymore, but also a moral question[19]. His four-year term put an end to the US support of Somoza's regime in Nicaragua, Pinochet's in Chile and Videla's in Argentina. Being a member of the Western bloc no longer justified the authoritarian drifts of some leaders, now more easily considered as dictators. Some African Heads of State could reasonably fear for their position.

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[17] Eleanor Roosevelt, *The Autobiography of Eleanor Roosevelt*, quoting Dr. Chang, https://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/history-document/index.html, accessed 28 September 2020.

[18] OAU archives, HR/LIBERIA/1979/BP.1, p. 3: Background Paper for the Monrovia Seminar, by Judge Taslim Olawale Elias, Vice president of the International Court of Justice The Hague, referring to Hersch Lauterpacht, *International and Human Rights*, Santa Barbara, 1950.

[19] Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, André Kaspi, *Histoire des relations internationales de 1945 à nos jours*, Paris, Armand Colin,2009, p. 378-379.

The East-West relations were also affected by the question of human rights. The Madrid Conference, held between 1980 and 1983, coped with the basket III of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. It aimed to secure commitments for human rights and democratic governance from Eastern European countries. Various dissident and activist groups from the Eastern bloc raised issues such as Russification and other human rights' violations by the Soviet Union[20]. Léonid Brejnev, at the head of the Soviet Union until 1982, did not hesitate to repress aspirations for individual freedoms, as shown by the forced exile of intellectuals such as Leonid Plyushch, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov. The doctrinal unity as well as the Soviet hegemony of the foreign communist parties started to crumble, specifically in Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania and Poland, where the *Solidarność* union rejected Soviet domination. Western communist parties, led by the Italian party, also distanced themselves from the central party. As a result, the internationalist « proletarian dictatorship » doctrine was smoothed to become a « voluntary cooperation and solidarity », opening a less binary reflection on human rights[21].

This wind of change blew up to the African continent, hit by a second wave of democratisation. The international community, as well as African societies, no longer supported or accepted the brutal authority of well-established dictators. Idi Amin Dada, at the head of Uganda since 1971, was forced into exile in 1979 after being ousted by a popular uprising and by the Tanzanian army. Francisco Macias Nguema was overthrown in 1979 after more than a decade of violent dictatorship in Equatorial Guinea. He was sentenced to death for genocide by a special military Tribunal assisted by the International Jurist Commission. Jean-Bedel Bokassa, dictator-president of the Central African Republic from 1966 to 1976 and self-proclaimed First Emperor in the Central African Empire from 1976 to 1979, was overthrown by the French after Valéry Giscard d'Estaing refused to allow the « Françafrique Empire » to become a nuclear power.

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[20] The Ukrainian Weekly, December 28, 1980, No. 31, Vol. LXXXVII, p.2-3, https://www.ukrweekly.com/archive/1980/The_Ukrainian_Weekly_1980-28.pdf, accessed 6 November 2020.

[21] Duroselle, Kaspi, *Histoire des relations internationales de 1945 à nos jours*, op. cit., p. 384-92, referring to the final statement of the 1976 Berlin Conference of the European Communist Parties.

In this context, it is not surprising that moderate African leaders embraced the human rights trend. Many of them redrafted their constitutions and allowed multi-party systems[22], while the OUA members adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. This sudden and strong interest in the concept of human rights also hid the Realpolitik considerations that motivated it. And some African countries made use of the human rights context, both for the process of their national construction and for the development of their international image.

The case of Gambia deserves particular attention. Sir Dawda Jawara became Prime Minister of The Gambia with independence in 1962. He was then elected as the country's first President and re-elected five-times to this position to run the country for 32 years. He was one of the greatest partisans of an African Charter. In 1980 and 1981, he welcomed OAU ministerial reunions in Banjul to finalise the Charter. This unconditional support enabled the capital city to qualify the African Charter, engraved in memories and history as the Banjul Charter. What better way for The Gambia — the smallest West African nation, with significantly less than a million citizens — to gain a positive image on the national and international stages ? And how to suspect or refuse support for a president so committed to the promotion of human rights ? Establishing the headquarters of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights in Banjul in 1989 only reinforced the success of a skillfully orchestrated national construction. This involvement in the African Charter was not a coincidence, but the sign of a real strategy. Indeed, between 1977 and 1983, the President also campaigned intensively for the establishment of a new human rights protection mechanism within the Commonwealth, which reinforced Gambia's image as an active defender of human right[23]. However, this political commitment to human rights' promotion did not guarantee their effective protection.

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[22] Paul Nugent, *Africa since independence*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 404 ff. : in Ivory Coast from 1980, in Central African Republic from 1981, in Cameroon from 1983, among others.

[23] James Kirby, « African Leadership in Human Rights : The Gambia and The Commonwealth Human Rights Commission 1977-83 », in *Journal of Contemporary History*, Paris, 2020, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022009420911069, accessed 6 November 2020.

The case of the Senegalese involvement in the process is also noteworthy. President Léopold Sédar Senghor was involved from the very beginning. In 1967, he welcomed the first ICJ conference on human rights in Africa to Dakar. He appointed the inventor of the *right to development*, the judge Kéba Mbaye[24], undoubtedly the most important actor in the African Charter drafting process, as the head of the Senegalese Supreme Court. Senghor advocated for the Charter and proposed resolution 115[25], at the 16th session of the OAU Heads of State and Government assembly, held in Monrovia in 1979, which officially initiated the African Charter's process. He also hosted the meeting of experts in charge of drawing up a preliminary draft in Dakar. But Senghor's role in promoting human rights contrasts with his own political situation in Senegal. Elected for his fifth presidential mandate in 1978, he quit the presidency before the end of his last mandate, leaving the concrete institutionalisation of the African Charter and Commission to his successor, but restoring his humanist image which had been somewhat tarnished at the beginning of his presidential career[26].

The OAU, as a continental organisation, also benefited from the adoption of a regional charter following the European and the Pan-American examples, enhancing its international image. The Organisation came within the scope of the global governance system in line with existing UN organs and became the natural and logical interlocutor for any African issues on the world stage. The new African human rights rhetoric fostered the South-North dialogue : as commentators observe, « the OAU's [human rights rhetoric] was primarily for international,

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[24] President of the Senegalese Supreme Court for 17 years and of the Senegalese Constitutional Council from 1990 to 1993, he was Vice president of the International Court of Justice The Hague from 1983 to 1991 and created the Court Arbitration in Sports (CAS) that he presided over from its creation until his death.

[25] OAU archives, AHG/Dec.115 (XVI), in OUA, AHG, Dec.111-117(XVI) Rev.1, *Decisions adopted by the Sixteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government*, Monrovia, 17th-20th June 1979.

[26] During his first mandate as President, his opposition with his President of the Council Mamadou Dia and several ministers, whom he ended up imprisoning, have earned him a lot of criticism from Pope John XXII, François Mitterrand and Jean-Paul Sartre, as well as his old friend of the *Négritude* Aimé Césaire.

particularly Western, consumption[27] » or in other words, « a political show to seduce the West[28] ».

These elements of realpolitik cannot be eluded, as they influence the whole process that led to the African Charter. They particularly contribute to explaining some of the motivations as well as some of the reservations, especially on the national state level, that shape the form and content of the Banjul Charter.

A particularistic contribution to universality

If the realpolitik considerations evoked in the preceding paragraph are blindingly obvious, analysis of OAU agendas and GAFS[29] interventions throughout the 1960s and the 1970s also shows deeper fundamentalist motivations in the process of *Peoples' rights* invention and adoption.

Consulting[30] and analysing the archives leave no doubt about the essential leading role of the UN in the promotion of human rights in Africa. But it also clearly highlights the will of African actors to redact a specific African charter. They consider it a necessary prerequisite to build efficient continental institutions that will put forward their own particular concerns: that is to say, « their economic backwardness, the fragile nature of their independence, the need to find unity and the persistence of colonialism on their continent[31] ». The consensus to promote and protect human rights in Africa is clear, « [b]ut above all, an answer must be found to the question […] : *Which human rights ?[32]* ».

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[27] Issa G. Shivji, *The Concept of Human Rights in Africa*, London, CODESIRA, 1989, p.94.

[28] Luc Sindjoun, « Africa's New Constitutions and International Policy : A Contribution to an International Economy of Political-Constitutional Goods », in *Etudes internationales*, n°26, 1995, p. 335 : « un spectacle politique pour séduire l'Occident », translated by the author.

[29] Regional UN Group of African States created in 1965.

[30] Archives of the OAU in Addis Ababa, of the IJC, of the UN in Geneva.

[31] M'Baye, OAU archives, op cit., p. 11.

[32] Ibid., p. 14 : referring to a central question already raised by Dean Ibrahima Fall at the Dakar Seminar on development and human rights in 1978.

This question is central to understanding the real essence of the Banjul Charter : the fear and the rejection of any Northern moral or ideological neo-colonialism and the will to solve the most urgent African issues. The continent's priorities are neither a question of security nor of individuality[33].

The three main subjects brought by African countries to continental and international organisations, i.e. decolonisation, discrimination and neo-colonialism, do concern human rights, but with specific regard to the situations inherited from the history of the African continent and peoples.

The first concern, as already stated in the 1963 OAU Charter, is the « absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories that are still dependent[34] ». The « eradication of all forms of colonialism from Africa[35] » is « one of the purposes of the Organization[36] ». The right of people to self-determination has constituted the absolute priority of the OAU since its creation, a claim made by intellectuals of African descent and activists since the 19th century. As an example, the famous Pan-Africanist activist and author W.E.B. Du Bois rushed to Versailles after World War I in an attempt to influence President Wilson with respect to the living conditions of Afro-Americans and the fate of colonised people[37]. Another example is *The Declaration of the Rights of the Negro Peoples of the World* initiated by Marcus Garvey and adopted at the New York UNIA Convention in 1920[38], mostly comprising articles on the liberation of and the self-determination of Black peoples all over the world[39]. Although the right to self-determination had been

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[33] Ibid., p. 11.
[34] OAU Charter, Addis-Abbaba, 1963, art. III, 6, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf, accessed 6 November 2020.
[35] Ibid., art. II, d.
[36] M'Baye, OAU archives, op. cit., p. 13.
[37] For more information : David Levering Lewis, *W.E.B. Du Bois: Biography of a Race 1868-1919*, New York, Henry Holt & Co, 1994 and Shamoon Zamir, *The Cambridge Companion to W.E.B. Du Bois*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, November 2008.
[38] *Universal Negro Improvement Association* created by Jamaican Marcus Garvey in 1914, claiming 5 million members over 40 countries in 1920.
[39] For more information : Colin Grant, *Le Nègre au chapeau : L'ascension et la chute de Marcus Garvey*, Paris, Afromundi, 2012.

discussed since the early 20th century, it was still not included in the Universal Declaration in 1948. But « as a result of the untiring efforts of the new African States, it has won a special place within the United Nations [...and is] today unquestionably recognized as a right and as a forming part of international law [...] expressly mentioned in the 1966 Covenants[40] ». However, despite its international formal recognition, several African territories still did not benefit from it after 1966[41]. The Pan-African struggle against colonialism, which had lasted over one hundred years, had still not come to an end. Not surprising then that the African Charter mentions the *Peoples' rights* in its title, referring to the right of people that occupy a large space in the text to self-determination.

Secondly, the quantitative analysis of the subjects raised by African states within the OAU and UN also highlights the essential importance of racial and discrimination issues. How could issues of human rights' infringements be discussed with young African nations while the South African regime of apartheid was tolerated by the international community and the UN institutions ? Western commentators questioned and condemned Amin Dada's Uganda's membership of the UN Commission on Human Rights from 1977 to 1979 but did not really contest the legitimacy of South Africa's continued inclusion in UN institutions. The anti-racism and anti-discrimination struggles were the core of Pan-Africanism and the very essence of *Pan-Negroism*[42]. They represented the fundamentals of the fight for equality and independence. They obviously echoed the *Garveyan Black Pride*, as well as the *Harlem Renaissance* and the *French Negritude* or the more recent US civil rights movement[43]. The anti-racism was expressed in a series of articles at the very beginning of the Charter, namely Articles 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.

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[40] M'Baye, OAU archives, op.cit., p. 13.

[41] Like Mozambique and Angola until 1975 or Namibia until 1990.

[42] Wilson Jeremiah More, « Africa and Pan-Africanism in the Thought of Du Bois », in Shamoon Zamir, *The Cambridge Companion to W.E.B. Du Bois*, Cambridge, November 2008, chapter 8, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-companion-to-w-e-b-du-bois/africa-and-panafricanism-in-the-thought-of-the-du-boi s/66ED8D3286BA41FD58F8022AF09A1390, accessed 16 November 2022.

[43] For more information about the origins and evolution of the Pan-Africanist movement : Amzat Boukari-Yabara, *Africa Unite ! Une histoire du panafricanisme*, Paris, La Découverte, 2014.

The third and latest concern of the Pan-Africanism, particularly since its 1945 Congress and the Africanisation of the movement, relates to the economic dependence of African territories on their former metropoles. Progress made towards political independence brings to light the tight interdependence of the economies, which would limit new nations' control of their own destiny. Theorised by Kwame Nkrumah in a book first published in 1965[44], the Gold Coast liberator and first President of Ghana was deeply preoccupied « with the phenomenon of neo-colonialism […] which [he] rightly regarded as the typical contemporary form of imperialism and with the special dangers to world peace and true decolonisation »[45]. The evolution of the Pan-African doctrine embraced subjects like the African elite's corruption and foreign support, the continental unity of newly independent countries, and primarily the governance of the local natural resources. Carried by Nkrumah, but also by Sekou Touré, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Julius Nyerere[46], these topics are clearly reflected in the *Right to Development,* an essential and innovative element of the Charter which was conceptualised by Kéba Mbaye. As mentioned in the introduction, the *development* also appears in Article 20 as the main goal of the peoples' self-determination. Article 24 states for its part « the right [of all people] to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development ». And if Article 22 is textually dedicated to the right of development, Article 21 clarifies its content. The primary right of people is to « freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources ». Africa must « eliminate all forms of foreign economic exploitations », « with a view to strengthening [its] unity and solidarity[47] ».

Peoples' rights enshrined in the Banjul Charter correspond to the main values and principles held by the Pan-Africanists throughout the 20th century. This angle tends to validate the hypothesis that the Charter is not the result of (*real*)political matters only, but also

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[44] Kwame Nkrumah, *Le Néo-Colonialisme. Dernier stade de l'impérialisme*, Paris, Présence africaine, 1973.

[45] Thomas Hodgkin, « Nkrumah's Radicalism », in *Présence Africaine*, n°85, Paris, 1973, p. 70, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24349624, accessed 6 November 2020.

[46] Respectively, first President of Guinea, first President of Nigeria, and first President of Tanzania.

[47] The Banjul Charter, Art. 21 § 4 and 5, online : https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36390-treaty-0011_-_african_charter_on_human_and_peoples_rights_e.pdf.

expresses a Pan-African doctrine that specifically relates to the African peoples' history. However, the term *solidarity* appears only five times in the original text of the Banjul Charter, and never in the form of *solidarity rights*[48]. The next section will explore how and why the new rights established in the African Charter are categorised as a new generation of human rights under the heading of *solidarity rights*.

Solidarity rights : New categorisation, context and motivations

Solidarity: a strong and contemporary concept

Solidarity is a difficult concept to define[49]. A « fetish or iconic term, invoked at all times like a talisman[50] » for Marie-Claude Blais, a « key idea[51] » for the philosopher Alfred Fouillée or a « master word[52] » for the jurist Michel Borgetto, the notion « resists all conceptual clarification attempts[53] ». Originating in Roman law, the term *solidarity* refers first to the relationship between various parties bound by a common obligation, « a commitment by which persons bind themselves to each other and to all[54] ».

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[48] https://tagcrowd.com/, accessed 21 September 2021.

[49] Two works have been particularly solicited to clear the meaning of the notion, its evolution and its perspectives. The first is *La Solidarité. Enquête sur un principe juridique*, edited by Alain Supiot, a jurist and holder of the chair entitled « Etat social et mondialisation : analyse juridique des solidarités » at the Collège de France. The second is *La solidarité. Histoire d'une idée* by the philosopher Marie-Claude Blais, which examines the concept from its genesis in the 19th century to its political consecration in the early 20th century.

[50] Marie-Claude Blais, *La Solidarité. Histoire d'une idée*, Paris, Gallimard, 2007, p. 10 : « Terme fétiche » in French.

[51] « Idée-force » in French.

[52] « Maître-mot » in French.

[53] Michel Borgetto, *La Notion de fraternité en droit français. Le passé, le présent et l'avenir de la solidarité*, Paris, 1993, quoted by Blais, *La solidarité. Histoire d'une idée*. op. cit., 2007, p. 10.

[54] French Civil Code of 17 February 1804, Book III, Title III, Chapter IV, Section 4: Joint and several obligations. (Art. 1197 to 1216), art. 1202, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/section_lc/LEGITEXT000006070721/LEGISCTA000006150253/1804-02-17/#LEGISCTA000006150253, accessed 20 December 2020.

Defined by Emile Durkheim as « a primitively social attitude », i.e. « as a social fact, [...] a reality prior to the individual[55] », Georg Kreis describes *solidarity* as « the fact of feeling morally bound by a common responsibility or interest[56] ». It « is thus always based on belonging to a community[57] » and defines a form of cooperation between individuals or groups of individuals. The notion « constitutes a fundamental dimension of being-in-society[58] ».

The concept spread more and more during the 19th-century national constructions with a first « hour of glory in the France of the Belle Epoque[59] ». The *Solidarist* movement of Léon Bourgeois « intends to base social organization on solidarity, considered as the culmination of the civilization process of mankind[60] ». *Solidarity* was seen as « the means » to develop what Durkheim called a *common consciousness* within society and to achieve « the goal » of social justice[61].

Close to the concept of *charity*, which it increasingly replaced in the second half of the 20th century, *solidarity* differs from it by adding a factor of reciprocity. Unlike Christian compassion, « solidarity does not divide the world into those who give without receiving and those who receive without giving[62] ». The notion strengthens the idea of a collective and equitable cooperation within an entire community. Interdependence is another essential constitutive factor of the concept. To quote Léon Bourgeois : « the man living in society, and unable to live without it, is at all times a debtor to it. Therein lies the basis of his duties, the burden of his freedom[63] ». It appears that the

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[55] Quoted by Blais, *La solidarité. Histoire d'une idée*, op. cit., p. 300-301.
[56] Georg Kreis, 2012, mentioned by Sandrine MAULINI at the Workshop *Concepts of Dedication*, organised in the framework of the SNSF Project on November 27th 2020.
[57] Alain Supiot, *Enquête sur un principe juridique*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2015, p.12.
[58] Blais, *La solidarité. Histoire d'une idée*, op. cit., p. 11.
[59] Ibid., p. 10.
[60] Serge Bernstein, « Léon Bourgeois et le solidarisme », in Alexandre Niess, Maurice Vaïsse, (dir.), *Léon Bourgeois. Du solidarisme à la Société des Nations*, Langres, Gueniot Dominique, 2006, p. 14, also quoted by Olivier Amiel, « Le solidarisme, une doctrine juridique et politique française de Léon Bourgeois à la Ve République », in *Parlement[s], Revue d'histoire politique*, N°11, Rennes, 2009, p. 152, https://www.cairn.info/revue-parlements1-2009-1-page-149.htm#no10, accessed 6 November 2022.
[61] Blais, *La solidarité. Histoire d'une idée*, op. cit., p. 282-283.
[62] Supiot, *Enquête sur un principe juridique*, op. cit., 2015, p.12.
[63] Léon Bourgeois, quoted by Amiel, op. cit., p. 154.

term *solidarity* is perfectly adapted for describing the new human rights in the Banjul Charter.

If *solidarity* is an essential concept at the beginning of the 19th century, there is no need to go back to the theories of Durkheim and Bourgeois to consider it. Indeed, after having been largely neglected in the early 20th century, the term *solidarity* regained popularity in the second half of the 20th century, and particularly around the 1980s.

Since the decolonisation movement of the 1960s, the notion of *international solidarity* has become a foreign policy objective in line with the republican ideals of Western countries. Development aid has indeed encouraged the growth and creation of new NGOs with solidarity objectives[64].

With the 1973 oil crisis, the idea of *national solidarity* also justified many civil society initiatives[65] such as the establishment of mechanisms to reinforce Western welfare states during serious social crises[66].

The term was also adopted by the Catholic Church. While Pope Paul VI had already reminded humanity of its « duty of solidarity[67] » towards poor countries in 1967, Pope John Paul II, the Polish Pope, « elevated solidarity to the rank of a Christian virtue[68] ». In his message, charity is « supplanted by the lay obligation of solidarity[69] », i.e. the duty « to work for the common good[70] » in order to overcome

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[64] The NGOs created under the Marshall Plan at the end of the Second World War experienced significant growth in the late 1970s. This was the case for World Vision International, which expanded considerably by launching its Sea Sweep operation to rescue Vietnamese refugees, and Care International, which initiated long-term development programmes in the 1980s. See : https://www.wvi.org/fr/our-history and https://www.care-international.org/who-we-are-1/cares-history. The decade also saw the creation of emblematic NGOs such as Médecins sans Frontières (1971), Greenpeace (1971), Cap Anamur (1979) or Handicap International (1982).

[65] Emmaus created by Abbé Pierre in 1971, Single Homeless Project (1977), The Passage (1980) or Streetlife (1982), to name a few.

[66] Such as the *Revenu Minimum d'Insertion* (RMI) in France or the *Soli* in Germany.

[67] Paul VI, « Populorum progressio », 1967, in *Le Discours social de l'Eglise catholique de Léon XIII à Jean-Paul II*, Paris, 1990, p. 518, §48.

[68] Blais, *La solidarité. Histoire d'une idée*, op. cit., p. 327-328.

[69] Ibid., p. 328.

[70] Jean-Paul II, « Sollicitudo Rei Socialis », 1987, in *Le Discours social de l'Eglise catholique de Léon XIII à Jean-Paul II*, Paris, 1990, p. 751, §38.

the challenges of interdependence and create a « new model of unity of the human race[71] ».

In Eastern Europe, *solidarity* gives its name to the Polish trade union *Solidarność*, a broad social movement against the ruling communist regime[72].

Solidarity, the common thread of European construction since Aristide Briand and Robert Schuman, has even become a legal principle that reinforces « the philosophy of European construction[73] ». While the Preamble to the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992 announces the desire to « deepen solidarity between peoples », Article 2 is even more binding in placing the duty of Community *solidarity* above national interests[74].

From the mid-1960s onwards, the term is also used to describe conferences organised by emancipation movements in the Third World in the wake of the Bandung Conference (1955). Meeting in Havana in January 1966, the first Tricontinental Solidarity Conference, bringing together the Pan-Asian, Pan-African and Latin American movements, gave rise to the Organization of Solidarity of the People of Asia, Africa and Latin America or OSPAAAL. This same idea of international *solidarity* is reflected in the economic claims of the Southern countries which call for the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), « based on equity, […] interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all[75] », as mentioned earlier.

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[71] Jean-Paul II, « Sollicitudo Rei Socialis », op. cit, p. 754, §40.
[72] For more information on Solidarność, see Renata Latala, «Solidarnosc « vit et lutte ». Les stratégies de l'émigration politique polonaise en Suisse dans les années 1980», in *L'émigration politique en Suisse au XXe siècle (1930-1990). Pratiques, réseaux, résonances,* Rémi Baudouï, Landry Charrier, Thomas Nicklas (éds.), ÉPURE - Éditions et Presses universitaires de Reims, 2017, pp. 207-228 ; Idem, « Solidarność », *Dictionnaire du Vatican et du Saint Siège*, Christophe Dickès (dir.), Paris, Robert Laffont, 2013, pp. 924-926. See also : Vincent Giret, *Solidarnosc & Solidarity,* Varsovie, 2005 and Patrick Boulte, Karol Sachs, Krystyna Vinaver, *De Solidarnosc à l'entrée de la Pologne dans l'Union Européenne, un engagement citoyen. L'action de l'association Solidarité France Pologne,* Paris, 2008.
[73] Blais, *La solidarité. Histoire d'une idée*, op. cit., p. 329.
[74] Maastricht Treaty, 7 February 1992, art. 2 : « The European Commission shall have the task of promoting economic and social cohesion and solidarity among the Member States ».
[75] UN Resolution 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, Preamble, §3.

The end of the twentieth century thus saw a proliferation of references to *solidarity* in the political, social and religious spheres. The term can be used to describe initiatives related to aid and charity, compassion and generosity, as well as to designate movements of fraternal or corporatist union, regardless of whether they are for or against a specific cause. Given its seemingly unfailing popularity, it is hardly surprising that *solidarity* also serves to redefine an existing concept, in this case, human rights, which, as a simple qualifier, it tends to adapt to the times. Even if it is perfectly adequate, the process of designating these new human rights by the term *solidarity* does not happen by chance. This is the subject of the next section.

Place and players

The actual term *solidarity rights* originates from a place that has been little mentioned so far : the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization or UNESCO. Founded by twenty signatory states in November 1945, UNESCO seeks to « strengthen the bonds between nations by promoting cultural heritage and the equal dignity of all cultures[76] ». To this end, the organisation « develops educational tools to help people live as global citizens free of hate and intolerance[77] ». In concrete terms, this means development aid programs, which take the form of education, literacy and information campaigns, specialised scientific or popular publications, technology transfers, or plans for the protection of tangible and intangible cultural assets. Based in Paris, UNESCO's governance is organised around three bodies. The General Conference, which meets every two years to determine general orientation, is composed of all Member States, each of which has one vote, irrespective of its size and contribution to the budget. The Executive Board ensures the proper execution of the Program set by the General Conference. It is composed of members who must represent the « diversity of the cultures, as well as their geographic origins » in order to « reflect the universality of the Organization », a balance achieved through « skillful negotiations[78] ».

[76] https://fr.unesco.org/about-us/introducing-unesco, accessed 23 September 2021.
[77] https://www.unesco.org/en/introducing-unesco, accessed 31 January 2022.
[78] https://en.unesco.org/about-us/governance, accessed 31 January 2022.

The implementation of the Program and the day-to-day tasks are carried out by the Secretariat, headed by a Director General who is responsible for overseeing the different sectors of the Program and for appointing a Deputy Director for each department.

From 1961 to 1974, UNESCO was headed by the Frenchman René Maheu, who gave the organisation a genuine intellectual and philosophical mission, tinged with a real ideological dimension. His « ambition [...] is to make UNESCO an important forum for reflection on the political, social and economic problems of the present day[79] ». He took office a few months after the year of African independencies and remained very attentive to the importance of these new Southern voices that appeared on the governance scene of his institution. He thus cultivated a very particular vision of development aid, based on the idea of *endogenous cultural development*, a model that encouraged « the use of developing countries' own cultural resources for their economic development [...] an assistance that enables these countries to forge their own methods and tools for development, adapted to their specific cultures and needs[80] ». Decolonisation and the emergence of the Third World contributed considerably to this « ideological shift[81] » that appeared very clearly in this progressive UN organism. As at the UN, African countries formed « a *highly cohesive* group, [which] now constitutes one of the essential elements of the Executive Council, [and whose demands therefore play] a *decisive role*[82] ». With this growing representation in UN organisations and the increasing influence of the Group of 77 or the NIEO, OAU members mobilised under the direction of President Senghor to agree on a common candidate to succeed René Maheu as the head of UNESCO[83].

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[79] Chloé Maurel, *L'UNESCO de 1945 à 1974*, Paris, Université de Paris I, 2006, p. 142 (translated by the author).

[80] Chloé Maurel, « L'Unesco : un âge d'or de l'aide au développement par l'éducation (1945-1975) », dans *Cahier d'histoire. Revue d'histoire critique*, n°108, 2009, p. 9, https://journals.openedition.org/chrhc/1819 (translated by the author), accessed 14 October 2021.

[81] Maurel, *L'UNESCO de 1945 à 1974*, op. cit., p. 267 (translated by the author).

[82] Extract from the correspondence of Olivier de Sayve, French delegate to UNESCO, to Couve de Murville, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Quoted by Ibid.

[83] Philippe Decraene, « Une éclatante victoire pour l'Afrique noire », in *Le Monde*, November 16, 1974, https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1974/11/16/une-eclatante-victoire-pour-l-afrique-noire_2529131_1819218.html, accessed 18 November 2022.

On November 15, 1974, the unity of the African continent and of southern countries was cemented on the international scene with the victory of the Senegalese Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow by a near unanimous vote[84]. Belonging to the « second generation of Senegalese academics […] who were often more combative towards the wealthy states than their elders[85] », he spent time with the African intellectual elites of Paris, including Kéba Mbaye, who was then a student at the Faculty of Law[86] and then at the *École Nationale de la France d'Outre-Mer* (*ENFOM*)[87]. He then returned to Senegal where he became involved in the struggle for independence. He joined the administration (where he found Mbaye himself very active in the codification of law in Senegal) and became Minister of National Education (1966-68), then Minister of Culture and Youth (1968-70). He joined UNESCO's Executive Board in 1966 and was appointed by Maheu in 1970 as Assistant Director-General of the Education Sector, UNESCO's largest division[88]. As « the first African to head a major United Nations institution[89] », M'Bow himself saw his election as « a demonstration of consideration and esteem for regions and peoples — those of the Third World — who have been kept out of the decision-making centres and of the universal influence hubs for so long[90] ». Like his predecessor, he tried to reconcile universalism and multiculturalism while consolidating the growing influence of the countries of the South : « it is in the genius of the African

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[84] He was elected with 123 votes in favour out of 126 (1 against and 2 abstentions), https://www.unesco.org/archives/multimedia/document-3987, extracted at 1'16".

[85] Philippe Decraene, « Une éclatante victoire pour l'Afrique noire », in *Le Monde*, November 16, 1974. Accessed online on: https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1974/11/16/une-eclatante-victoire-pour-l-afrique-noire_2529131_1819218.html.

[86] Fondation Kéba Mbaye, « Qui est Kéba Mbaye ? », p.1.

[87] ENFOM is the National School of Overseas France. Many Africans among its students have gone on to important positions in their liberated nations, including Paul Biya, President of Cameroon since 1988; Hamani Diori, first President of the Republic of Niger ; Gabriel Lisette, Chadian politician; Philibert Tsiranana, first President of Madagascar. In addition to Kéba Mbaye, many Senegalese attended ENFOM : Babacar Ba, Minister ; Daniel Cabou, several times Minister and Secretary of the Central Bank of West African States; Alioune Badara Fall, Ambassador and then President of the Bar; Cheikh Hamidou Kane, politician and writer ; Habib Thiam, Prime Minister as well as Abdou Diouf, successor of Léopold Sedar Senghor to the Presidency of the country.

[88] Fernando Valderrama Martinez, *Histoire de l'UNESCO,* Paris, UNESCO, 1995, p. 189 and 313.

[89] https://www.unesco.org/archives/multimedia/document-3987, extracted at 0'33'.

[90] Maurel, *L'UNESCO de 1945 à 1974*, op.cit., p. 166.

people, in their wisdom, that I will draw my reasons for action[91] ». In 1976 he published a book on the policy he intended to pursue with UNESCO, *Le monde en devenir. Réflexions sur le nouvel ordre économique international*[92], in which he urged people to « replace the prevailing disorder by a new, fairer and more equitable order, […] born of the aspirations [of a large part of the world's population] for greater solidarity[93] ». *Solidarity* between peoples and nations was an absolute necessity for him, which guided the philosophy of his action throughout his mandates[94].

« Human rights are at the heart of UNESCO's mandate[95] ». Its main tasks are to « promote studies on the implementation of the Declaration[96] », « to invite Member States to develop their cooperation in favor of international understanding and human rights[97] » and « to ensure the implementation of the rights proclaimed in the UDHR[98] », i.e. to translate, explain and « disseminate[99] » the concept beyond the West. Although human rights are now integrated across all the organisation's action programs, a specific department was devoted to them in its early decades, the *Human Rights and Peace Division*. Its mission and role are described and defined in a 1974 document[100], a true programmatic vision of M'Bow's policy at the head of the institution and terms of reference for the *Human Rights and Peace Division*. The text stresses the need

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[91] Martinez, *L'histoire de l'UNESCO*, op.cit., p. 226.

[92] *The world in the making. Reflections on the new international economic order*, not published in English.

[93] Amadou-Mahtar M'bow, *Le monde en devenir. Réflexions sur le nouvel ordre économique international*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2004, pp. 15 and 13.

[94] Amadou-Mahtar M'bow, *Le temps des peuples*, Paris, Robert Laffon, 1982, p. 13-14 : *Necessary solidarity* is the title of the first chapter of his book.

[95] https://en.unesco.org/human-rights, accessed on 2022.01.31st.

[96] Martinez, *L'histoire de l'UNESCO*, op.cit., p. 89.

[97] Ibid., p. 125.

[98] Ibid., p. 184.

[99] Anton Prohaska, « L'UNESCO : De nouvelles idées pour les droits de l'Homme ? », in *Karel Vasak Amicorum Liber. Les droits de l'homme à l'aube du XXIe siècle*, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1999, p. 1117.

[100] UNESCO, « Recommandation sur l'éducation pour la compréhension, la coopération et la paix internationale et l'éducation relative aux droits de l'homme et aux libertés fondamentales », in *Actes de la Conférence générale*, Paris, 1974, p. 152-160, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000114040_fre.page=149, accessed 18 November, 2022.

to « understand and respect all peoples, their civilizations, values and ways of life[101] ». It also makes clear reference to the rights of the peoples : the « equal rights of all peoples », as well as the « right of peoples to self-determination » are considered as priorities in terms of education and the non-respect of these principles as one of « the major problems of humanity[102] ». The *Recommendation* clearly states « the importance of international law[103] », which is now seen as a tool, a means of action to implement the principles that should lead to better understanding and cohabitation between peoples.

In 1976, M'Bow appointed a French-Czech Doctor of Law, Karel Vasak, to head the Human Rights division. He was a colleague and then a member of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) where he befriended Kéba Mbaye. In 1959, he was appointed to the Human Rights Directorate of the Council of Europe and began « teaching human rights in all parts of the world[104] ». In 1968, he became editor-in-chief of the renowned *Human Rights Review*, and the following year, he was chosen to become the first Secretary General of the International Institute of Human Rights (IIHR), created in Strasbourg by René Cassin[105]. A former participant in the teaching sessions held in Strasbourg remembers « the abundance of ideas and encounters that they were[106] ». His friend Kéba Mbaye, for example, gave a lecture on the right to development in July 1972, well before the subject became a key element in the evolution of international law[107]. Its lectures « made it possible to tackle or deepen subjects which, at the time, were often not taught (such as other regional systems of human rights protection, humanitarian

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[101] Ibid., III. (4b), p. 153.

[102] Ibid., V. (18a), p. 155.

[103] Ibid., V. (18b), p. 155.

[104] Jean-Marie Bécet, « Le Professeur Karel Vasak ou les droits de l'homme enseigné aux étudiants brestois », in *Karel Vasak Amicorum Liber*, op. cit., p. 9.

[105] *Karel Vasak Amicorum Liber*, op.cit., p. 17-18.

[106] Martine Schlüter-Lapierre, « Souvenirs d'une ancienne participante aux sessions d'enseignement de l'Institut international des droits de l'homme », in *Karel Vasak Amicorum Liber,* op.cit., p. 35.

[107] Amadou-Mahtar M'bow, « Le droit au développement comme un droit de l'homme », Inaugural Lesson of the Third Teaching Session of the International Institute of Human Rights, Strasbourg, 3-21 July 1972. Mentioned by Cullet, op.cit., p. 62.

law or the work of the Red Cross)[108] ». Praised for his pragmatism, « put at the service of innovative and original ideas[109] », Vasak readily asked : « Shouldn't there be human rights based on the obvious fraternity of men and by their indispensable solidarity ? [110]». His qualities, but above all his vision in terms of human rights (is the indispensable *solidarity* he mentions not in line with the necessary *solidarity* that Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow calls for ?) quickly convinced M'Bow that he was the perfect candidate to head the organisation's legal think tank. And as his friend Anton Prohaska, then Austrian representative at the General Conference, testifies, « Karel Vasak was certainly not the last to cultivate this quest for invention and innovation at UNESCO[111] ».

He did not hesitate to take up international law in order to spread the idea of the peoples' rights to peace, development and a healthy and sustainable environment beyond the circle of their original creators and supporters. Through further cooperation with the International Commission of Jurists and the International Institute of Human Rights, UNESCO remains extremely active, organising seminars and conferences, but above all by actively disseminating its important publications devoted to human rights, their various dimensions and their evolution. It is in the context of this inventory and reflection that the notion of *solidarity rights* will become the central element of a new human rights classification theory.

Vasak first mentioned the concept of *solidarity rights* during a symposium on human rights and discrimination held in Besançon in December 1971[112]. In a much later article, published in 1977, he brought his innovative thinking under the patronage of UNESCO

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[108] Schlüter-Lapierre, « Souvenirs d'une ancienne participante aux sessions d'enseignement de l'Institut international des droits de l'homme », op.cit., p. 37.

[109] Bécet, « Le Professeur Karel Vasak ou les droits de l'homme enseigné aux étudiants brestois », op.cit., p. 11.

[110] Chevreuse, « Humanisme », in *Karel Vasak Amicorum Liber,* op.cit., p. 17. In French: « Ne devrait-il pas y avoir des droits de l'homme sécrétés par l'évidente fraternité des hommes et par leur indispensable solidarité ».

[111] Prohaska, « L'UNESCO : De nouvelles idées pour les droits de l'Homme ? », op. cit., p. 1115.

[112] Karel Vasak, « Le droit international des droits de l'homme », Contribution to the 2nd Symposium of Besançon, *Les droits de l'homme en France en 1970-71. La France devant la discrimination raciale*, Besançon, 9-11 décembre 1971.

by linking the formulation *solidarity rights* with « [t]he imperative need to formulate what the Director General of UNESCO M'Bow describes as the third generation of human rights[113] ». He thus skillfully laid the groundwork for his new classification of human rights, while at the same time following the policy of UNESCO's Director-General, who himself supported the idea of presenting to the United Nations the draft of a third International Covenant which included these brand-new *solidarity rights*[114].

For the thirtieth anniversary of the UDHR, UNESCO published a book intended as a theoretical and didactic reference on human rights : *The International Dimensions of Human Rights*, edited by Vasak[115]. In 1981, Vasak became Director of International Standards and Legal Affairs at UNESCO, where he was able to act as legal adviser and concentrate fully on disseminating his theoretical vision. In 1982, in a Meeting of Experts organised in Strasbourg with the assistance of the International Institute of Human Rights, a revised version of *The international Dimensions of Human Rights* was published in English under the direction of Philip G. Alston, who had a master's degree in law from the University of California, Berkeley, where Vasak had generated a following[116]. These events and publications were followed by numerous articles by Vasak and his followers, advocating for the recognition of a new generation of human rights[117]. This led in 1990 to the publication of a new UNESCO

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[113] Vasak, « A 30-year struggle ; the sustained efforts to give force of law to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights », dans *The UNESCO Courier : a window open on the world*, XXX, 11, 1977, p. 29, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000048063, accessed 18 November 2022.

[114] The text of the Preliminary Draft can be found in André Lapeyre, François de Tinguy, Karel Vasak, (ed.), *Les dimensions universelles des Droits de l'Homme*, Brussels, Bruylant, 1990, p. 310-316.

[115] Karel Vasak (ed.), *Les dimensions internationales des droits de l'homme*, Paris, UNESCO, 1978.

[116] Karel Vasak (ed.), *The International Dimensions of Human Rights*, Volumes I and II, Paris, UNESCO, 1982.

[117] Karel Vasak, « Pour une troisième génération des droits de l'homme », in *Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles*, 1984, p. 837-839. Stephen P. Marks, *Emerging Human Rights : A New Generation for the 1980s*, Harvard, 1980. Philip Alston, « A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights : Progressive Development or Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law ? », in *Netherland International Law Review*, Vol.29, N°3, 1982. Dominique Rousseau, « Les droits de l'homme de la troisième génération », in *Revue interdisciplinaire d'études juridiques*, vol. 19, Brussels, 1987.

book, *The Universal Dimensions of Human Rights*, the first volume of which concludes with Karel Vasak's seminal contribution « The Different Categories of Human Rights », which recapitulates his theory of the « Three Generations of Human Rights[118] ».

The new category of human rights, as well as its qualification by *solidarity rights*, is the result of a long intellectual, administrative and political process that took place in different circles and organisations. The five innovative articles of the Banjul Charter appear as a step in this process which is independent of the Banjul Charter's adoption process. The intellectual process of conceptualising new rights adapted to the needs of the African continent and the process of universalisation of a new category of human rights on a global scale, if certainly interconnected, are completely different.

Hybrid origins with hybrid motivations

As Sandrine Kott describes in her book *Organiser le monde, une autre histoire de la guerre froide*, « International organizations were the privileged places for the new nation states to enter the scene by offering them a framework for collective organization and a forum[119] ». The *solidarity rights* emergence process described above highlights two elements that fall within Kott's analysis.

Firstly, the focus should not be on « international organizations » only. If UNESCO played a significant role as a forum and as a megaphone in promoting *solidarity rights*, the importance of influential groups such as NGOs and specialised institutes should not be underestimated. In the present case, it is a question of considering and acknowledging all the initiatives and work done upstream by the International Institute of Human Rights and by the International Commission of Jurists. These groups of reflection, influence and pressure are clearly the real drivers of the resolutions and actions put in place by international organisations.

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[118] Lapeyre, de Tinguy, Vasak, (ed.), *Les dimensions universelles des Droits de l'Homme*, op.cit., p. 297-309.
[119] Sandrine Kott, *Organiser le monde. Une autre histoire de la guerre froide [Organising the world, another history of the cold war.]*, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 2021, p. 177.

Secondly, as a result of the previous point, international organisations do not represent a field of opportunity solely for « nation states » but also for individuals or groups of individuals whose interests do not systematically overlap with those of the nation from which they originate. While Senegal and The Gambia have been very supportive of the recognition and implementation of *solidarity rights*, research shows that they are neither the result of a bottom-up grassroots national movement, nor the result of a national policy. The concept of *solidarity rights* is rather the result « of a current of thought in which one meets [in addition to Kéba Mbaye and Karel Vasak] other great activists and thinkers such as Niall Mac Dermott[120], Theo van Boven[121], Philipp Alston[122] ». The *solidarity rights* current was in line with other civil activist initiatives or groups, like the NOEI or the Club of Rome. The movement initiated by Lelio Basso should be mentioned here. An important member of the Italian Socialist Party and President of the Russell Tribunal II for Repression in Latin America between 1973 and 1975, Basso created with his wife, Lisli, the *League* and the *International Foundation for the Rights and Liberation of Peoples*, which seeks to extend international law to « new subjects, [such as] peoples, national liberation movements, international non-governmental organisations — which are among the most dynamic elements of the international community [...] and which many states tend to ignore[123] ». Supported by Algerian President H. Boumedienne and a growing number of jurists[124], political scientists[125] and intellectuals[126] around the world, the *International League for*

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[120] Niall Mac Dermott, British Labour MP, was Secretary General of the International Commission of Jurists from 1970 to 1990.

[121] Theodoor Cornelis dit Theo van Boven, eminent Dutch jurist, Director of the UN Human Rights Division from 1977 to 1982 and a faithful member of the International Commission of Jurists, of which he became Vice-President in 1991.

[122] Abderrahman El Youssoufi, « Réflexions sur l'apport de la *Troisième Génération des droits de l'Homme* », in *Karel Vasak Amicorum Liber,* op. cit., p. 427, who also mentions « others such as Georges Ali Saab, René-Jean Dupuy or Johan Galtung ».

[123] Antonio Cassese, Edmond Jouve, (ed.), *Pour un droit des peuples. Essais sur la Déclaration d'Alger*, Paris, Berger. Levrault, 1978, p. 20.

[124] Among which were Léo Matarasso, Albert Bourgi, José Echeverria, Bert V. A. Röling, Richard R. Falk and François Rigaux.

[125] Among which were Edmond Jouve, author of *Relations internationales du Tiers Monde et Droit des peuples*, Paris, 1979 and Antonio Cassese, but also Sergio Caruso and Armando Uribe.

[126] Among which were Jean-Paul Sartre and Laurent Heynemann (1948), continuing Paul and Nusch Eluard's friendship with the Basso couple.

the Rights and Liberation of Peoples, led by the renowned jurist Leo Matarasso, organised a major international conference in Algiers in 1976, where the *Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples* was promulgated as a « political and legal document, but above all as a weapon for the liberation of peoples[127] », in which peoples, and no longer states, became « subjects of international law[128] ». Based on the *Algiers Declaration*, the *League* then founded the *Permanent Peoples' Tribunal* in 1979, a court of opinion « without legal value or enforceability », but a « high moral authority » and « spokesperson for the universal conscience » which brought to light crimes ignored « for reasons of Realpolitik[129] ».

Peoples' rights, the *right to development*, the *African Charter* or *solidarity rights* are all concepts or achievements resulting from this current of thought which has advanced the idea of a new kind of fundamental rights on a global scale. Close to the NOEI, from which it develops in parallel, the movement could be described as militant for a *new international legal order*. From schools they have attended, to the associations of which they were members, to the positions they have held during their professional careers, they gathered around an idea to constitute a transnational influence group. The essence of this school of thought is characterised by a triple observation shared by its members.

Firstly, they are concerned about a growing danger in the interpretation, application and dissemination of human rights. They consider that existing human rights presuppose an excessive individualism that places the individual and the society in radical opposition. And « [f]rom individualism to egoism, the slope is then easy to descend[130] ». Human rights would neglect the fact that the individual is part of a community in which he or she lives

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[127] Lelio Basso, « Avant-Propos » and « Les fondements idéologiques de la Déclaration d'Alger », in Cassese, Jouve (ed.), *Pour un droit des peuples. Essais sur la Déclaration d'Alger*, op. cit., p. 10.

[128] Ibid., p. 7.

[129] Cassese, Jouve (ed.), *Pour un droit des peuples. Essais sur la Déclaration d'Alger*, op.cit., p. 21.

[130] Karel Vasak, « Les Différentes Catégories des Droits de l'Homme », in Lapeyre, de Tinguy, Vasak, (ed.), *Les dimensions universelles des Droits de l'Homme*, op. cit., p. 301.

and on which he or she depends for the realisation of his or her full potential[131].

Like the advocates of a new international economic order, they are also concerned about the capacity of nation states to meet new challenges that go beyond the boundaries of their respective sovereignties. « The emergence of many states [...] with the successive phases of political decolonization, [...] population growth, [...] the information technology revolution and economic interdependence[132]» between nations, peoples and individuals implies problems that can no longer be solved by an isolated state. The maintenance of peace, the protection of the environment, and the equitable development of all peoples are all challenges that Vasak, M'Bow or Mbaye identify as going beyond a national framework[133]. International terrorism, human migrations, tax evasion, or the management of a pandemic would undoubtedly be added to their list today.

Finally, they call for the institutionalisation of a set of new rights that are needed because the rights guaranteed by the two existing International Covenants « are not sufficiently flexible or dynamic to respond adequately to present circumstances[134] ». *Solidarity rights* are now needed « to provide a globally coordinated response to the threats to human rights arising from the global interdependence of all peoples and nations[135] ». And these new rights imply « international cooperation », as their « realization can only be achieved through the joint efforts of all : States, individuals and other public and private entities[136] ».

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[131] Carl Wellman, « Solidarity, the Individual and Human Rights », in *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 22, N°3, Baltimore, 2000, p. 642, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4489297, accessed 16 November 2022.

[132] Amadou Mahtar M'bow, *Aux sources du futur. La problématique mondiale et les missions de l'UNESCO,* Paris, L'Harmattan, 2011, p. 14-15-16.

[133] Karel Vasak, 1984, quoted by Wellman, « Solidarity, the Individual and Huamn Rights », op. cit., p. 642.

[134] Philippe Alston, « A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights : Progressive Development or Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law ?», in *Netherland International Law Review*, Vol.29, n°3, 1982, p. 1.

[135] Wellman, « Solidarity, the Individual and Huamn Rights », op. cit., p. 642.

[136] Extract from the Preamble, §3, of the Preliminary Draft of the Third International Covenant on Solidarity Rights, in Lapeyre, de Tinguy, Vasak, (ed.), *Les dimensions universelles des Droits de l'Homme*, op. cit., p. 310.

Those observations perfectly match the definition of the concept of *solidarity* as defined above. The idea that all nations form an interdependent community whose bonds need to be strengthened in order to face global challenges constitutes the very basis of the *solidarity rights* ideology. Both a long-lasting world peace and the path to progress lie in the equitable development of all communities, which is only possible through the fraternal and reciprocal cooperation of each group, people or nation. In the same way that it was invoked to cement republican communities in the 19th century, *solidarity* appears to be the indispensable virtue for building a fairer world order, guaranteeing freedoms and equality within the diversity of its autonomous and sovereign communities, but above all in *solidarity*. The need for a common commitment, for a certain global consensus, and for a constant effort of coordination explains the choice of the concept of *solidarity* to qualify this new generation of human rights. The notion of *solidarity* expresses this « bond » and « moral duty towards other members of a group », sharing a « community of interests », to use the Larousse definition[137]. *Solidarity rights*, « while comprising quite heterogeneous claims, are distinguished above all by the fact that solidarity is a prerequisite for their realization[138] ».

While they share a common theoretical vision and combine to promote it, all elements of the identified « current of thoughts » do not necessarily pursue the same motivations, goals or strategies.

Kéba Mbaye, who drafted the African Charter, primarily agreed with Pan-African thought and philosophy. The *right to development* was his real battle horse. His engagement was part of the fight for the economic independence of young African states, in the purest tradition of the post-war Pan-African Congresses[139] and of

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[137] https://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/solidarit%c3%a9/73312, accessed 24 September 2021.

[138] Alston, « A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights : Progressive Development or Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law ? », op.cit., p. 1.

[139] William E. B. du Bois, *Fifth Pan-African Congress final resolution, ca. October 1945*, Special Collections and University, Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries, http://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b107-i461, accessed 16 November 2022. Womber, P. K., *The Pan-African Congress of Manchester, 1945 : The Outcry for Independence*. Yaoundé, 2016.

Nkrumah's intellectual heritage. But he differed from previous Pan-African activists by using the law rather than politics as his tool. His publications and interventions showed his determination to impose a new principle in international law that would influence international relations by smoothing the dependence of the former colonial states with respect to their former colonial power. The combination of its *right to development* with *solidarity rights* gives its invention a clear support and a wider audience. Part of a larger movement, his concept was not only central to the African Charter but also became a part of the UN debates on the evolution of international law[140]. As for the notion of *solidarity*, it referred above all to the very Pan-African notion of *unity. Unity,* reflected in the name of the continental *African Unity Organization,* appeared no fewer than 24 times in the African Charter. The *unity* concept also accompanied the claims of African descent since their origins, from the early 20th-century *Pan-Negroism*[141], aiming at the unity of all the Black-American people, to the *Pan-Africanism,* aiming at the unity of all the people of African descent, to the African Unity movements, aiming at the federalisation of the African continent[142]. *Solidarity* is necessary to create and legitimise a continental *legal unity* of fundamental principles, in Mbaye's opinion the best or only way to guarantee the rule of law in Africa.

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[140] ONU Résolution 41/128, *Déclaration sur le droit au développement*, New York, 4th December 1986, https://www.ohchr.org/fr/professionalinterest/pages/righttodevelopment.aspx, accessed 16 November 2022. Henri Sanson, « Le droit au développement comme norme métajuridique en droit du développement », in Maurice Flory, Jean-Robert Hendy, Ahmed Mahiou (dir.), *La formation des normes en droit international du développement. Actes du colloque d'Aix-en-Provence (7-8 octobre 1982)*, Paris, 1984, p. 61-70.

[141] Wilson Jeremiah More, « Africa and Pan-Africanism in the Thought of Du Bois », in Shamoon Zamir, *The Cambridge Companion to W.E.B. Du Bois*, Cambridge, November 2008, chapter 8, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-companion-to-w-e-b-du-bois/africa-and-panafricanism-in-the-thought-of-du-bois/66ED8D3286BA41FD58F8022AF09A1390, accessed 16 November 2022.

[142] Immanual Geiss, « Notes on the Development of Pan-Africanism », *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, vol. 3, n°4, June 1967, pp. 719-740. Immanuel Geiss, *The Pan-African Movement*, London, Holmes & Meier, 1974. Boukari-Yabara, *Africa Unite ! Une histoire du panafricanisme*, op. cit. Oruno D. Lara, *La Naissance du Panafricanisme. Les racines caraïbes, américaines et africaines du mouvement au XIXe siècle*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2015. Leslie James, *George Padmore and Decolonization from Below. Pan-Africanism, the Cold War, and the End of Empire*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow and Mbaye were both Senegalese and had a common Pan-African background. M'Bow became director of UNESCO thanks to the support of African and Southern countries. And the democratic and progressive election mode of UNESCO encouraged him to pursue a policy of non-alignment, a third way devoted to the interests of emerging countries. He thus became a leader in the defence of the Third World and a key player in the NIEO and the anti-globalisation movements that emerged at the end of the 20ᵗʰ century. However, unlike Mbaye, he did not follow a *legal* strategy. Rather, he pursued the political agenda of a major international civil servant, through careerism and ideology. As mentioned, *solidarity* was a key concept of his philosophy and of his plan of action. His attachment to the notion was not just pragmatic or opportunistic but echoed his political penchant for socialism. Symbol of Third-Worldism, the anti-American UNESCO policies he pursues earned him the label of « Marxist [143] ». For him, *solidarity* had an internationalist connotation, tinged with class struggle, which was in direct opposition to the liberalism he was trying to overcome with his *endogenous development* policies.

Contrary to Mbaye and M'Bow, Karel Vasak did not take his inspiration from the ancient Pan-African struggles. His motivation was rather to be found in his anti-communism and anti-Sovietism. As a postgraduate student on a scholarship in France, Vasak watched helplessly as the communist putsch of 1948 took place in his country. Despite assurances from the new Czechoslovak authorities that they would respect the agreements with France on university exchanges, Vasak preferred not to return to the country during the holidays. At the beginning of the next academic year, he was disappointed and shocked to see that his fellow Czechoslovakian students were not allowed to leave the country anymore. For him, this was akin to « the rape of the young Czechoslovak democracy by the dictatorship of the proletariat[144] ». This violation of human rights marked the beginning of his anti-communism as well as his commitment to the law. He eventually left UNESCO in 1984,

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[143] Dr. Antonin Hornych, « Les souvenirs d'un ami—52 ans d'amitié (1947-1999) », in *Karel Vasak Amicorum Liber. Les droits de l'homme à l'aube du XXIe siècle*, op. cit., p. 25.
[144] Ibid., p. 23-24.

precisely as a protest against M'Bow's policy against the USA. His exchanges with Mbaye clearly showed his support in favour of the *right to development* and the free use of natural resources, thus coming closer to the proponents of *environmental law* that also emerged in the 1970s[145]. He also vigorously defended the very Eastern *right to peace* and exhumed the *right to self-determination*, which together allowed him to constitute a new category of human rights. His support for Mbaye's undertaking was also a way of ensuring that the African Charter included several articles on *solidarity rights* and that they were all grouped together in a common part which gave weight to his own categorisation theory. The use he made of the concept of *solidarity* therefore stemmed neither from its unitary character derived from Pan-Africanism, nor from its egalitarian aspect dear to communism. It was rather to be found in his *universalisation strategy*. The observed method consisted of the semantic appropriation of both Western and Soviet concepts in order to reinforce the universality of his theory and to gain the widest possible support. The *right to peace*, a concept borrowed from the Eastern tradition, just like the s*olidarity* rhetoric, became a pledge to encourage the acceptance of his theory by the Soviet bloc[146]. In the same way, the adoption of a very Western *human rights rhetoric* facilitated more support for his vision in the rest of the world. His priority seemed to be the spread of his theory of the three categories or generations of human rights rather than the actual implementation of these new rights in the global and regional legal systems.

Analysis of the various goals and motivations of the actual individual players highlights both the hybrid and the theoretical character of what is grouped under the banner of *solidarity rights*.

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[145] The first *Earth Summit* took place in June 1972 and resulted in the *Stockholm Declaration*. For more information, https://www.un.org/en/conferences/environment/stockholm1972, accessed 16 November 2022.

[146] See Nat Rubner, *An Historical Investigation of the Origins of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights*, Cambridge University, 2008.

Conclusion

The African Charter on human and peoples' rights institutionalised new human rights responding to the needs of new independent nation states. Through the establishment of a continental Convention on fundamental values, traditional Pan-African claims were turned into new universal principles to be added to the global rule of law. This use of international law marked a strategic Pan-African turn. Grievances were turned into proposals by using a new legal rhetoric that was familiar to Northern countries. Pan-Africanism joined Third-Worldism, as if absorbed into a more global and less identity-based movement but extending its impact beyond Afro-descendants.

The innovative human rights included in the African Charter are labeled as a new category or a third generation of human rights under the name of *solidarity rights*. This is not the product of one individual or one nation state but the result of a complex and multiple process. Initiated by a *current of thoughts* composed by jurists from different backgrounds and with different motivations, it involves African States and their continental organisation, NGOs, foremost among which are the ICJ and the IIHR, and international organisations, in particular, UNESCO.

If the use of international law is an innovative aspect of the Pan-African and Third-Worldist policies in the 1970s, the wording *solidarity rights* itself also marks a new strategy in terms of rhetoric. The two Northern blocs, Western and Eastern, are caught at their own game. On the one hand, the reference to human rights allows the Southern countries to overcome the claims vs. aid relationship in their dialogue with the Northern countries. The addition of new fundamental freedoms, those of the peoples to those of the individuals, allows them to *overtake by the right* the Western countries, based on the values that are historically theirs. On the other hand, the use of the concept of *solidarity* allowed the Soviet bloc to be *overcome from the left*, based on the idea of an egalitarian internationalism dear to communism. Labelling of Southern demands with Northern wordings tends to undermine the founding principles of each bloc which are emptied of their essence, overtaken by an improvement

of their own values. The result is an increased moral emancipation of the countries of the South, causing a re-multi-polarisation that certainly contributes to the outcome of the Cold War.

In the vein of humanitarian law, whose *magnetism* has been demonstrated, *solidarity rights* should benefit from the esteem and the reputation of the two values that comprise their name in the global public domain as well as in international political circles. Stating virtues that are at the same time Western and Eastern, Christian and secular, republican and internationalist, the *solidarity rights* banner fits perfectly into a universalist logic. However, a few decades after their enunciation, *solidarity rights* as a category were not as recognised and celebrated as *civil and political rights* or as *social, economic and cultural rights*. They never penetrated the collective imagination nor entered all the world's legal systems. And the reason is certainly to be found in their branding rhetoric and in their categorisation theory itself.

If the denomination *solidarity rights* perfectly matches the content they defend, research shows that the new rights' invention and theorisation is the result of a very distinct process from their denomination and categorisation process. The first, i.e. the content process, involves a current of thoughts influenced by Pan-Africanist and Third-Worldist motivations, while the second, i.e. the form process, tends to strengthen and market a human rights theory, mainly for the benefit of its author Karel Vasak and for the prestige of the international organisation that employed him.

Solidarity rights have been criticised by many with respect to their content. Generally, the creation of new rights is believed to erode existing rights. Initiators or defenders of prior generations of human rights feel targeted in their philosophies and, maybe worst, in their moral authority. Moreover, the approximate definition of *solidarity rights'* holders and objects provokes many remarks. They appear as a vague or immaterial concept that cannot really be implemented. The transnational aspect of *Peoples' rights* also asks the question of their judicial reach. Who could implement them and how could global infringements be sanctioned ? *Peoples' rights* cannot be « enforced without the cooperation of states, [...] this is the reality

of international politics. It is states that create and implement international law ». And « each State values its own sovereignty [too] highly[147] ».

Beyond the binding aspect of supranational law for the sovereignty of national legal systems or any other resistance to their substance, the *right to development* as well as *environmental rights* gained in importance and became central topics for the UN. S*olidarity rights* as a category have on the contrary aged in exactly the same way as the theory of the three generations of human rights. Indeed, the categorisations of human rights are widely questioned[148]. As mentioned above, the principle of the indivisibility of rights[149] implies that they intersect, complement and respond to each other. Moreover, any categorisation would risk encouraging a hierarchical distinction between different categories of rights. Depending on one's background, history or interests, one might come to regard a category as the most essential, relegating the others to second-class rights. Any categorisation would « reflect distinctions that do not exist in either theory or in practice[150] ».

The classification into generations is even more contested and questionable. It is true that the chronology of the emergence of different conceptions or categories of human rights corresponds to three distinct periods in history. However, the idea of generations implies a chronological hierarchy. In other words, the first-generation rights would be the first to be conceptualised and therefore the most essential, but also the oldest and therefore the least adapted to the realities of present-day society. Such a categorisation would therefore be particularly subjective and therefore misleading. Generations also entail a notion of succession. In other words, a new generation tends to replace the previous which

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[147] Wellman, « Solidarity, the Individual and Human Rights », op. cit., p. 656, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4489297.

[148] Stephen L. B. Jensen, « Mettre fin à la théorie des trois générations de droits humains », in OpenGlobalRights, 2017, https://www.openglobalrights.org/putting-to-rest-the-three-generations-theory-of-human-rights/?lang=French, accessed 9 October 2020.

[149] UN International Covenant I & II, 1966, Preambles, §3; Proclamation of Teheran, 1968, §13.

[150] Cullet, *Droits de solidarité en droit international*, op. cit., p. 54.

hardly applies to human rights and even completely contradicts the dynamic and indivisible character of human rights. Successive generations should also imply a filiation between them, whereas the three generations are instead described as being at odds with each other. They are the result of very different ideological visions and therefore certainly do not succeed each other. In this sense, the term generation is not suitable to describe a new category or species given their difficult-to-trace parentage.

Finally, a categorical periodisation of human rights seems impossible as they overlap and respond to each other. Since the 1980s, the emergence of new rights, such as those relating to the new means of information and communication or those—increasingly in vogue—aimed at protecting the animal kingdom would bring the new generations ever closer to each other. Although new human rights arise from the new challenges of the global and modern world, they do not necessarily comprise a new generation. *Digital rights*[151] are indeed an individual right that must be implemented by one state and that simultaneously requires the cooperation of all states. This example illustrates very well the case of a new right, i.e. one that responds to a contemporary need, which simultaneously corresponds to the criteria of the three defined categories of human rights.

The critiques are therefore more targeted on the form than the substance of *solidarity rights*. As global interdependence becomes more and more evident, the idea of *Peoples' rights* and the global values that the concept defends is gaining ground. The influence of the African Charter and the so-called third generation rights thus constitute a fundamental contribution to the evolution of the world order.

The theoretical recuperation of *Peoples' rights* and their categorisation into generations, on the other hand, seems to have had the opposite effect to that intended. The association of the notions of *human rights* and *solidarity*, although promising, never had the *magnetic*

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[151] For more information, check, for example, the Institute for Digital and Fundamental Rights (https://idfrights.org/) or the European Digital Rights network (https://edri.org/).

effect hoped for by its initiator. The use of the term *solidarity*, which also has a strong left-wing connotation, has not allowed the concept to gain lasting acceptance.

Karel Vasak's theory thus seems to have been designed to make its way into the world's intellectual elites and international bodies. It served the acceptance of the concepts it contains by the leading circles of the two blocs and the world institutions. However, it contributed to restricting the dissemination of the concepts and ideas it contains by confining them in a very (too) politicised straitjacket.

Solidarity : Idea, value or hope for a political ideal
The concept of solidarity within the *Solidarność* movement, 1980-1981[1]

Renata Latała

« *Solidarność's* greatest strength — and, who knows, perhaps the only way in which it can now oppose the regime — is the motto contained in its name[2] ». These words by Gustaw Herling-Grudzinski, a Polish essayist and literary critic, which Adrien Le Bihan reports in his diary, are intended to underline the power of the very idea embodied by the word « solidarity ». However, behind this observation, there is also a recurring question : what meaning was given to this word at the time ?

In the 1980s, the word « solidarity » functioned as an important element of a symbolic device through which a mass movement in Poland, acting on national and political fronts as well as being a trade union, sought to give itself an identity and a coherence. The word « Solidarity » was visible as an image or logo everywhere : flags, banners, leaflets, postcards, posters, postage stamps, badges. *Solidarity, Solidarność, Solidarity with Solidarność,* could be heard everywhere. This word-idea-image invaded the public space of the 1980s, both in Poland and around the world. Openly

[2] Adrien Le Bihan, *Gniewne drzewo. Dziennik krakowski 1976-1986,* Krakow, Oficyna Literacka, 1995, p. 163. All translations by the author.

or clandestinely. Various individuals, groups, and factions, very different in their philosophical or ideological backgrounds, sought to express their beliefs or ideals. Political movements in the West have even appropriated the Solidarity logo and transformed it (even without the author's knowledge). Solidarity, a word that is as banal in its simplicity of use as it is complex in its meaning, immediately became an indicative, an obvious one. But what is behind this idea that many claim ? What was the meaning given to this idea within the Solidarity movement, which took it as its motto: an ideal, a value, a project ?

Since the strikes of August 1980, the signing of the Gdansk Agreements and the birth of *Solidarność* as an independent trade union which developed into an important social movement[3], the phenomenon of Solidarity continues to fascinate sociologists and political scientists, as well as historians of ideas. As their different points of view often provide very divergent interpretations of the movement, a dispute about the nature of *Solidarność* has arisen. *Solidarność* has been defined as a « national uprising[4] », a real « workers revolt[5] ». Some have seen it as « a self-limited revolution[6] », or a « social movement » whose goal was national liberation[7]. Others have seen it as a project of democracy and an

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[3] On the History of Solidarność cf. Kamiński, L., Waligora, G. (eds.), *NSZZ Solidarność 1980-1989*, (vol. 2 : *Ruch spoleczny*; vol 7 : *Wokół « Solidarności »*), Warsaw, 2010; Andrzej Paczkowski, Malcolm Byrne, *From Solidarity to Martial Law. The Polish Crisis of 1980-1981 : a Documentary History,* Budapest, New York, Central European University Press, 2007 ; Patryk Pleskot, *Kłopotliwa panna « S ». Postawy polityczne Zachodu wobec « Solidarności » na tle stosunków z PRL (1980–1989)*, Warsaw, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2013.

[4] Jan Skórzyński, *Krótka historia Solidarności 1980-1989,* Gdańsk, 2014.

[5] Roman Laba, *The Roots of Solidarity: A Political Sociology of Poland's Working-Class Democratization,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991 ; Lawrence Goodwyn, *Breaking the Barrier : The Rise of Solidarity in Poland*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991.

[6] Jadwiga Staniszkis, *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution,* Princeton - N.J, Princeton University Press, 1984.

[7] Alain Touraine, François Dubet, Michel Wieviorka, Jan Strzelecki, *Solidarité. Analyse d'un mouvement sociale. Pologne 1980-1981,* Paris, Fayard, 1982.

expression of the formation of a mentality regarding civil society[8]. While these different analyses have brought to light various aspects of the phenomenon, some remain rather reductive, such as those that highlight the aspect of class division, or that make it a metaphor for revolution : a « Polish Revolution[9] », a nonviolent, peaceful revolution[10], or « revolution in masks[11] ». Timothy Garton Ash noticed these attempts to manipulate the « Polish Revolution » to adapt it to « existing categories » and ready-made Western forms of thought[12]. Arguably, this is particularly evident in the case of authors who interpret *Solidarność* exclusively as a workers' uprising, using the class divide as the lens through which to view events[13].

Ever since the « era » of *Solidarność*, interpretations have indeed proved very divergent. Many works by sociologists and theorists of ideas confront each other on the nature of the movement, seeing in it a more democratic and libertarian light, or associating it with the movement reflecting totalitarian or illiberal thought[14].

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[8] Michael H. Bernhard, *The Origins of Democratization in Poland. Workers, Intelelctuals and Oppositional Politics, 1976-1980*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993 ; Ireneusz Krzemiński, *Solidarność. Projekt polskiej demokracji*, Warsaw, Oficyna Naukowa, 1997 ; Ireneusz Krzemiński, « Solidarność - organizacja polskich nadziei », in Antoni Sułek, *Solidarność. Wydarzenie - konsekwencje - pamięć*, Warsaw, PAN, 2006, p. 13-43. Krzemiński believes that the movement wanted to realise the ideal of « debating democracy » (2006, p.33).

[9] Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution : Solidarity*, Penguin Books, 1999 (1ᵉed. Jonathan Cape Ltd, 1983).

[10] Abraham Brumberg (ed.), *Poland: Genesis of a Revolution*, New York, Vintage Books/Random House, 1983 ; Tomasz Kozłowski, *Anatomia rewolucji. Narodziny ruchu społecznego « Solidarność » w 1980 r.,* Warsaw, 2017.

[11] Jacek Kuroń, *Nie do druku*, in Idem, *Polityka i odpowiedzialność*, Lublin, Wyd. Niezależne CiS, 1986, p. 181-182.

[12] Timothy G. Ash added: « The Western reactions to Solidarity (...) varied not only with ideology but also very much with nationality », and he suggested that « rather than manipulating the Polish revolution (...) we might do better to adjust our categories until they fit the Polish revolution », *The Polish Revolution*, op. cit., p. 320.

[13] In this context, it is worth mentioning authors such as Roman Laba (*The Roots of Solidarity...*) and Lawrence Goodwyn (*Breaking the Barrier*), who emphasise the workers' identity of the movement, which was born independently of the initiatives of the intelligentsia. According to Ireneusz Krzemiński, their interpretations of events from the point of view of class division were integrated into a broader theoretical and consciousness-raising discussion, and linked to the ideological views of the authors. Cf. Krzemiński, *Solidarność. Projekt polskiej demokracji*, op.cit., p. 15.

[14] Cf. Sergiusz Kowalski, *Krytyka solidarnościowego rozumu*, Warsaw, Wyd. Akademickie i Profesjonalne, 2009 ; Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński, *Rozpad połowiczny. Szkice z socjologii transformacji ustrojowej*, Warsaw, PAN, 1993.

Another interesting research perspective was opened by the political and philosophical analyses that linked *Solidarność* to the great traditions of political thought, particularly the republican tradition. Arista Maria Cirtautas[15] was one of the first to try to place Solidarity in the perspective of democratic changes, seeking comparisons with the American and French Revolutions. On the Polish side, attempts to place *Solidarność* within the tradition of Western and Polish republican thought were undertaken by Paweł Śpiewak[16], Dariusz Gawin[17], Bronisław Świderski[18] but above all Elżbieta Ciżewska[19]. According to Polish sociologist Ireneusz Krzemiński, many of the sociological and political analyses remain strongly determined by their authors' civic and political orientation[20]. The current political sympathies and antipathies of the authors seem to have a decisive influence on how they have approached the phenomenon and analysed its impact on, and place in, world history[21]. Some see it as a regional movement, others as a « significant contributor » to the fall of communism, which brings us to the Round Table. Alain Touraine, for example, describes *Solidarność* as the greatest freedom uprising, « one of the most important social movements to have taken place in a country at the end of the 20th century[22] ».

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[15] Arista Maria Cirtautas, *The Polish Solidarity Movement. Revolution, Democracy and Natural Rights,* London- New York, Routledge, 1997.

[16] Paweł Śpiewak, « Alexis de Tocqueville i Hannah Arendt o "Solidarności" », in Idem, *Ideologie i obywatele,* Warsaw, Więź, 1991, p. 218-227.

[17] Dariusz Gawin, « Sierpień 1980 w świetle tradycji republikańskiej », in Antoni Sułek, *Solidarność. Wydarzenie - konsekwencje - pamięć,* Warsaw, PAN, 2006, p. 45-74 ; Dariusz Gawin, « *Solidarność,* - republikańska rewolucja Polaków », in Idem (ed.), *Lekcja Sierpnia. Dziedzictwo « Solidarności » po dwudziestu latach,* Warsaw, Wyd. IFiS PAN, 2002, p. 161-188.

[18] Bronisław Świderski, *Gdańsk i Ateny : o demokracji bezpośredniej w Polsce*, Warsaw, IFiS PAN, 1996.

[19] Elżbieta Ciżewska, *Filozofia publiczna Solidarności. Solidarność 1980-1981 z perspektywy republikańskiej tradycji politycznej*, Warsaw, Narodowe Centrum Kultury, 2010.

[20] Ireneusz Krzemiński, « Solidarność » une expérience sociale et le projet de la démocratie polonaise, in Chantal Delsol, Joanna Nowicki, Michel Masłowski (eds.), *Mythes et symboles politiques en Europe centrale,* Paris, PUF, 2002, (p. 220-235), p. 222-223.

[21] Despite their limitations, these sociological analyses, mostly written on the basis of observations made during the 1980s, or reflections of the time, remain an interesting source for historical analysis.

[22] Touraine, Dubet, Wieviorka, Strzelecki, *Solidarité,* op. cit., p. 14.

This variety of approaches indicates the complexity of the phenomenon, and there is no doubt that, regardless of attributed functions and effects, it remains a significant event in the popular consciousness. Following historians for whom complex and fateful events can be considered a typical context for changes in conceptualisation, or the birth of new concepts[23], our question concerns the ways in which the concept of solidarity varies with the experience of *Solidarność*. The conceptual history approach, which creates a specific field of mediation between experience and knowledge, can certainly constitute both a counterpoint and a complement to both social and political history, and can offer an alternative perspective. Thus the conceptual approach, which shifts the focus to the understanding of the phenomenon through the analysis of the structures of thought and specific intellectual traditions, or the long-term symbolic code, affords a new perspective with which to view the meaning and cultural and political stakes of the historical phenomenon. This understanding leaves the present paper with the status of neither analysis of the history of the *Solidarność* movement nor political-science study. For our question does not concern what Solidarity was, what Solidarity is or wanted to be, given that these questions already have a rich historiography[24]. Rather, the purpose and the challenge of this study is the comprehending of the *phenomenon* of *Solidarność*, achievable through analysis of the very concept that is solidarity. In other words, our question addresses ways in which the idea of solidarity has been perceived and experienced by the members of *Solidarność* and its sympathisers in Poland in the 1980s and 1981.

Our work has referenced the chronological milestones chosen to correspond to the period from the events of August 1980 in Gdańsk, when the Trade Union movement was created, through to 13th

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[23] Willibald Steinmetz and Michael Freeden, « Introduction. Conceptual History : Challenges, Conundrums, Complexities », in Willibald Steinmetz, Michael Freeden, and Javier Fernández-Sebastián (eds), *Conceptual History in the European Space*, Oxford and New York, Breghahn, 2017, p. 1-46.

[24] As Paweł Rojek has already shown in his book, where he analyzes the semiotics of Solidarność, Paweł Rojek, *Semiotyka Solidarności. Analiza dysursów PZPR i NSZZ Solidarność w 1981 roku,* Krakow, NOMOS, 2009. See Jan Kubik, *The Power of Symbols and Symbols of Power. The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland,* Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, 1994.

December 1981, the date of the proclamation of Martial Law. A further requirement has been to examine how this concept functions rhetorically in its cultural and political context. This is a matter, not only of looking at sources synchronically, but also of analysing them and understanding how they are stated in the long-term.

In order to analyse the « field of social experience » that was *Solidarność*, the scope of this study is defined by both the diversity of the analysed discursive fields that compose it and the uniformity of its questioning. As the study of the concept of solidarity from a historical perspective requires specific theoretical-philosophical resources, there will be an initial highlighting of certain research milestones. Following the preliminary analytical tracks, it will explore the notion of solidarity by looking at the content of the concept and its rhetorical functioning.

Solidarity : Word — idea — concept

The term « solidarity » as an expression and concept is to be found in many philosophical, sociological and anthropological reflections that seek to determine the essence of the interdependence between the individual and the community[25]. Existing theories often remain determined by the worldview, philosophical orientation, civic or political view of the author. Indeed, some interpretations in the past have been based on an extremely ideological attitude.

Away from theoretical approaches strongly determined by the philosophical orientation of the thinkers, the word « solidarity » also functions in public space, in everyday use. Solidarity remains an important aspect of social life, a specific marker through which a society perceives and thinks of itself, imagines the relations between the individual and the community, and expresses its hopes. Embedded in a concrete historical experience, this « living

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[25] For example, the theme has been examined by : Léon Bourgeois, Émile Durkheim, Richard Rorty and Jürgen Habermas, as well as Popes Pious XII and John Paul II.

together » may well appear as one of those « social imaginaries » of which Bronislaw Baczko speaks[26]. He noted :

> Throughout history, societies have been engaged in a permanent work of inventing their own global representations, as many idea-images through which they give themselves an identity, perceive their division, legitimise their power, elaborate formative models for their members, such as the « valiant warrior », the « good citizen », the « devoted militant », etc. These representations are invented and elaborated through materials drawn from symbolic resources : they have a specific reality which resides in their very existence, in their variable impact on mentalities and collective behaviours, the multiple functions which they exert in the social life[27].

Following Baczko in maintaining that a society is revealed through these images/ideas, how is the representation of « solidarity » invented, elaborated or conveyed within the *Solidarność* movement ? What social reality contextualises it, what intellectual tradition can it draw on, and what is its socio-political function ?

The *Solidarność* discourse is constructed through several solidarity « languages » coming from ethical, religious, national-liberation, worker and citizen discourses. Each of these though rooted in a common socio-political reality and « community of destiny[28] », claims certain symbols, emphasises certain ideals, and expresses certain expectations. Various terms, such as fraternity, dignity, responsibility, community, freedom... all these notions, with their own semantic contents, are incorporated in the concept of solidarity. Considering with Koselleck that a « word becomes a concept when one needs a single word that contains — and is indispensable for articulating — the whole range of meanings derived from a given

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[26] Bronislaw Baczko, *Les imaginaires sociaux. Mémoires et espoirs collectifs,* Paris, Payot, 1984.

[27] Baczko, *Les imaginaires sociaux,* op. cit., p. 8.

[28] The term comes from José Ortega y Gasset (*En torno a Galileo. Esquema de las crisis,* Madrid, 1933), whose thinking is analyzed by Claudine Attias-Donfunt, *Sociologie des générations. L'empreinte du temps,* Paris 1988, p. 51–52.

socio-political context[29] », the question then remains regarding the extent to which the discursive language of Solidarność, its symbolism and its usage, reflects the meaning attributed to the idea of solidarity.

From our perspective, we could define the « concept of solidarity » after Nicholas Capaldi, for whom it is both : « a descriptive and a normative concept[30] ». He states : « It purports to describe the network of communal relationships from which we derive and that define who we are. It purports, as well, to prescribe our moral and political obligations to the network of communal relationships[31] ».

Without entering the debate suggestive of the complexity of this semantic enterprise, we can speak, following Bayertz[32], Karl Metz[33] or Andreas Wildt[34], of four main contexts in which the concept of solidarity is used. The first, normative context, i.e., the anthropological perspective, is that of morality, religion, and ethics in the broadest sense. This approach treats solidarity as one element, often the most important element, of the moral space in which the individual finds himself. It is assumed that solidarity stems from or is one of the norms accepted in a given community which are external to the subject. Understood in this way, solidarity places the emphasis on the duties of the individual rather than on their rights.

The second context is a social one, referring to civilisational change, or the concept of community. In this case, the word « solidarity »

[29] « In terms of our method, a word becomes a concept when a single word is needed that contains—and is indispensable for articulating—the full range of meanings derived from a given sociopolitical context ». Reinhart Koselleck, Introduction, in Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck, eds., *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur Politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland* [*Basic Concepts in History: A Dictionary on Historical Principles of Political and Social Language in Germany*], 7 vols. of text; 2 vols. of a multilingual index (Stuttgart, 1972–90), p. 19.

[30] Nicholas Capaldi, « What's Wrong with Solidarity », in *Solidarität. Rechtsphilosophische Hefte,* Berne, Peter Lang, 1995, p. 65.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Kurt Bayertz, « Die Solidarität und die Schwierigkeit ihrer Begründung », in *Solidarität,* op cit., p. 9-16.

[33] Karl H. Metz, « Solidarität und Geschichte. Institutionen und sozialer Begriff der Solidarität in Westeuropa im 19. Jahrhundert », in *Solidarität,* op. cit., p. 17-36.

[34] Andreas Wildt, « Bemerkungen zur Begriffs - und Ideengeschichte von Solidarität und ein Definitionsvorschlag für diesen Begriff heute » in *Solidarität,* op. cit., p. 37-48.

is simply defining a social bond. In this context, it is important to emphasise the importance of the ties that bind different social groups, rather than what generates conflicts between them. In this respect, the idea of solidarity was expressed in the 19th century through the social movement of solidarists in France (represented by Leroux, Bourgeois, Comte and Durkheim) or Catholic solidarity emerging in Germany (Pesch and Gundlach). Since the 19th century, the word « solidarity » has also been the watchword of social movements. In this, it means the emotional bond between the members of these social movements, and the support they offer each other in the struggle for common goals. These movements link freedom with the notion of justice and human rights. The essence of the unity that binds a community together is a common enemy. Solidarity understood in this way is directed against someone and is therefore inclusive.

Finally, a context related to the origin of the term. Related to the Latin word *in solidum* used in Roman law, this term denoted a relationship of obligation between a creditor and a debtor. It appeared as a legal term in the 17th century to denote the relationship between lenders and debtors, and still functions today to denote mutual legal responsibility in joint business arrangements and commitments[35]. In this context, solidarity is the cornerstone of a public order based on a legal order regulating the basic participation of people, whose core principle is interdependence.

There is no doubt that this distinction is theoretical, with these various contexts in reality complementing and converging. The bearing in mind of these constructions of the ideal type has a methodological function, as I will refer to them, directly and indirectly, in these contexts when analysing the *Solidarność* movement.

A questioning of the « concept of solidarity » within this movement requires an understanding of the discursive formations in this concrete historical moment in the 1980s, i.e. the dominant,

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[35] Hugues Puel, « Solidarity between Employers, Employees and the Unemployed », *Societas Ethica, Jahresbericht 1997. Solidarität und Sozialstaat*, 34. Jahrestagung in Gdansk-Oliwa/Polen, 27-31 August 1997, (p. 177-180).

prevailing views and interpretations of the people of the time, and the expectations they used as a basis for their actions. The idea, its significance and use, is built on the experiences of people, on their aspirations, their desires at a historical moment surrounded by *a horizon of expectation, worry, hope*[36]. Therefore, given the « contextual specification of meaning described by Malinowski[37], it is necessary to place the idea of solidarity in its broader and deeper historical context. This means looking at it from both a synchronic and a diachronic perspective. Initially, this will require reconstituting the emergence of the idea of solidarity during the month of August 1980, as it became a symbolic image identifying a movement through the subsequent interpretation of the concept. An analysis of the content of the concept of solidarity will follow, through a dissecting of various elements to its contextualised rhetoric.

Solidarność : Idea – image – symbol

On 23rd August 1980, the bulletin of the Strike Committee at the Gdansk Shipyard was published. The title of the bulletin already announced an idea : Solidarity. A few days later, the Solidarity sign was created. Its graphic design was that of Jerzy Janiszewski, a young artist from Gdansk. It became the symbol of the newly-formed union, which was to adopt the name *Solidarność* (Solidarity) in September 1980. According to the sign's creator, it was the word « solidarity » that best described what happened among the people in the days of August 1980[38]. A fusion of graphic form and image, simple and logical, made it a universal symbol :

> The typeface was meant to resemble people standing in a dense crowd supporting each other, but not pushing each other. The national flag was meant to indicate that the protest was a univer-

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[36] Reinhart Koselleck, « Geschiche, Historie », in *Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland*, op. cit., vol. 2, Stuttgart, 1975, p. 593-595; 647-717.

[37] Bronisław Malinowski, « The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages », in *The Meaning of Meaning,* ed. Charles Kay Ogden and I. A. Richards, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1923, p. 451-510, at 465.

[38] « Nasz znak », *Tygodnik Solidarność*, 5 April 1981, p. 4.

sal cause and not the claim of a particular group. The shape and placement of the letters was also meant to emphasise the spontaneous nature of the strike. Solidarność expressed symbolically in the colors of the political community with which the strikers identified themselves: red lettering on a white background[39].

Solidarity as an idea, solidarity as a symbol, was rooted in deep-seated needs that eventually became a reason for existence and action for individuals and social groups that embodied the social movement in communist Poland that chose to call itself « Solidarność ». This symbol was born of a concrete *historical experience* surrounded by a *space of expectations and hopes*[40].

To understand this idea, this symbol on which the social imagination is based, built on the desires and aspirations of social agents, we must return to the events of August 1980 in Gdansk. There is no shortage of testimonies and memories of the participants in the events and observations of journalists. Some of them were collected and published during as the events themselves were in progress[41]. Written as the historical events occurred, they carry a strong emotional imprint. Their contemporary debates and reflections seized on the spot constitute an interesting documentary source. This provides first-hand impressions of the notion of solidarity as it emerged during the years 1980-81 in Poland, with the creation of the independent trade union *Solidarność*, born in the powerful wave of strikes of summer 1980, shaking the country and plunging it into a generalised economic and social crisis.

The climax came at the « Lenin » Shipyard in Gdansk, where more than 10,000 workers went on strike on 14th August. However, the initiative was taken by a small group of workers, about 30-50 people. On the morning of 14th August 1980, this small group called for a

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[39] Ibid.

[40] Cf. Henri Desroches, *Sociologie de l'espérance*, Paris, 1973.

[41] *Kto tam wpuścił dziennikarzy : 25 lat później* wg pomysłu Marka Millera, Warsaw, Rosner, 2005; Krzysztof Pomian, *Pologne: Défi à l'impossible ? De la révolte de Poznan à Solidarité*, Paris, Éditions ouvrières, 1982; *Pologne. Le dossier de Solidarité. Gdansk, août 1980- Varsovie, décembre 1981, Alternative*, numéro spécial, January 1982 ; Ash, *The Polish Revolution*, op. cit.

strike in solidarity with Anna Walentynowicz. She had been fired just before her retirement after working at the site for thirty years. She was engaged for years in the struggle for the formation of free trade unions, and in illegal commemorations of victims of the 1970 strike. This had broken out on 14th December 1970 at the same Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk due to increases in the prices of essential items, particularly food. The strike engulfed the whole city of Gdansk and neighbouring towns and cities on the Baltic Coast (Gdynia, Szczecin, Słupsk, Elbląg) and was ultimately suppressed bloodily by the communist regime. The exact number of victims was not known at that time. There were said to be 45 people killed, around 1200 injured, 3000 brutally beaten and arrested. Many families have never been reunited with the bodies of their relatives. Since then, there has been a call for a monument to the victims of this massacre.

This act of reclamation by the descendants and survivors of the massacres has a dual identity : compassion and duty. To remember and deplore the lives lost also gives them meaning and maintains solidarity with the cause for which the men died. These men who were killed by the hand of an oppressive system are identified not only as victims, but also as martyrs and guarantors of duty, justice, freedom, and the workers' cause. In this sense this commemoration can also be seen to be claimed as « a place of foundation of the identity of the survivors[42] », as bearers of compassion, but also of duty that leads to a commitment[43]. And, on this significant day in August 1980, this call became a rallying cry for this small group of shipyard workers as they started to walk under the banner : strike. The group grew as it walked through the site. As it passed through the Shipyard, the workers stopped their machines and joined the marching column. The demonstration moved towards the entrance door where, ten years previously in December 1970, the massacre of the strikers had begun. A minute's silence was observed to commemorate the victims. Some demonstrators wanted to go out and protest in the city. On the proposal of mechanic Lech Wałęsa, who had also been dismissed, it was decided to make the strike a

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[42] Reinhard Koselleck, « Le monument aux morts, lieux de fondation de l'identité des survivants », in Idem, *L'expérience de l'histoire,* édité et préface par Michael Werner, (translated by A. Escudier et al.), Paris, Seuil/Gallimard, 1997, p. 135-160.

[43] Ibid., p. 136-137.

sit-in. A Strike Committee was elected, and demands formulated : security for the strikers, increased allowances and a salary for all employees, the rehiring of Anna Walentynowicz and Lech Wałęsa, the erection of a monument in memory of the strikers massacred in December 1970, and free and independent trade unions. This is an outline of what happened on 14th August at the Gdansk Shipyard. In the following days, the strike embraced the whole city of Gdansk, as well as neighboring centers. Strikes spread gradually to other regions of Poland.

The movement then took a political turn, with the foundation of the Interfactory Strike Committee [MKS] (during the night of 16th/17th August). This Committee, whose aim was to communicate with the various protest sites and coordinate their actions (as workers from more than 150 enterprises had come to be represented), drew up a list of 21 demands. On 20th August, 64 intellectuals launched an appeal in support of the strikers, demanding that the authorities recognise the Committee, and calling for discussion and calm. A « Commission of Experts » was formed from the signatories to the appeal to « prove our solidarity with the strikers », as noted by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who was to head it[44]. These intellectuals came to the Gdansk Shipyard to support the strikers in their negotiations with the government representatives. Further strikes in solidarity then broke out in several Polish cities in support of the 21 Demands.

After several days of negotiations, the 21 Demands were finally recognised by the government following the agreements of Gdansk, Szczecin and Jastrzebie on 30th August, 31st August, and 3rd September. This led to the foundation of the Independent and Self-Governing Trades Unions. The union did not yet have a name, but it already had an emblem that indicated its direction : solidarity.

Alain Touraine, who conducted observations with a team of Polish and French sociologists in several Polish cities in 1980-1981, notes that « the August strikes are the founding act of Solidarity, not only because the union acquires the right to exist, but also because all

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[44] *Kto tam wpuścił dziennikarzy,* op.cit., p. 127-128.

aspects of the movement are already present in this birth[45] ». In fact, even before the Union had formulated its program in 1981 during debates and discussions around its status, it was the experience that made the idea emerge and evolve.

During the Gdansk strike, the word solidarity circulated spontaneously. It was everywhere. From graffiti, tags adorning the walls of the Shipyard, from the buildings in the city, on the packets sent to the strikers, a word came back: we are in solidarity, let us be in solidarity. What is striking is that the word, which in its common acceptance designated a unity and identification with the aspirations of the strikers, was breaking into the field reserved until then for the communist regime. A word, so present in the Polish social and political movements since the 19th century as it was closely linked to the word freedom, somehow became obsolete, distorted by the ideological language of the regime, which used this word to give value to the « socialist future », to an « international workers' solidarity ». Suddenly, with the strikes of the summer of 1980, this word returned to the public space, as a producer of dreams, as a symbol.

But this word took a while to take hold as it gave the men an objective — one could say, following Max Weber, « a sense » in their conduct and rules of behaviour[46]. This became apparent during the 1970s : firstly, in connection with workers' protests : the strike that broke out on 14th December at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, embraced the entire city as well as neighbouring centers, and was bloodily repressed.

There were ever-present calls from families of the victims of this massacre, for solidarity, and for remembrance. It was also following the protests of 1976, in Radom, Ursus — after which workers were repressed, arrested and fired — that the « Workers' Defence Committee » (KOR) was formed in 1977 in the name of solidarity with the workers and their families, following an initiative by Antoni Macierewicz, Piotr Naimski, Jan Lipski or Jacek Kuroń. The

[45] Touraine et al., *Solidarité,* op. cit., p. 65.
[46] Cf. Max Weber, *L'éthique protestante et l'esprit du capitalisme,* 1904 (Paris, Plon, 1964) ; Idem, *Le savant et le politique,* trad. par J. Freund, Paris, Plon, 1959.

Committee brought together people from a wide range of political backgrounds, including Catholic intellectuals and many intellectuals from left-wing and independentist circles.

That same year, in May, a surge of solidarity encompassed the students of Krakow. They took to the streets, braving reprisals, following the death of one of their number, Stanislaw Pyjas, a student beaten to death by the Police. They formed a committee, which was then called the « Student Solidarity Committee » (SKS)[47] and which remained under the protection of the Archbishop of Krakow, Karol Wojtyła. He inspired the establishment of the Students *Solidarność* committees at other Polish universities.

The actions in various cities of the protest movement's cells from the different backgrounds took many different forms. The KOR, for example, organised three major hunger protests (1977, 1979, 1980) in defence of those imprisoned by the regime. These hunger strikes were a way of politicising a person's body, thus transforming the political problem into an existential one. Personal suffering inflicted on a body, even at the risk of death, was symbolically equivalent to the violence inflicted on it by those in power, and it became a call to action for the community. For those taking part, it was a matter of responsibility, a single means of passive resistance to injustice where other forms of expressing opposition had apparently been exhausted. This is also how Bohdan Cywiński, a Catholic intellectual and participant in the first hunger strike at the Church of St. Martin in Warsaw saw it in May 1977, aware of the risks to himself and his family[48]. This first hunger protest in communist Poland was organised in 1977 as a sign of solidarity with the workers imprisoned after the strikes in Radom and Ursus. It demanded the release of arrested workers from prisons[49].

These events show that the challenge emanating from the various actions taken had a common theme : to unite in solidarity with those who were oppressed, imprisoned or dead for a cause that became

[47] Jarosław Szarek, *Czarne juwenalia. Opowieść o Studenckim Komitecie Solidarności,* Krakow, Znak, 2007.

[48] Bohdan Cywinński interviewed by Renata Latała, 21 January 2020, Przerośl (Poland).

[49] Ania Szczepańska, *Une histoire visuelle de Solidarność,* Paris, Ed. de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 2021, p. 34-55.

« ours ». The list of these events, or movements, that claimed citizens' rights and freedoms, could be extended further. Krzysztof Wyszkowski, who was active in the 1970s as an underground publisher of political material and books forbidden by the communist authorities, joined the KOR circle and had already been planning to use the name « solidarity » as a slogan for the entire independence movement which was forming illegally during those years[50]. He was able to realise this aspiration during the strikes in Gdansk in 1980.

Wyszkowski, who in August 1980 took part in the Great Strike at the Gdansk Shipyard, began printing documents for the Inter-Union Strike Committee, as well as strike leaflets. From 23 August 1980, he became part of the Editorial Board of the *Strike Information Bulletin Solidarność,* as the author of this title. Krzysztof Wyszkowski is thus the person regarded as having introduced the word « Solidarność » into the public space, with this ascending to the rank of symbol.

The process of adaptation of this word by the strikers was spontaneous and rapid. While *Solidarność* (Solidarity) was initially only the name given to the strikers' information bulletin printed in single type in a shipyard printing shop, the sign of the movement was being created at the same time. A short account of how it came into existence : Jerzy Janiszewski, 29-year-old graphic designer from Gdansk, was heavily influenced by the strikes at the Shipyard :

> From the first days of the strike I took my place in front of the gate of the Shipyard. It was a great experience. It was the first time I witnessed such rebellion. I saw how solidarity was established among people, how a social movement was born out of it... It all had a strong impact on my psyche... I wanted to get to the other side of the gate [...]. I wanted to somehow help the Shipyard workers[51].

Janiszewski got a pass, went into the Shipyard, offered to help, observe and discuss. As a result of these meetings, he, his wife Krystyna Janiszewska, and friends thought about creating a sign that could

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[50] Krzysztof Wyszkowski, Instytut Pamięci Narodowej**,** https://ipn.gov.pl/pl/o-ipn/struktura/kolegium-ipn-1/sklad-kolegium-ipn/35659,Krzysztof-Wyszkowski.html, accessed 13 January 2022.

[51] *Nasz znak,* op. cit.p. 4.

convey their support for the Shipyard workers and provide them with an identity. They considered using the Shipyard gate, decorated with flags and flowers, as a motif : « This gate was symbolic, it did not divide, but united people[52] ». However, they rejected this idea as too literal. Janiszewski observed, discussed and finally chose as a slogan the word that was gaining most frequent use, « solidarity » : « I chose this word, because it was the most appropriate (literal translation : hardest, in the toughest way) to describe what was happening to people[53] ». He then developed the graphic form of the inscription.

The sign spread quickly among the strikers. When talks between the Strikers' Committee and government representatives began, banners with the *Solidarność* sign were flying in the meeting hall, on the walls of the shipyard. This symbol became a motto of the movement, even before the union was called « Solidarność ». During the debates of the meeting of representatives of the MKS Committee in September 1980, several names were discussed : unity, fraternity, solidarity. On the proposal of Karol Modzelewski, the name *Solidarność* was adopted as the name of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union, on 17th September[54]. A logotype created by Janiszewski, which had functioned as the symbol of the movement since August, was adopted as its sign. Can we see in this a kind of consecration of the idea the men were aiming for through their actions and hopes, a consolidation of their aspirations of the previous weeks ?

« It is difficult to name another symbol that would so accurately, emphatically, and concisely express the essence of what the nation is experiencing, and which would be so widely accepted as a sign of identity », we read in 1981, in *Tygodnik Solidarność* (weekly newspaper), the official press organ of the union[55]. In fact, this motto gained its canonical meaning over the 16 months of the union's existence. Every Pole knows how it should be understood when asked

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[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

[54] « De l'autogestion ouvrière au mythe de Solidarność », Entretien avec Karol Modzelewski, par Jean-Paul Gaudillière, Irène Jami, Mathias Richter, Inka Thunecke, *La Découverte « Mouvements »*, 2005/1 n° 37, p. (109 à 118) p. 110. The Independent Self-Governing Trades Union « Solidarność » was registered by the Supreme Court in Warsaw on 10 November 1980.

[55] *Nasz znak*, op. cit.

what he or she considers the ideal society to be: to be in solidarity is to participate in a common cause ; to put the motto into practice is to be together. If, following Bronislaw Baczko[56], we admit that a community defines its identity by elaborating a self-representation which expresses and imposes certain common beliefs, defines their relationship to the institutions, and regulates their reciprocal behaviours through symbols, it is therefore necessary to deconstruct the meaning that has been given to this idea within the movement emerging in those months of August 1980.

« **We are together** » — inclusive or exclusive solidarity ?

Analyzing Solidarity from the point of view of the republican tradition, Dariusz Gawin highlighted the importance of human ties to an element of republican solidarity. For him, the name *Solidarność* did not refer to any political institution or ideology, « but only to a particular, universal, interhuman relationship [...] a relationship that is elementary, because it is obvious, it is "proto-political"[57] ». All the observers underline the primordial interhuman bond created between people that is expressed in the idea of the foundation of *Solidarność*. The question, then, is what unites the workers in August 1980, what defines the community that formed in the 1980s.

There is no doubt that the socio-political context of the time, the context of « real socialism » in Poland[58], essentially contributed to the specific quality of this experience and the way of understanding solidarity as a social bond. All social and economic life was regulated and controlled by the Communist Party. The primacy of the Party rendered it impossible for anyone else to have a public voice. The

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[56] Baczko, *Les imaginaires sociaux,* op. cit., p. 32-33.

[57] Gawin, *Sierpień 1980 w świetle tradycji republikańskiej,* op. cit., p. 56.

[58] Cf. Stefan Nowak (ed.), S*połeczeństwo polskie czasu kryzysu,* Warsaw, 2004 ; Edmund Wnuk- Lipiński, *Rozpad połowiczny. Szkice z socjologii transformacji ustrojowej,* Warsaw, ISP PAN, 1993 ; Jadwiga Staniszkis, *Ontologia socjalizmu,* Krakow-Nowy Sacz, wyd. Dante, 2006; Winicjusz Narojek, *Perspektywy pluralizmu w upaństwowionym społeczeństwie. Ocena sytuacji na podstawie polskich kryzysów,* Warsaw, Instytut Studiow Politycznych PAN, 1994 ; Rojek, *Semiotyka Solidarności,* op. cit., pp. 83-106.

Party controlled all groups and associations and organised social life. The structures of the state, the economic administration, the media, the trade unions, the legal system, all social and cultural societies depended directly or indirectly on the Central Committee of the Party. The expansion of the power of the administrative system was especially visible in the 1970s, when the principle of *nomenklatura* became firmly established. According to Staniszkis, these regulations led to the creation of « structural Stalinism[59] » in 1970s Poland. No institution could make a decision without the agreement and guidance of the Party Central Committee. In « real socialism », politics dominated the economy and social life. The administrative logic suffocated the economic and social spheres because the entire organisation of common life was « nationalized » by the administration. The dominance of the principle of *nomenklatura* is illustrated by the fact that leading positions in companies were granted on the recommendation of the Party, and not based on technical or entrepreneurial skills. Ash notes : « The *nomenklatura* can accurately be described as a client ruling class. Its members enjoy power, status, and privileges (in varying degrees) by virtue simply of belonging to it. They may not individually own the means of production, but collectively they do control them[60] ».

Several historians and sociologists underline the fact that « real socialism » was paradoxical in the extreme[61]. The project comprised the creation of a collectivist society in which the « I » should give way to the « we » ; its implementation took the form of suppression by the controlling powers of any « horizontal », interpersonal link. Sociality was thus stratified ; the only vectors for social life were vertical and centripetal, resulting in atomisation of the base. Communism had deformed, even in some cases destroyed, the culture of motivated work, civic culture, the culture of unfettered discursivity and, finally, that of everyday life in the company of others. A human being was then deprived of the means, the abilities, and the incentives to take

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[59] Staniszkis, *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution*, op. cit., p. 107-108, 159.
[60] Ash, *The Polish Revolution*, op. cit., p. 9.
[61] Cf. Stefan Nowak, S*połeczeństwo polskie czasu kryzysu*, op. cit., Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński, *Rozpad połowiczny. Szkice z socjologii transformacji ustrojowej*, op. cit ; Staniszkis, *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution*, op. cit.; Winicjusz Narojek, *Perspektywy pluralizmu w upaństwowionym społeczeństwie*, op. cit.

part in the maintenance of a healthy and vigorous institutional order conducive to his or her flourishing within the interpersonal communities provided by such an order. The absurdity of the reality of socialist realism is best reflected in the literary image created by Tadeusz Konwicki in his novel *Mała Apokalipsa* (A Little Apocalypse), which was produced by an underground press in 1979. The writer satirically depicts the everyday life of the period : constant surveillance, social injustice, division of society into the privileged (party members and the rest) and the oppressed, the poverty and ugliness of everyday life, the constant propaganda and indoctrination which kills people's ability to think for themselves.

The social project that sought to build or rebuild the *Solidarność* movement aimed at reanimating the spirit of interhuman links that Gawin speaks of. What was the character of this bond ? In the program of the First Congress of *Solidarność*, which defined itself as a social movement, it is expressed in the preamble of the program as follows : « Our Union was born out of the revolt of Polish society that has been tested over three decades by the suppression of human rights, a revolt against discrimination and economic exploitation, a protest against the system and power » (Program NSZZ : 1) [62].

A more detailed explanation of the reasons is provided subsequently :

> We were united by a protest against injustice, abuse of power, and the monopolisation of the right to define and express the goals of an entire nation. We were united in protesting against the state's treatment of a citizen as its own property, the gift of depriving people of a real representation in confinement with the state, against the mercy of the rulers who know better how much freedom to assign to the rulers, against rewarding intransigent political service instead of initiative and independence of action. We were united by the rejection of lies in public life, the rejection of wasting the results of the harder, more patient work of the nation. (Program NSZZ : 1)

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[62] Program-Resolution, I[st] National Congress of Delegates of NSZZ Solidarność : www.archsol.pl.

In this program we find then the rejection of the experience of real socialism, of a collectivist society which suppresses any social ties. The same political and economic situation provides the starting point for the mobilisation and formation of an extensive movement. This « common destiny » constituted the « psychological context » that created emotional cohesion among the members of the movement, and formed the basis for the mutual support they offered each other in the struggle for common goals. An interpretation of the formation of the movement exclusively through the spirit of revolt could suggest that the social bond created served only to « be together against[63] ». Thus, the Solidarity movement is guided by the solidarity that is created around common interests and that reaches a unity of action only through the mobilisation of its participants against the communists, against the ruling party, against the state. This situation cannot be described only in terms of the inadequate realisation of human rights or the lack of democracy in the political practice of the state authorities. Polish society lived, like other Central and Eastern European societies, in slavery. The notion of national slavery conceived in this way, « esclavage » in French, has quite different connotations in the Polish context, and had a developed collective reflex of resistance against state power — foreign or supposedly Polish, but imposed from outside. This explains « the huge emotional societal bond with the emerging Solidarity union[64] ». This way of looking at it allows us to place the idea of solidarity in the context of social emancipation, solidarity based on negative mobilisation, as analysed by Bayertz[65]. And it is certainly possible to talk about « solidarity against » : at first glance, it seems to be against abuse, lies, communism or power.

However, as Krzemiński pointed out, seeing *Solidarność* exclusively as a protest is related to the desire to interpret the movement from

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[63] According to Krzemiński, this thesis may be supported by authors who approach the Solidarity phenomenon from the point of view of political issues, such as Edmond Mokrzycki (Bryant C., Mokrzycki E., *Democracy, Civil Society and Pluralism. In Comparative Perspective: Poland, Great Britain and The Netherlands,* Warsaw, 1995) or Staniszkis (*Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution,* op. cit.), or Roman Laba, who emphasizes the nature of the revolt, cf. Krzemiński, « *Solidarność* » *une expérience sociale,* op. cit., p. 223.

[64] Cywiński (Interview), op.cit.

[65] Bayertz, *Solidarität,* op. cit., p. 12-13.

an ideological perspective[66]. It is no less true that, concretely, it is not about taking power, not even about getting out of the system[67]. Power, even if it is considered bad, is not the goal. Although united by protest, this protest is considered a starting point for formulating the principles of a new order. A community united, it seeks to reconstitute a project of « living together ». All in all, taken from a public perspective, it was firstly a political solidarity « against » but also « solidarity with », a positive mobilisation.

Indeed, solidarity in the *Solidarność* movement is not exclusive, is not directed against anyone. The symbolism itself is a character of positive mobilisation. There is no aggression, no dehumanisation of the enemy in the symbol of *Solidarność*. By using a national symbol, the flag that floats above the inscription, the graphic designer intended to show that it is about a general cause, not only of a concrete social group, but all society.

Analyses of sociological research[68], carried out by questioning various actors from a range of social groups and union circles, by consulting internal union documents, but above all by relying on the memories of participants in the events, with their strong subjective emotional contribution, allow us to grasp the meaning of this experience, the way in which this reality was lived. Based on his analysis, Ireneusz Krzemiński points out that, in August 1980, the workers did not strike in order to gain influence over the government for themselves or for a specific working-class group. The initial protest developed into a general protest[69]. To support this thesis, he points out that

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[66] Krzemiński, « *Solidarność* » *une expérience sociale*, op. cit., p. 223.

[67] Ash, *The Polish Revolution*, op. cit., p. 297-311.

[68] From April to November 1981, the Franco-Polish team led by Alain Touraine formed groups of corporate activists in six cities : Gdansk, Szczecin, Warsaw, Lodz, Katowice and Wroclaw. Solidarity helped these active members to conduct an analysis of their own actions and to compare them with those of other groups (Touraine, et al., *Solidarité,* op. cit.). Two research projects on the creation of the Union *Solidarność* in Warsaw were conducted by Mirosława Marody and Ireneusz Krzemiński between the autumn of 1980 and the winter of 1981 (Mirosława Marody, Jan Kolbowski [et al.], *Polacy '80: Wizje rzeczywistości dnia (nie)codziennego*, UW, Warsaw, 2004 ; Ireneusz Krzemiński and team, *Polacy-jesień '80*, Warsaw, UW, 2005. Cf. Ireneusz Krzemiński, *Solidarność. Projekt polskiej demokracji*, Warsaw, 1997; Krzemiński (eds.), *Solidarność - doświadczenie i pamięć*, Gdansk, 2010.

[69] Krzemiński, *Solidarność. Projekt polskiej demokracji*, p. 44-100.

the Strike Committee appointed in Gdansk brought together labour representatives of various plants from the whole of the Tri-City (Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot metropolis). So, the shipyard workers did not act purely on their own behalf, but became the voice of demands common to many workers' crews, what Krzemiński or Ash calls a civic attitude. This also confirms the request of the strikers rearding the release of a dozen or so detained opposition activists (from intelligentsia circles) as one of the conditions for ending the strike, something he sees as evidence of this living link between the actions of the workers and the tasks of the intelligentsia. Indeed, we observed at the time a strong identification between the strikers and broader social circles.

From the very first days of the strike, the population of the city Gdansk came to the gate to demonstrate their solidarity, linking their interests with the strikers. This is illustrated symbolically by numerous photos from those days of August 1980 showing the city population on one side of the gate and the strikers on the other. One of the best-known is the image of the door of the Shipyard. « That door didn't divide, it connected people », notes a journalist who visited the Gdansk Shipyard during the strikes of August 1980[70]. « On one side, there were the shipyard workers, on the other, there was the city. On one side, there were the husbands, on the other, the wives and children [...][71] ». What was happening in Gdansk and in other Shipyards became central to the lives of residents of Pomerania. And so, as Krzysztof Pomian notes, the MKS, which was created to represent the strikers, practically administered a conurbation of about 750,000 inhabitants for the 18 days of strikes[72].

However, the argument to confirm this thesis is the program of *Solidarność* itself. First of all, in the first chapter of the document, it states that Solidarity unites many social currents ; it unites people with different opinions, political and religious, regardless of their nationality. In this sense, the social bond that unites the movement is not exclusive or limited to a social group or ideological current.

[70] *Kto tam wpuścił dziennikarzy: 25 lat pozniej*, p. 86.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Krzysztof Pomian, *Pologne : défi à l'impossible ? De la révolte de Poznan à Solidarité*, Paris, Les éditions ouvrières, 1982, p. 18.

Solidarity is the engine of action that binds all the groups that make up a community. The link of Solidarity created within the movement is not directed against any social or ideological group. Solidarity is thus a social bond that unites a community. This solidarity also aims to be a project formulated in a positive way. We read in the declaration : « We are not just a force of refusal. We want to rebuild a just Poland, a force that refers to the common values of mankind […]. Solidarity is not only a revolt, but a living force tending to the reconstruction of the state and social rules[73] ».

These lines suggest a normative dimension to the revolt. And this is how some authors interpret it. « *A revolution of the soul* », wrote Ash, who observed the events. « I have found no better phrase than the one used by the Poznań worker in the spring of 1981 to describe what changed in the everyday lives of millions of Poles[74] ». Indeed, the community of destiny, which determines the common interest and can « be the reason for the common action of action » is not, according to Ciżewska, « its moral justification[75] ». According to her, joint action gains moral legitimacy when the goals it pursues are just. *Solidarność*'s appeal to shared values, therefore, meant that the movement's members recognised that they were the ones to decide what was right, and this gave them the moral legitimacy to act together. However, *Solidarność* stood as a « spokesman » of values and not as a « creator of values ». Consequently, « to be together », as symbolised by the image of the gate of the Gdansk Shipyard or the Solidarność emblem, was an appeal to an ethical experience. It is in this sense that the philosopher Józef Tischner (1931-2000), considered one of the thinkers of *Solidarność*, developed the idea of solidarity.

Tischner was a priest who had links with the democratic opposition from the 1970s onwards. In his sermons, discussions, and debates of the 1980s, he attempted to grasp the meaning of the experience of *Solidarność* from the first months of the movement's formation. His first sermon on 19th October 1980 to the leaders of the Solidarność

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[73] Program-Resolution, I[st] National Congress of Delegates of NSZZ Solidarność.
[74] Ash, *The Polish Revolution,* op. cit., p. 290.
[75] Ciżewska, *Filozofia publiczna,* op. cit, p. 222-223.

trade union (Anna Walentynowicz, Lech Wałęsa and Marian Jurczyk) at the Mass celebrated at the Wawel Cathedral in Kraków (published in *Tygodnik Powszechny*) was the first of a series of texts by Tischner reflecting on the ethical dimension of events. Tischner's texts expressing the idea of solidarity as a humanistic ethical experience were published in the autumn of 1981 under the title *The Ethics of Solidarity*[76]. He described various aspects of the idea of solidarity as created within the movement, and tried to encourage reflection. He was invited to the convention of the First National Congress of Delegates of the Solidarity Trade Union (*NSZZ Solidarność*) held at the Olivia Hall in Gdansk in 1981[77]. Tischner's address delivered at the 1981 congress was appended to the official documents[78].

Tischner emphasised that Solidarity was created not only through a common economic and political situation, but also through an ethical experience, showing the specific bonds that exist between people in a solidarity « community of people of good will[79] ». These bonds are created spontaneously: they come from the heart, from within, and cannot be brought in from outside—solidarity grows out of a fundamental sense of togetherness between individuals. On 19th October 1980, addressing the leaders of Solidarity at Wawel and placing his reflection within the Christian tradition, Tischner defined « solidarity » using the words of St. Paul : « Bear one another's burdens » (Ga 6,2). Using these words as a springboard, he added : « Authentic solidarity is the solidarity of consciences[80] ». Fraternity and conscience are both terms that are meant to conceptualise a dominant inter-human category. Following Tischner's thinking, solidarity is the simply human — or, rather, interhuman — experience practiced in all areas of life and activity and thus incapable of being restricted to its political or economic dimension. Its objective is the good of the human being, in a bodily and spiritual dimension, in the

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[76] Józef Tischner, *Etyka Solidarności*, Spotkania, Paris, 1982 (Krakow 1981).

[77] The first round was called for 5th-10th September, the second organized from 26th September to 7th October.

[78] Józef Tischner, *Independence of Work* : Sermon preached to the delegates of the Congress on 6 September 1981 and adopted as Resolution 11/81 of the I KZD ; *Time to Root* : Sermon preached to the delegates of the I KZD : 27 September 1981, adopted as Resolution 32/81 of the I KZD.

[79] Tischner, *Etyka Solidarności*, op.cit., p.9.

[80] Ibid., p. 12.

full development of material and spiritual needs. Everyone, in their place (work, family), fulfills their duties through their actions in the space of solidarity. To be in solidarity is, above all, to share the same values. However, merely doing things together cannot be considered an attitude of solidarity. To be in solidarity, one must be « conscious » of that status and circumstance. Everyone can exclude themselves from a community by not respecting its values. Solidarity does not arise from the fact that we are in the same economic and political situation; it is not a question of solidarity of class, of a specific group, but an experience created first of all by an ethical bond that is formed between people, as founded in common values[81].

Community created by a consensus of values

The community taking shape during the Gdansk strike, whose institutional manifestation will be the creation of the Solidarity trade union, refers to ethical values as the basis of its vision of the social and political design it will seek to realise. In this sense, Krzemiński wrote that the social movement, which was formed in Poland in 1980-81, consisted in the fact that both the thinking of the « realisation of the social world and the actions » that gave rise to this thinking were developed in a sharper and even « metaphysical perspective — in the perspective of objective and transcendent discernment in the human community of an order of moral values[82] ». The basis of the *Solidarność* program was, according to Krzemiński, a « consensus of values[83] ».

Solidarność did not create new values, but wanted to advocate for them, especially when it came to common human values. Most authors indicate that there was a combination of two elements :

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[81] Ash pointed out : « The Polish workers, in contradiction to Marx, believed that ultimately consciousness (*Bewusstsein*) would determine being (*Sein*). Whatever their debt to socialist ideals, in this vital sense their priorities were Christian, not socialist. Socialism proceeds from society to the individual : people are unfulfilled, it suggests, because society is imperfect. Christianity proceeds from the individual to society : society is imperfect, it suggests, because human beings are imperfect », Ash, *The Polish Revolution*, op. cit., p. 291.

[82] Krzemiński, *Solidarność. Projekt polskiej demokracji*, op. cit., 1997, p. 163.

[83] Ibid., p. 11.

belief in human dignity and recognition of the need to create a community based on this[84]. Speaking of the strikes on the Baltic coast, one observer, a publicist and author of numerous reports, Ryszard Kapuściński, did not hesitate to say that : « The main motive for the demonstrations was human dignity, the effort that had to be made to build new relationships between people[85] ». This observation of the importance of the recognition of human dignity as the foundation of the community being built in Gdansk and then within the *Solidarność* movement is confirmed by numerous socio-historical analyses that have looked on the one hand, at trade union writings and documents and, on the other, at surveys conducted among workers in various cities[86].

This postulate of dignity is deeply rooted in the functioning of the system of real socialism (or communism). One of the main problems is the crisis of values and especially the crisis of the value of work[87]. In this area, there is a contradiction between the rhetoric of power, where we talk about the dignity of workers and work, and the reality of everyday life, where people are precisely confronted with this lack of human dignity. The studies of the research team led by Mirosława Marody in the 1980s, carried out among workers, reveal several aspects concerning working conditions and the relations between workers and their superiors, in particular, that the former consider themselves humiliated by the latter, both as persons and as workers[88]. Privileges, climbing of the hierarchical ladder, social benefits, an easy financial situation are possible solely through membership of the Communist Party (PZPR). Skills remain secondary. This discourse on the Party, contrary to reality, makes the workers consider themselves second-class citizens[89]. Moreover, the feeling of

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[84] Kowalski, *Krytyka solidarnościowego rozumu,* op. cit., p. 103-111 ; Grzegorz Bakuniak, *My Solidarność - nowy związek we własnych oczach*, in Krzemiński, *Polacy-jesień '80*, p. 185-212, Krzemiński, *Solidarność. Projekt polskiej demokracji*, op. cit., Ciżewska, *Filozofia publiczna*, op. cit, p. 225-239.

[85] Ryszard Kapuściński, *Notatki z Wybrzeża,* in *Rewolucja Solidarności. Polska od Sierpnia 1980 do grudnia 1981, Polityka,* 2005/n°4, p. 8 (p. 7-8).

[86] Cf. Krzemiński, *Solidarność. Projekt polskiej demokracji,* p. 44-66.

[87] Marcin Kula, (eds.), *Solidarność w ruchu 1980-1981,* Warsaw, NOWA, 2000, p. 39.

[88] Ibid., p. 39-43.

[89] In a way, these remarks can be inscribed in the reflection on the human condition of certain thinkers such as Montesquieu, Rousseau or, closer to us, Simone Weil, who look at this slave-citizen opposition.

being « manipulated », of being regarded « as machines », of being exploited and treated as slaves is reflected in the stories collected[90]. As a result, the strike, the founding of the union, allows workers to regain their identity, and the meaning of their work. From then on, human dignity takes on its full meaning and becomes central within *Solidarność*, in its program, in its demands. Workers go on strike not only in the name of material demands, but also for the improvement of working and living conditions, as well as in the name of values[91].

Some of the economic demands of the strikers in 1980 reveal an attempt at defence against humiliation. This is how certain formulations among the 21 demands of Gdansk can be interpreted[92]. For example, the demand to export surplus food only after the needs of the internal market are covered, that the privileges of members of the Communist Party and the state administration be eliminated, that the health system be improved, that particularly low wages be increased, as well as pensions : these are demands linked to human dignity[93]. This « discovery » of human dignity is largely linked to John Paul II's pilgrimage to Poland in 1979[94]. During that trip, the questions of the human dignity, the dignity of work, the importance of community were all brought to the forefront[95]. The Pope also developed this question through his magisterium. As early as in his first Encyclicals (*Redemptor hominis*, 1979 and *Laborem exercens*, 1981), the question of human rights and human dignity, of the value of work as an act of solidarity, remain central in his statements. It should also be noted that his reflections draw on the Polish romantic poet Norwid and his « philosophy of work », as well as on Tischner. In his declarations, John Paul II addresses the « social question », stressing the nature of work and the dignity of the worker (*Laborem exercens*). The idea of solidarity is embedded in the very nature of

[90] Bakuniak, *My Solidarność - nowy zwiazek we własnych oczach*, op.cit., p. 186.
[91] This was shown by the sociological surveys carried out by Ireneusz Krzemiński among the workers who took part in the strikes, notably between 1980 and 1981.
[92] See Rojek, *Semiotyka Solidarności* op. cit., Krzemiński, *Solidarność. Projekt polskiej demokracji*, op. cit.
[93] This is what has been shown by socio-historical analyses based on the surveys conducted under the direction of Marcin Kula, *Solidarność w ruchu*, op. cit., p. 45.
[94] Krzemiński, *Religia i Solidarność, Aneks,* 1987/n°48, p. 52-53.
[95] See analyses of Krzemiński, *Solidarność - doświadczenie i pamięć,* op. cit., p. 133-141.

working people, expressing a spirit of universalism, rooted in the principle of equality between people and nations, emphasising that « work is a sign of unity and solidarity[96] ».

The strikers in August 1980, then the trade unionists, discovered that they were similar, equal, because they rediscovered the value of the human person and the meaning of their work. This is typified by the following testimony : « We were born a second time as humans », says one journalist observing the strike, « We felt hope, the hope that we might be worth something, be masters of our own home [...] in this strike, what was wonderful was that the sphere of professional life had regained its dignity, its nobility [...] and that nobody wanted to part with it by slamming the door of their home[97]».

It is this experience of discovering the dignity of the human person that makes the discovery of the value of one's own person and the meaning of one's own work a possibility. The dignity of work allows people to leave their private space and find themselves in a public space where a community is created[98]. For Dariusz Gawin, who links the idea of solidarity to those of freedom and equality, strikers discover they are similar and regain their identity by discovering their dignity and the dignity of their work[99]. This equality can, according to Gawin, be translated as « amity ». This reasoning then allows us to say that this friendship that cements the strikers of Gdansk is defined by the idea of solidarity. In other words, we can say that the friendly ties, the ties of solidarity that are created, imply this moral requirement, which is the defence of human dignity, allowing involvement for the common good. This echoes the thinking of the Greek philosophers who considered that true friendship is only possible between people who are conscious of their own values and existence. Consequently, those who live their existence to the full can surpass themselves and move towards the good — because of their involvement in the common good and their

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[96] Pope John Paul II, Allocution, Plenary Session of the International Labour Organisation, 15 June 1982, Geneva.
[97] *Kto tu wpuścił dziennikarzy,* op. cit., (by Tadeusz Knade), p. 246.
[98] This reflection on the human condition according to Ciżewska is central in the context of the republican tradition. According to Aristotle, man « of a social nature » regains the fullness of his humanity (Aristotle, *Politic,* 1275b). Ciżewska, *Filozofia publiczna,* op. cit., p. 164.
[99] Gawin, *Sierpień 1980 w świetle tradycji republikańskiej,* art.cit. p. 59.

involvement with others. In other words, people who are free and conscious of their value, who regain a sense of dignity, can become involved in the community and be in solidarity. This is what those who adhere to *Solidarność* seem to experience or at least to aspire to.

The faith that forms the community has no ideological connotation. The ethical basis of a social movement provides for the formulation of its further objectives as well as offering a reference point for the definition of its participants' identity. Therefore, the existing divergences, diversities, variations of views or ideological orientations or practical interests did not lead to divisions but, on the contrary, enriched and enlivened the movement. This is expressed in *Solidarność*'s desire to base the social order on values and to recognise pluralism of opinions. In fact, in the *Solidarność* program, the values claimed have no ideological connotation. Based on universal values, they allowed for diversity.

The adopted system of values allowed the word multi-faith to be included in the understanding of the discourses that promoted their assumptions. These values include Christian ethics, the « national and working-class tradition », as well as the « democratic tradition of the world[100] ». This basing of solidarity on a normative system arguably distinguishes it from other movements, especially emancipation movements, which define their actions by a common destiny. It also includes human rights, national values, religious values, democracy, human and civil rights[101]. All these currents were united by one axiom : the adoption of the basic tenets of the « ideology » of solidarity, the conviction of human dignity and therefore the right to speak and be heard. Recognition of dignity and communitarianism, which were expressed in various discourses, formed the core of the movement's « ideology ». *Solidarność*, which defines itself as a social movement carrying values, is a community created by a consensus around values. Implicitly, this thought is found in the Program of the First Congress of *Solidarność* (1981), which reads : « We want justice, democracy, truth, legality (regime

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[100]The Program of the Solidarity Trade Union adopted by the 1st National Congress of Delegates: 1/ Who we are and where we are going (NZSS Program : 1).

[101] For program analysis, cf. : Rojek, *Semiotyka Solidarności,* op. cit., p. 107-166.

of legality, in accordance with the law), human dignity, freedom of conviction, restoration of the *res publica*, and not just bread, butter and sausage ». (NSZZ Program : 1)

The Program emphasises that unionists not only have a material purpose but also defend values. Its further states that the protest that is at the origin of Solidarity is economic, social and moral. In fact, as early as the spontaneous strikes in the summer of 1980, economic demands were not the most central. It is true that the strike broke out as a result of supply problems, and specifically the rise in the price of meat. When the Gdansk strikers' demands for wage increases were met, the strikes could have ended. However, many workers then demanded that the strike be renewed in solidarity with the companies in the regions that had not received the same wage benefits. And so it was decided to continue the strike in Gdansk and to renounce the wage increases (which could have been of more than half). The Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee was also created ; the delegates set up their common postulate and, on the list of demands, it is the demand for free trade unions that remains central.

This community is built on absolute values of the highest order. These values of dignity, justice and solidarity are described in the *Solidarność* Program as feelings of fraternal bonds. These are « natural » values, which are recognised by people as universal. As Rojek notes, the particularity of Solidarity is to transfer them to the public sphere, in a specific context, because the communist system leads to the « dimorphism of values[102] », that is, to divergence between the values and principles that govern the private sphere and those in the public sphere[103].

It is *Solidarność* that destroys this monopoly of the norm and language of power in the public sphere[104]. But, more than that, its community is created in a concrete historical context, in the reality formed by years of communist power, which is a political project,

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[102] Concept formulated by Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski (*Rozpad połowiczny. Szkice z socjologii transformacji ustrojowej,* op. cit.*)*, taken up and developed by Rojek, *Semiotyka Solidarności* op. cit., p. 84.

[103] Rojek, *Semiotyka Solidarności*, op. cit., p. 85-91.

[104] Ibid., p. 89.

based on an exclusive political connection, on the principle of the enemy, seeking to make people aware of the existence of a common enemy. The bond created by the system is based on negation, in the categorisation of « us » and « them[105] ». The values accepted by this system can create a political bond that is imposed artificially because it is devoid of any ethical bond. In this system, there is no room for independent ethical communities. They are tolerated as long as they are limited to a private space. When they enter the public sphere, they are immediately classified as enemies. This is how an ethical community was formed around the Church, tolerated or not[106]. The fact remains that John Paul II's first pilgrimage made it possible, for the first time, to experience this ethical bond in public, bringing together a large part of the society around him.

Reading the program of *Solidarność*, one must return to Hannah Arendt[107] – for whom solidarity is not a simple retribution for good, is not the result of social justice, and cannot be understood as a response to social or economic discrimination. Solidarity manifests itself when people act in common, having as their concern the common good, « the cause », public affairs. Solidarity is not based on identification with a social group, but on the overriding principle that governs a community. Solidarity is collective action, a matter related to *res publica*, as also mentioned by Dariusz Gawin, who, exploring the strikes in Gdansk, notes that it is the relations between citizens that are the basis of the *polis*[108]. In this sense, the relationship that is created between the members of *Solidarność*, the society, as desired and defined in the program, is based on an agreement between free and equal people bound by the same system of values. The willingness to found a community based on the « moral consensus » developed by *Solidarność* allowed even « previous opponents » to be included in this community, i.e. people who « had important roles in the organs of the Party and the state », to achieve a shared way of thinking[109].

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[105] Krzemiński, *Solidarność. Projekt polskiej demokracji,* op. cit., p. 45 (p. 44-149).
[106] Pomian, *Pologne : défi à l'impossible ?,* p. 112-124.
[107] Hannah Arendt, *L'Humaine Condition,* Gallimard, 1972.
[108] Gawin, *Sierpień 1980,* art. cit., p. 55.
[109] Krzemiński, *Solidarność. Projekt polskiej demokracji,* op. cit., p. 28.

« The ethics of responsibility »

The concept of an ethical bond, as developed in 1980/81 draws on the notion of the « ethics of responsibility », coined in the 19th century and influenced by the Polish Romantic poets (Mickiewicz, Krasiński, Słowacki and Norwid)[110]. It is crystallized in a specific, historical Polish context: in the situation of a « stateless people », a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional nation that was divided between three spoliating powers (Prussia, Russia, and Austria) at the end of the 18th century[111]. In this context of political dependence, the political institutions, represented by the occupier who had partitioned the homeland, were rejected along with the official discourse that justified the partitions and represented the interest of the Holy Alliance states. The Polish people, a « *nation-people* », developed « a symbolic code » influenced by Romanticism that guaranteed a cultural bond[112]. The period of Romanticism, which crystallised the overall Polish cultural paradigm, including the political and religious, created a model of behavior and moral norms: the ethics of responsibility[113]. This concept was developed and enriched during the 19th century and conveyed through literary, theatrical and plastic works.

The ethics of responsibility embody the new values of dedication and patriotism : individuals develop « transcendently » by taking responsibility for the problems of others, of society, of the human community. This responsibility towards others, as a principle of solidarity, must be accompanied by the internalisation of transcendent values[114]. This

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[110] Cf. Andrzej Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic nationalism: The case of Poland*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982; Idem, « Le messianisme romantique », in Chantal Delsol, Michel Masłowski and Joanna Nowicki (eds.), *Mythes et symboles en Europe centrale*, PUF, Paris, 2002, p. 465-477. Michel Masłowski, « Pologne : un héros romantique moderne », in *Mythes et symboles en Europe centrale*, op. cit., p. 302-316 ; Michel Masłowski, « Le paradigme romantique du croire et son rôle au XXe siècle en Pologne », in Michel Masłowski (ed.), *Religion et identité en Europe centrale*, Belin, Paris, p. 59-75.

[111] Jerzy Lukowski, Hubert Zawadzki, *A Concise History of Poland*, Cambridge University Press, 2001.

[112] Masłowski, *Pologne : un héros romantique*, op. cit., p. 302. Masłowski, *Le paradigme romantique du croire et son rôle au XXe siècle en Pologne*, op. cit., p. 67.

[113] Masłowski, *Pologne : un héros romantique*, op. cit., p. 314.

[114] At this point Mickiewicz wrote : « The more you improve and enlarge your soul, the more you will improve your laws and enlarge your borders », (Polish Pilgrim's Book, 1832), *Le Livre des Pèlerins polonais*, L'Âge d'Homme, Lausanne, Paris, 1982, p. 128.

concept, which develops as a principle of « horizontal transcendence », according to Michel Masłowski, seems to be « an expression of a new type of universality as inherited from the Enlightenment, which is not merely rationalist, but refers to the collective ethical project — to the ethical universals and the specific memory of each culture[115] ».

As Baczko points out, this « collective memory », which is specific to each culture, is not a purely literal dimension, but also includes a « deeper dimension, where structures and trends in the long term are manifested[116] ». This eventuality not only allows these structures to manifest themselves, but also makes them recur, adding their unique significance. In the Polish case, an ideal that shapes this memory permanently is freedom. In the 19th century, the defence of ethical universals such as freedom was particularly evident in Romanticism : the fight for freedom is the fight for the homeland, while the homeland is God's vehicle for the realisation of humanity's development. Indeed, for the Polish poets Mickiewicz or Norwid, there is no need to renounce patriotism to support the cause of humanity. On the contrary, the latter can be supported more effectively by building the homeland first and foremost. The free homeland remains an intermediary between the individual and humanity.

In the 19th century, solidarity, as a concept of responsibility and the struggle for freedom, was employed as a mode of relationship between individuals and a collective destiny: one cannot exist without the other. The individual carries the community while existing only through recognition by the community. This concept establishes a heroic model of commitment : the development of a persona dependent on the embodiment of communal aspirations. In the Romantic era, this model is represented by a patriotic hero who fights for the freedom of his homeland and who successively transforms himself into a pilgrim of the universal cause, one who fights for the freedom of other peoples. In the Romantic concept of solidarity, it was a question of the solidarity of the peoples as opposed

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[115] Masłowski, *Pologne : un héros romantique moderne,* p. 314.
[116] Bronislaw Baczko, « La Pologne de Solidarité : une mémoire explosive », in Idem, *Les imaginaires sociaux,* op. cit., (p. 185-239), p. 204.

to the solidarity of the governments of the Holy Alliance[117]. This was embraced by Polish insurrectionists, who after their own defeats, continued their struggle on behalf of other nations in the Spring of the Nations, or other national movements. In the second half of the 19th century, under the influence of positivism, this theoretical model assumed its reality in the shape of, for example, a scientist, a disinterested intellectual or entrepreneur who took responsibility for the collective destiny to the detriment of his own career and, at the end of the century, a social activist, dedicated to the health of the poor or the education of the people[118].

This model provided significant autonomy from institutional power and gave society coherence during dramatic historical moments. This can be seen in the years of the Second World War when the Polish state did not exist. Society, under German Occupation, organised itself to fight for survival through the Home Army and armed struggle, clandestine education, etc. The historical situation of Polish society from 1945 to 1980 saw a Polish state entirely dominated by Soviet politics and violence which resulted in the « enslavement of society ». Since then, as has been pointed out by Bohdan Cywiński, the historian of ideas who was also one of the Gdansk experts, *Solidarność* « consciously, though not declaratively, took up the chain of successive forms of self-defence and social resistance against inauthentic state powers that is alive in the Polish tradition[119] ». In this sense, « it found it difficult to even fit into the structure of the trade union, going — especially in thought — beyond its typical area of interest and activity ». Its ambition was to provide society with what the state institution had failed to create — a free social space : « *Solidarność* wanted to be a structure of social self-help[120] ». In the 1980s, the idea of solidarity, as a concept of struggle for freedom, as well as social assistance, was used as a form of commitment and patriotism.

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[117] Mickiewicz's heroic figure has a universal cast : « Wherever there is evil, there is the Fatherland ; for wherever in Europe there is oppression of Freedom, and it is fought for, so will the Fatherland be fought for ».

[118] Cf. Bohdan Cywiński, *Rodowody niepokornych*, Warsaw, Bilbioteka Więzi, 1971.

[119] Bohdan Cywiński, mailing-letter to Renata Latała on 17th January 2020.

[120] Ibid.

For the workers who went on strike in Gdansk, and later within the trade union movement, a status as belonging to the Polish nation was one of the premises of solidarity. The central theme of patriotic language is the strengthening of the emerging community through a common history, a common experience, a common heritage. This was particularly important in the context of a totalitarian regime which outweighed, confiscated or deformed that heritage.

The claim to the « right to the past », and hence the exercise of collective memory, was part of a wider context, that of *Solidarność*'s reclaiming of a « symbolic field freed from the monopoly of power[121] ». The sixteen months of the *Solidarność* movement is a period marked by « an explosive memory », in Baczko's words[122], which is now marked by commemorations, anniversaries, rituals and symbols around historical events or figures. They have a unifying role and occupy an important place in the national memory. This « recovery of the confiscated past[123] » was already evident in the Gdansk Shipyard during the strike. Historical categories, symbols and rituals were used to give shape to the community created with an emphasis on values considered essential to national identity and culture, such as Christianity and the Catholic faith, with a focus on the Cross, Mass in plain language, hymns, and the portraits of John Paul II that accompanied the ceremonies.

The understanding of solidarity as a form of patriotism, as rooted in a common history, can be found in the thought of Maurizio Viroli[124]. He puts patriotism in opposition to nationalism (defined as enclosure and exclusion), as well as many liberal visions of an impersonal society of rational individuals bound together by loyalty to abstract ideals and principles[125]. Viroli highlights the role of the past as a source of civic education, pointing to « republican virtue » and « republican martyrs », who make sacrifices to defend the

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[121] Baczko, *La Pologne de Solidarité : une mémoire explosive*, op. cit., p. 222.
[122] Ibid.
[123] Ibid., p. 192.
[124] Maurizio Viroli, *Républicanisme*, (Translation of *Repubblicanesimo*, Roma- Bari, 1999), Lormont, Le Bord de l'Eau, 2011.
[125] Viroli, *Républicanisme*, op. cit., p. 89-99.

common freedom[126]. Recalling the First National Congress of the *Solidarność* Trade Union in Gdansk in 1981, Timothy Ash notes :

> [...] it was a patriotic gathering, an alternative parliament without precedent in the Soviet bloc, a National Assembly — and not merely of the Third Estate. [...] the usually soulless Olivia sports hall was filled with the spirits of the national martyrs. No chance was lost to demonstrate that here were the true heirs of the great tradition of Polish ideals, of the other, the real People's Poland, whose history is remembered by months[127].

This rediscovered common history, this collective memory, finds its voice in a variety of ways : through the workers' memory centred on the very recent strikes of 1956, 1970 and 1976 and their repression, through the memory of a society that is rediscovering its values and traditions, and through the memory of a nation that is rediscovering its confiscated history.

By providing stories of shared experiences, history set standards of behaviour by cementing not only the bond between them, but also the intergenerational bond. Romantic poetry enjoyed great popularity as it highlighted the intergenerational ties and intergenerational brotherhood resulting from the common fight for freedom. The legacy of Romanticism conveyed an open patriotism, compatible with an ethical universalism. It is also significant that, during the Gdansk strikes, Mickiewicz's *Pilgrim's Book of the Polish Nation* was read by the striking workers[128]. This work develops the idea that the solidarity of all nations can be treated on an equal footing with the idea of national solidarity. It is therefore possible to consider that *Message to the working people of the countries of the Eastern Bloc* from the First Congress of delegates of the *Solidarność* Trade Union was based on a conviction that the ideal of *Solidarność* had a universal message, a missionary character.

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[126] Ibid., p. 81-106, also p. 70-80.
[127] Ash, *The Polish Revolution,* op. cit., p. 217.
[128] Walicki, *Le messianisme romantique,* op. cit., p. 477.

However, the fact remains the updating of the past through its symbols and representations, which was evident at the time, entailed a risk of sliding towards a certain national megalomania[129]. And in the 1980s, critical voices were raised against the exaltation of all these national pseudo-truths and imagined ideas of the nation's past[130]. However, this debate was anyway stifled quickly by the communist government as it declared Martial Law in December 1981, and war on society. The debate continued in the « catacombs », but these clandestine spaces, with their overtones of persecution and oppression, restricted the transparency of debates on the « difficult and debatable moments of Polish history ».

Political friendship?

The creator of the *Solidarność* logo intended it to represent people walking. This artistic interpretation conceptualizes a social reality in a symbolic way. To dissect the symbolic meaning of this idea-image allows us to understand the idea of solidarity that gives identity to the Polish movement. Marching indicates direction, includes the act of stepping through space, displays movement towards a common goal. To walk together, the marchers must hold each other tight, to support each other. « Walking together » is a matter of common agreement. If we relate this symbolism to the level of a social order, the implementation thereof is possible by « common agreement ».

Referencing the notion of common agreement, Edward Swiderski emphasizes that, in the construction of a social order on the basis of agreement, affectivity yields to the rationality of the actors who recognize and define common interests and the ways to achieve them[131]. According to the philosopher, their agreement in this case

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[129] According to Baczko, the celebration of a « recovered » past often consolidates the stereotypical images found in the myths, while its darker aspects remain hidden. Baczko, *Pologne de Solidarité*, op. cit., p. 230.

[130] The figure of J. J. Lipski, a historian and activist from the democratic opposition, was one of them. His text, whose title remains emblematic : « Two countries, two patriotisms. Reflections on the national megalomania of the Poles », initiated a debate over the nation's past. Baczko, *La Pologne de Solidarité*, op. cit., p. 231.

[131] Remarks taken from Edward Swiderski's commentary at the colloquium « Concepts of Dedication » held on 27 November 2020.

forms the basis of mutual obligations and expectations regarding the objectives of their common action. It is then possible to speak of a « we » with a normative character that can therefore be regarded as ethical. This reflection is in line with Bayertz's contextual interpretation, mentioned above, of solidarity as a norm which organises social life. It has also been developed further by Margaret Gilbert[132], who elaborated the concept of sociality from the concept of « joint commitment », the foundation of the whole group in the strong sense of the term, which justifies speaking of a « plural subject » corresponding to the pronoun « we » : we do, we think, etc. So, the common agreement is a « joint commitment » by which the parties to the agreement confer reciprocal and complementary obligations and expectations upon each other, such that everyone is obliged to do what is necessary to maintain the « We ». This analysis is not unrelated to Aristotle's vision of the *Polis* : according to him, the « political » community takes precedence over the individual citizen, and it is in the individual's interest to subordinate his decision-making power to the well-being of the community[133].

The reference to an Aristotelian vision of the *Polis*, and in particular the emphasis on the experience of « us » as a « common cause » or « common agreement », is emphasised by historians who analyse the *Solidarność* movement from the perspective of the republican tradition. Dariusz Gawin, analysing the course of the strike at the Gdansk Shipyard, describes *Solidarność* among the strikers as a joint action and as a joint « cause » — « *Res publica* » — recalling that the original meaning of the word « res » is not a « thing » but a « cause » ; it is not a state existing alongside its citizens, but a relationship between citizens which constitutes the foundation of a state[134]. Gawin considers

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[132] See Margaret Gilbert, *Living Together : Rationality, Sociality and Obligation,* Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 1996 ; Idem, *Marcher Ensemble: Essais sur les fondements des phénomènes collectifs,* Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 2003. Thanks to Edward Swiderski for drawing attention to this thinker.

[133] « Consent, on the other hand, is said to exist in a state when its citizens share the same views on what is useful to them, pursue the same goals, and act in accordance with resolutions adopted jointly. Consent between people is therefore said to refer to that which is of great importance and may be shared by two opposing parties or by all ». Aristote, *Éthique à Nicomaque,* in Id. *Œuvres,* Gallimard 2014, (p. 1-259), p. 215-216/IX, 1167 a.

[134] Gawin, *Sierpień 1980 w świetle tradycji republikańskiej,* p. 55.

« solidarity » as a common cause, as a common action. Acting together is not the pursuit of individual interests which happen to be the same for many individuals, but moving together in a common world called into being by a program, acting together in a relationship[135].

This awareness of « participation in collective action » was widespread, as shown by the sociological research carried out among *Solidarność* activists by a group of researchers led by Krzemiński. This is seen in the period of *Solidarność*, described by its participants as one of the experience of « spontaneous organisation », « grass-roots activity of ordinary people », « feeling of great communion, friendliness, sense of unity, atmosphere of cooperation[136] ». The surveys carried out by the researchers showed the conviction of activists and members that joining the movement, joining *Solidarność* in autumn 1980, was a « natural » thing to do.

This « common cause » is based on positive mobilisation because it is not based on identification with one social group but on moral principles that guide collective action. In this sense, Gawin links solidarity with freedom and equality, showing that this experience is a component of solidarity. The strikers discovered that they were like each other because they became equal in dignity as subjects in action. Gawin defines this similarity with the word *homonoia*, which is translated as consent or friendship. He points out that, just as consent and friendship were the glue of the *Polis*, solidarity was the glue of the political community in the Gdansk Shipyard[137].

Certainly, the community of strikers in Gdansk, then the *Solidarność* movement, lacking institutional means, could only aim to reanimate horizontal inter-human links. References by Gowin and Ciżewska to Aristotle are therefore well-founded. *Solidarność* certainly sought to embody and promote friendly ties. It was often born out of small family and friendship groups, which at one point meant, as Bronisław Świderski points out, that « solidarity », as a feature of a small group, became a characteristic of the Union. And Świderski

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[135] Regarded as near Arendt's vision.
[136] Krzemiński, *Solidarność - doświadczenie i pamięć,* Gdańsk, Europejskie Centrum Solidarności 2010, p. 072-073.
[137] Gawin, *Sierpień 1980 w swietle tradycji republikańskiej*, art. cit., p. 59.

added that the members of *Solidarność*, « who had not known each other before, seemed to say: we can trust each other as friends trust each other[138] ». These relations of mutual trust, spontaneous relations of friendship, mutual kindness and cooperation, were first observed during strikes, and then within the *Solidarność* Trade Union. This behaviour manifests itself in how individuals address each other, in the common moral principles guiding the collective action[139]. Certainly, the adoption of the principle of territoriality and not sectoriality as a means of allocating the administration of the *Solidarność* Trade Union, especially regarding the concept of workers' self-government[140], allowed the relationship to take root in the region, and for the formation of closer ties[141].

But this was not merely a friendship based on affective, face-to-face relations, reciprocal sincerity and trust, reserved for intimates and restricted to small groups. Indeed, this is not enough to create an ethical bond on a societal scale. According to Aristotle, it is not enough for citizens to have goodwill towards others : « Consent is friendship between citizens and is usually regarded as such because it concerns what is useful and what belongs to life[142] ». It is necessary to internalise the values of republican life. This requires effort. Political friendship[143]

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[138] Świderski, *Gdańsk i Ateny*, art. cit., p. 117.

[139] Many of these reactions were captured directly from observers, witnesses to the events. Most of these accounts have remained in the memories of the participants, preserved and subsequently analysed. Two research groups under the direction of Morody and Krzeminski conducted research around the events, using question-naires among the participants in the movement. It can be assumed that surviving descriptions or memories may not always be true. Nevertheless, their value is different : they capture the atmosphere of the period, highlighting the emotions of the participants' experiences.

[140] This method of organisation was based on the ideas of Abramowski, the socialist thinker whose ideas influenced the practice of *Solidarność* (cf. Wojciech Giełżynski, *Edward Abramowski. Zwiastun Solidarności,* London, Wyd. Polonia, 1986). His idea of self-governing republics is comparable to the principles enshrined in the Program resolution adopted by the first congress of delegates. Uchwala programo-wa I Krajowego Zjazdu Delegatow NSZZ Solidarność (Solidarity' Program : Thesis 20).

[141] Cf. Ash, *The Polish Revolution*, op. cit. ; Touraine et al., *Solidarité*, op. cit.

[142] Aristote, *Ethique à Nicomaque*, p. 216/IX, 1167a.

[143] Cf. Evgeny Roshchin, « Friendship of the Enemies : 20th century treaties of the United Kingdom and the USSR », in *International Politics,* 2011. Vol. 48 (1), p. 71-91 ; Idem, « The Concept of Friendship : From Princes to States » in *European Journal of International Relations,* 2006. Vol. 12 (4), p. 599-624.

requires the acceptance of a commitment to care for fellow citizens in the enterprise of living together; it gives a moral sanction to the action, to the citizens' commitment to others, to respect for differences. This identity must be recognized consciously, and accepted because it entails obligations. Kurt Bayertz sees such a positive commitment to individual action as one of the basic components of the idea of solidarity[144].

However, as Paweł Śpiewak notes, political friendship, which expresses itself in the acceptance of obligations, common rules and constitutional foundations (as in the case of the Greek philosophers), « does not exclude the divergent spiritual and political ways in which they perceive the common good[145] ». Understood in this way, a political community built on friendship is not an exclusive community. It does not require a single vision of the world, which means the acceptance of pluralism of convictions and opinions. At this point, Gilbert's approach, which proceeds from the simple example of « walking together », remains interesting. She observes that we can agree on a goal and walk together without knowing each other inside out. What counts is a willingness to trust others.

It is this idea of friendship that Tischner also contemplates in his texts collected in the *Ethics of Solidarity*, which are both the definition of and the appeal for a norm to be followed in the new community created by *Solidarność*. « Solidarity is always a solidarity around a certain dialogue[146] », he notes. This allows for a leaving-behind of prejudices and one's own anguish, making it possible for people to open up to each other. The condition of this dialogue is the capacity to « penetrate » (to have empathy with) the point of view of the other, and accept that the other is right, holds a part of the truth[147]. This means that every voice, every opinion, of every member of the community must be respected, that the arguments must be debated by everyone. We find in Tischner the same observation, even if formulated in other

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[144] On this issue, the positive obligation to act, Bayertz notes that modern ethics and political philosophy prefer to concentrate on the defence of the individual against external threats, to emphasise the individual's rights, rather than to speak of the individual's duties. Bayertz, *Solidarität*, op. cit., p. 9-10.

[145] Paweł Śpiewak, « Przyjaźń i res publica », in *Res Publica*, 1988, n°6, p. 12-18.

[146] Tischner, *Etyka Solidarności*, op. cit., p. 15.

[147] Ibid., p. 16.

words, as in Aristotle : a person's discovery of their own dignity and the awareness of belonging to a community lead to the recognition that all members of that community enjoy the same rights, i.e. are equal. Recognising one's own dignity and that of others has consequences in the way one sees the world, thinks, looks and speaks. The formation of communities of dignified people inclines towards a debate in which everyone can speak and empowers people to respect every opinion. Following the logic of this reasoning, two elements are important to guarantee « concord », which is the essence of political friendship (Aristotle) : pluralism that allows dialogue, and the rejection of violence. *Solidarność* refers to the idea of peaceful struggle, and seeks to create a social reality by referring to solidarity[148].

What we are seeing is a broad movement, very diversified, based on a consensus on the values to be defended and accepting differences of opinion, disputes over doctrines and differences in political convictions. This resulted in the trade union's practice, and was reflected in field experience demonstrating sociological analyses and experiences « lived » by trade unionists[149]. At assemblies, congresses and meetings, neither the subjects nor the themes to be debated were decided upon. Divergent and opposing voices were accepted. Common Position had to take into consideration everyone's point of view, and allow everyone to express themselves. Persuasion prevailed, not violence or force. The immediate effect of this awareness of being in a community is that people start to speak up, to discuss. Several authors have observed this « willingness to debate », these endless discussions, « the social debate » that extended throughout the country, from union groups to the family, through all strata of society, from the public to the private space. Krzemiński notes : « In the autumn of 1980, Poland was transformed into an enormous forum for public discussion [...] there was no place where there were no popular meetings[150] ». And in this « space for public debate[151] » created by *Solidarność*, we find a diversity of discourses : one that deals with aspects of citizenship (citizen discourse), a workers' discourse, one that claims religious values, another patriotic, another with aims of independence

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[148] Józef Tischner, *Rozmowy niekontrolowane,* Paris, Instytut Literacki, 1983, p. 14-15.
[149] Krzemiński, *Solidarność - doświadczenie i pamięć,* op. cit., p. 300-313.
[150] Krzemiński, *Dziejowe zwyciestwo i codzienne niespelnienie, Więź,* n°7, 2005, (p. 9-17), p. 13.
[151] Krzemiński, *Solidarność - organizacja polskich nadziei,* op. cit., p. 20.

and national freedom. This plethora of discourses formulating different points of view was also in fact a source of permanent tensions. In any case, none of them claimed to be exclusive, to be the only one valid ; the spirit of « concord », in the Aristotelian sense in the space of *polis*, is preserved. The ideal of solidarity expressed by this political community forming the *Solidarność* movement was above all a kind of permanent discussion of the « common good », on how to live together, a debate that sought to be based on mutual listening and finding consensus. As sociological analyses show, the aspiration to this ideal was expressed in the demand for freedom of speech in the media, not only in the official media, but also in the internal debates of the union to ensure that a kind of self-censorship did not develop within the movement.

As Carl Schmitt showed in his analyses, friendship as a denial of dispersion and political separation, must mean a state of union and concentration of the human community, a state of political unity[152]. The latter is nothing more than a state of absence of hostility within a nation. It is the goal of solidarity. Is it also the goal of *Solidarność* ?

Zbigniew Stawrowski writes that « the Solidarity community did not consider anyone an enemy[153] ». To be in solidarity is to enlarge the community, to promote the bonds of friendship and renounce violence, and not to look for an enemy. Tischner stressed « that Solidarity, which is created in the spirit of the Gospel, has no need of enemies or adversaries. It addresses to everyone and is not against anyone[154] ».

The attempt to establish a dialogue, and the reluctance to use violence, was also rooted in the memory of previous social protests (1956, 1968, 1970)[155]. Linked to this experience was the fear of uncontrolled spontaneity capable of leading to bloodshed. Peaceful methods of struggle therefore had to distinguish the trade unionists from the representatives of the Party establishment.

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[152] Carl Schmitt, *Nauka o konstytucji*, Fundacja Świętego Mikołaja. Redakcja « Teologii Politycznej », Warsaw, 2013.

[153] Zbigniew Stawrowski, *Solidarność znaczy więź. W kręgu myśli Józefa Tischnera i Jana Pawła II,* Kraków, Instytut Mysli Tischnera, 2010, p. 112.

[154] Tischner, *Etyka Solidarności,* op. cit , p. 8.

[155] Krzemiński and all, *Polacy-jesień'80,* op. cit., p. 207-208.

The combination of civic efforts to preserve freedom, common action and the possibility of understanding the behavior and opinions of others, which Ciżewska observes in the *Solidarność* movement, is in her view based on voluntariness[156]. This is what she describes as the attitude of a citizen-friend among friends. It is one which recognises accepted values and goals as its own. This attitude, according to Ciżewska, does not exclude altruism, but does not presuppose it. The difference is significant : « Altruism is directed towards people as such, it is apolitical, while republican solidarity puts the good of the common people first. Its subject is not a more specific humanity, but the common citizens[157] ».

In the attribution of constitutional power to friendship, recognizing this as the basis of the republic as covered by Ciżewska, we also find the following link to the idealistic concept of Edward Abramowski, a thinker from the turn of the 20th century[158]. His thought, far from republican, is cited as one of the most important concepts to influence the practice of *Solidarność*. In his short essay, *Friendship Ties (Związki Przyjaźni)*, Abramowski considers friendship to be « the one and only value, an element of development on the social as well as on the individual level », while « the value of man is his ability to live friendship[159] ». According to this thinker, it is in a relationship of friendship that the social good is identified with the individual good. It is from friendship that the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity are derived. It is friendship that is the basis of solidarity. Now « social solidarity must have a soul, solidarity cannot be formed out of the struggle for life ». What is « the soul » of solidarity ? It is « friendship, a disinterested attitude in all areas of life, both individual and social[160] ». Abramowski, thinking of the ideal of a future community for his compatriots which would be created in Poland with national independence, emphasizes the importance of the ethical bond, seeking to show his contemporaries the idea of solidarity that is realized outside the state or parallel to the state and sometimes even in opposition to it. Abramowski's intuition regarding the importance of interhuman ties, which are essential for founding a community, seems to have reappeared spontaneously during the events of summer 1980.

[156] Ciżewska, *Filozofia publiczna Solidarności,* op. cit., p. 217.
[157] Ibid.
[158] Ciżewska, *Filozofia polityczna,* op. cit., p. 217-218.
[159] Abramowski, *Związki Przyjaźni,* op. cit, p. 248
[160] Ibid.

Such was the practice of the union in 1980-1981. It was a question of enlarging the community, of weaving the bonds of wider friendship, the movement within the union and outside to create concord, to enlarge the community. Krzemiński notes that common ground was found with the government representatives in Gdansk through dialogue[161]. They sought to discuss and negotiate so as not to fracture society. At this time there was no division between « us » and « them ». The aim was to maintain amity even with those in power, with those who were members of the Party, through a permanent discussion to preserve unity, not to construct a dichotomic vision of enemy and friend, not to consider anyone as « enemy ». Maintaining friendship among citizens was important to preserve social unity. The hope of expanding this community of friends was embodied in the call noted by Tischner : « Those who support our solidarity must take the measure of their solidarity ![162] ».

Solidarity — aspiring to a political ideal

« The word "solidarity" brings together our anxious hopes, stimulates fortitude and thinking, and binds together people who only yesterday stood far apart », wrote Józef Tischner in 1981[163]. Certainly, the most important sense of this period is of the profound experience of togetherness, and the profound awareness of the existing ties between the people participating in these events. The experience of solidarity cannot be understood in isolation from the specific context, i.e. the social reality created by real socialism, by the dependence of power on the Soviet Union during the years of communist rule. Acting in solidarity presupposed an awareness of a common destiny, of the interdependence between people ; and required a spiritual motivation to reduce self-interest in favour of the other.

It is a fact that, in 1980-1981, the reinvigorated Polish society created the common work that was *Solidarność* as an expression of hope and certain expectations. It was certainly an attempt to realise a true political

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[161] Krzemiński, *Solidarność. Projekt polskiej demokracji,* op. cit., p. 45-46.
[162] Tischner, *Etyka Solidarności,* op. cit., p. 91.
[163] Ibid., p. 7.

ideal : a community built on a moral consensus of values. The personal decision to participate in a common cause, the sense of personal responsibility for others, was closely linked to a deep awareness of the common good : a common heritage, a common history, an aspiration to live in truth. This way of living in solidarity, linked closely to the ideal of freedom, had its roots in the tradition of the 19th century, in conditions where the community organised a communal space outside an imposed, alien existing power. It is therefore possible to define the 16-month period of the *Solidarność* movement as an updating of the « ethics of responsibility » and its concept of horizontal transcendence as a base for communal experience. It was also an attempt to broaden the community. Although the communist power was perceived as alien, this period was also an attempt to create social bonds with the circles of power, with those belonging to the Communist Party, to transcend alienation. Power was seen as a possible dialogue partner, even if this dialogue was difficult. In the event, many members of the Communist Party left its ranks and joined the *Solidarność* movement during this period.

Elżbieta Ciżewska notes that *Solidarność* translated the belief in solidarity into a « grammar of interpersonal relations », and thus a belief in ethics into a « grammar of civic relations[164] ». Arguably, one can agree with her that Tischner's vision of the experience of union being considered on a meta-level is difficult to transfer to political theory. In his description, solidarity is an idea, not a theory. His analyses were « pastoral » or didactic in nature, pointing the way for personal commitment and reflection on newly formed community bonds. It was more an attempt to orient the movement, a way of searching for a political ideal. The concept of solidarity brings together many ideas such as freedom, independence and human dignity, and this is evident both in Tischner's thought and in the practice of the movement. Perhaps this was an attempt to make the idea of solidarity a formative political element. But the deep aspirations of the movement were not aimed at creating a global model of society, in either the future or the past. In view of the experience of the communist system, there is without doubt an absence of such a project and a distrust of it. The objective was not to build a new abstract theory. Building a link

[164] Ciżewska, *Filozofia publiczna Solidarności,* op. cit., p. 224.

through the *Solidarność* movement by rediscovering the basic facts of friendship, dignity, truth, justice and freedom expressed the collective desire to return the fundamental values to their original meaning. It was an attempt to return to the essence of solidarity, a desire for a moral requirement that could not be manipulated by anyone.

In light of the subsequent events of the 1980s, the idea of solidarity as a political ideal based on an ethical bond can be seen as too idealistic, not to say utopian. The imposition of Martial Law on 13th December 1981, which was a declaration by power of an « open war against society », the outlawing of the union and the imprisonment of its leaders and activists, the violations of civil rights seen throughout the 1980s actually mark a split in the emerging community. In this state of war, power, hitherto ignored, came to the fore. As Zbigniew Stawrowski points out, this power « re-entered the social sphere and, according to its logic immediately set about destroying all ethical ties[165] », those formed during the years of the « first *Solidarność* », as the period from 1980 to 1981 is often called.

Martial Law blocked the public space and prevented the development of Tischner's ethical community of « people of good will ». So, if we take the idea of « consent » or « social contract » as the basis for political friendship, we can say that it no longer had a place in the new reality. The logic of « us » and « them » was imposed. As a result, the idea of solidarity open to all in the face of danger and persecution, open even to members of the Communist Party, was over. In fact, in this new context, in which society could no longer be realised in the public sphere, the idea of solidarity took on a different dimension.

This idea asserted itself much more as a fighter, accuser and liberator. It preserved and reproduced the hopes and expectations that were expressed during sixteen months of *Solidarność*, but it was expressed through different attitudes. The majority of people were forced to accept the new reality that imposed itself throughout the common public space, but they continued to seek the importance of ethical bonds, of maintaining the community at an elementary level.

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[165] Zbigniew Stawrowski, *Solidarność znaczy więź*, op. cit., p. 113.

This ideal of solidarity was embodied by the figure of the « Good Samaritan », by being present among the most deprived and helping the dispossessed : imprisoned members of *Solidarność*, political prisoners, their families, the persecuted and the needy. The second attitude was represented by those who, in the face of persecution, sought to reclaim the public space forcibly won by the Party, when the Communist authorities were clearly regarded as the enemy. They were part of the Romantic insurrectionist tradition of the Polish people, who have an ethical right to revolt against tyrannical power. For them, the main political goal is rebellion against authoritarian power. This is the solidarity of Antigone, who openly defies authority, the solidarity of Kordian, the hero of Slowacki's plays, who embodies the heroic attitude of fighting for freedom in the spirit of sacrifice for the community[166]. This idea of solidarity was expressed by *Solidarność* as it fought back and went underground : it published illegal publications, organized demonstrations, sought to overthrow the communist system through peaceful means, but nevertheless represented the idea of solidarity based on negative mobilisation against. Its « fight » for freedom, for the common good, resurrected hopes and resonated with a large part of society. Their solidarity with those who fought manifested as a living and creative force that produced new acts and symbols, such as the popular demonstrations on the anniversaries of the workers' victory in Gdansk, or the crosses with flowers to which were added the shells of police grenades, which were evident on the pavements of Polish cities in memory of the victims.

Utopian or idealistic, the idea of solidarity, founded by and through the bonds of friendship, which attempted to create a political community based on a consensus of values, remains a phenomenon, a moment in history, which certainly changed the consciousness of those who participated in it. The analysis proposed here has merely outlined a few elements of this phenomenon, and should be seen more as a contribution to the concept of solidarity as defined by the complex set of ideals it contains.

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[166] Literary works in Poland have power. Kordian was the preferred pseudonym of young people involved in the successive uprisings in the 19th century, and in the anti-German resistance during the Second World War.

« To action for full participation and equality ». Reframing international solidarity in 1980s Nordic disability rights activism

Anna Derksen[1]

In his debate book *In the Backyard of the People's Home*, Swedish disability rights activist Vilhelm Ekensteen proclaimed that :

> For obvious reasons it should be easy for the handicapped[2] to feel community and solidarity with other marginalised groups, both within and outside their own national borders. Because of the misery in the world, such a community and solidarity will create cohesion between almost all people[3].

Published in the turbulent year of 1968 by the left-leaning association Verdandi, Ekensteen's statement is early evidence of a fundamental shift in the relationship between people with disabilities and the wider public in the second half of the 20th century. Addressing a wide range of disability-related issues, the book forms part of a broader

[2] « Handicap » was used in Sweden throughout the second half of the 20th century as a relatively neutral and descriptive term for a variety of physical impairments. Since the 1960s and the emergence of the disability rights movement, it was also applied to barriers in society and the spatial environment as external causes of disability. I use this term only in the context of accurate translation of historical sources.

[3] Vilhelm Ekensteen, *På folkhemmets bakgård. En debattbok om de handikappades situation*, Uppsala, Prisma, Föreningen Verdandi, 1968, p. 48. All translations by the author of this article.

discourse on disadvantaged social groups emerging during this time, as it critically examines the marginalised position of people with disabilities in the Swedish welfare society[4]. Together with its author's activist commitment, the book became a starting signal for an increasingly politicised disability rights movement in which Ekensteen assumed a prominent position[5]. Beyond the domestic scope, the topic of disability was also eminently compatible with the international protest climate of the time. Radical intellectual and socialist ideas also flourished in the late 1960s in Sweden as students occupied university buildings and new protest groups and solidarity movements emerged that propagated unity with disadvantaged citizens at home as well as in the so-called Third World[6]. By taking up such contemporary leftist ideals of solidarity, *In the Backyard of the People's Home* can therefore also be read as a testimony for the growing international engagement of Swedish foreign policy in humanitarian interventions and development cooperation[7]. It is therefore somewhat surprising that historians have paid scant attention to disability from a global, inter- or transnational

[4] In the Nordic public discourse and political language, « welfare state » and « welfare society » are often used interchangeably. Civil society, as an actor endowed with comparatively far-reaching normative powers, is not so much in opposition to the state as it serves to conceptualise and legitimise it. At the same time, Nordic welfare states are construed around ideas of community, solidarity and equality, connoting, as Hellman points out, « a Nordic societal contract with certain obligations and expectations by the public sector and the citizens » (p. 163). See Matilda Hellman, « How Is the Nordic Welfare State Doing ? Contemporary Public Constructs on Challenges and Achievements », *Nordisk Välfärdsforskning / Nordic Welfare Research* 6 (3), 2021, p. 160–179 ; Pauli Kettunen, « The Conceptual History of the Welfare State in Finland », in Nils Edling (ed.), *The Changing Meanings of the Welfare State. Histories of a Key Concept in the Nordic Countries*, New York, Berghahn, 2019, p. 226–228.

[5] Anna Derksen, « "Eine Aufgabe der gesamten Bevölkerung". Behinderung im schwedischen Wohlfahrtsstaat der 1970er und 1980er Jahre », in Theresia Degener, Marc von Miquel (eds.), *Aufbrüche und Barrieren. Behindertenpolitik und Behindertenrecht in Deutschland und Europa seit den 1970er-Jahren,* Bielefeld, Transcript, 2019, p. 185-212.

[6] See Kjell Östberg, « Sweden and the Long "1968". Break or Continuity ?», *Scandinavian Journal of History*, 33 (4), 2008, p. 339–352; Christina Florin, Bengt Nilsson, eds., « Något som liknar en oblodig revolution' » *Jämställdhetens politisering under 1960- och 70-talen,* Umeå, Umeå universitet, 2000 ; Lena Lennerhed, *Välfärdens rebeller. Sveriges liberala studentförbund och kulturradikalismen under 1960-talet,* Stockholm, Idéhistoriska uppsatser 18, Stockholms universitet, 1989.

[7] Anders Danielson, Lennart Wohlgemuth, *Swedish Development Cooperation in Perspective,* Lund, Lund University, Department of Economics, Working Papers, 2003.

perspective[8] and even less to the phenomenon of disability rights internationalism[9]. Elaborating on this international dimension, Ekensteen outlines that :

> It is particularly important to highlight this solidarity because there is so much talk about having to choose between new reforms here at home and a further expansion of foreign aid. This choice, just like the choice between different domestic reforms, is as a matter of principle unacceptable. With such questions there should never be an either-or, but a both-and[10].

In recent years, international historiography has analysed social movements and transnational solidarity activism primarily from the perspective of human rights and democracy promotion. Such narratives tend to focus on specific organisations, tracing the expansion of individual interest groups into transnational networks and thus creating a rather fragmented, linear history of transnational solidarity[11]. In this regard, a look at the Nordic countries can provide us with novel and intriguing insights into the subject. Here, social rights and participation not only became a central demand of Nordic disability self-advocacy organisations but were from an early stage also discussed in the context of international human rights discourses and transnational development cooperation.

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[8] Exceptions are, for example, Shaun Grech, Karen Soldatic (eds.), *Disability in the Global South. The Critical Handbook*, Cham, Springer, 2016 and Benedicte Ingstad, Susan Reynolds Whyte (eds.), *Disability in Local and Global Worlds*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2007.

[9] Diane Driedger, *The Last Civil Rights Movement. Disabled Peoples' International*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1989.

[10] Ekensteen, *På folkhemmets bakgård*, op. cit., p. 48.

[11] This has, for instance, been argued by Neil Stammers, *Human Rights and Social Movements*, London / New York, Pluto Press and Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Different applications of this approach can, for example, be found in Aryeh Neier, *The International Human Rights Movement. A History*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2012; Micheline Ishay, *The History of Human Rights. From the Stone Age to the Globalization Era*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2004 ; Helle Krunke, Hanne Petersen, Ian Manners (eds.), *Transnational Solidarity. Concept, Challenges and Opportunities*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2020; *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire*, 21 (4), Transnational Solidarities and the Politics of the Left, 1890-1990, 2014.

As I will demonstrate in this article, this Nordic engagement is historically interesting for several reasons : Firstly, it was primarily driven by disability organisations and disability rights activists themselves — for instance, in the form of lay diplomacy in the institutions of the United Nations and their specialised agencies, or in the context of transnational networks like Disabled Peoples' International (DPI). Secondly, the region can be seen as a frontrunner in the establishment of local development aid projects that not only addressed disability by means of expert knowledge in medicine, rehabilitation or special education, but actively supported claims for self-advocacy, social rights and political recognition. These objectives and activities were, thirdly, not only understood as an act of solidarity among persons with disabilities, based on similar life experiences and problems going beyond national and ideological borders, but also addressed the broader Nordic public. An exploration of Nordic disability rights activism in the sphere of development cooperation may thus help to shed new light on changes in the understanding of disability, as well as the conceptualisation of international solidarity more generally.

This article takes Ekensteen's statement as a starting point for examining the ways in which Nordic disability self-advocacy organisations have conceptualised, practiced and reframed notions of international solidarity with regard to development aid projects and fundraising campaigns in the 1980s and early 1990s. In view of the grassroots character of many of these projects — at a time when development aid was primarily understood as monetary assistance on the level of governments and international organisations — the question arises as to the motives, designs and dissemination strategies behind this « internationalisation » of disability rights activism. Different, often contradictory or competing notions of marginalisation, self-advocacy and social participation developed that influenced internal understandings and practices of solidarity as well as the support of foreign projects. How did solidarity with persons with disabilities in the context of development relate to personal experiences of Nordic disabled activists and the Nordic countries' involvement in foreign aid ? Which strategies and arguments were employed to generate public solidarity, and in which ways did this differ from related notions of humanitarianism, charity or philanthropy ?

I begin with a brief theoretical and historical overview of disability solidarity in the Nordic countries. I then examine three international development aid projects and their promotion in fundraising campaigns carried out by Nordic disability self-advocacy organisations in the wake of the UN International Year of Disabled Persons in 1981[12]. These projects exhibited distinct dividing lines between national and international solidarity which, the article argues, can be explained in part by differences in historical experiences and societal positions of the disability organisations who developed and arranged them : whether the projects and their respective public (fundraising) campaigns during the International Year displayed a traditional understanding of charity and humanitarianism — based on needs and underlying ethical principles demanding impartiality and political neutrality — or more progressive ideas of equality-based solidarity was largely dependent on the extent to which these organisations understood themselves as social movements, as well as on previously employed strategies of gaining the solidarity of the non-disabled majority in the Nordic countries.

Preliminary thoughts on solidarity and disability

In his theoretical considerations on social solidarity, Émile Durkheim (1893) identifies the concept as the foundation of every society, as an abstract conception that can be measured by the intensity of cohesion of individuals' personal attachment to the society in which they live. Since modern societies in this perspective are characterised by internal differences, the common interests on which social solidarity is based must therefore be constantly renegotiated[13]. This perception is also the core of Ekensteen's argumentation. In calling on Swedish disability rights activists to extend their solidarity beyond the limited circles of their own community to persons with disabilities in other parts of the world, he implicitly points to an assumed universal set of shared experiences of marginalisation and exclusion from which

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[12] Anna Derksen, « Disability, development and the Nordics, 1960s-2000 », *nordics. info*, 21st January 2020, https://nordics.info/show/artikel/disability-development-and-the-nordics/.

[13] Émile Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society*, (1st edition in French 1893), transl. W. D. Halls, intro. Lewis A. Coser, New York, Free Press, 1997.

common interests can be generated. Distinguishing solidarity from related concepts of charity and philanthropy, Ekensteen employs « equality » as the essential keyword, as « charity has never sought to tear down the walls around the handicapped. [...] The issue of equality never arises; when all is set in order and the best has been done, the handicapped are supposed to behave well and be satisfied, and that's it[14] ».

Historian Peter Baldwin engages with similar reflections in *The Politics of Social Solidarity* (1990), arguing that solidarity « is only misleadingly analogous to altruism. An individual sentiment, altruism is generally confined to narrow circles of the like-minded. Solidarity, in those few instances where it has been realized, has been the outcome of a generalized and reciprocal self-interest[15] ». This statement is insofar significant, as it refers both to intrinsic motivations for solidarity as well as to a need for a collective identity, or identification, between those who provide and those who receive solidarity. « Solidarity is the child of interdependence, although not of interdependence alone. [...] Without some sense of collective identity, of community or "sameness", even a shared predicament is unlikely to prompt mutual aid[16] ». Charity or philanthropy, based on an unequal dependency between recipient and donor, is thus to be distinguished from solidarity which is based on mutual dependence and collective identity. Such distinctions can also help us better understand the different motives and objectives of development assistance projects that Nordic disability rights organisations began to initiate in the early 1980s.

The emergence and design of these projects was closely related to a general shift in the international understanding of disability. Originating in the 19th century, the concept of disability has for a long time been understood primarily as a matter of rehabilitation, social welfare and public care, a view that only gradually changed from

[14] Ekensteen, *På folkhemmets bakgård*, op. cit., p. 68.
[15] Peter Baldwin, *The Politics of Social Solidarity. Class Bases of the European Welfare State, 1875–1975*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 199.
[16] Ibid., p. 33.

the 1960s onwards[17]. With the establishment of new disability and self-help organisations, but also with a change in perspective within international human rights discourses toward various marginalised groups, disability increasingly came to be seen as a social and relational issue, rather than an individual or therapeutic problem. While the reports *Social Rehabilitation of the Physically Handicapped* and *Social Rehabilitation of the Blind*, adopted by the Social Commission of the UN General Assembly in 1950, still focused on rehabilitation and vocational training, the 1971 Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons and the 1975 Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons also addressed, at least to some extent, problems of social participation and the need for alleviating measures. A new conceptual framework issued by the World Health Organization in 1980, the International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities, and Handicaps (ICIDH), also emphasised social marginalisation and exclusion as a widespread consequence of disease, injury or congenital condition, but was soon criticised for its continued deficit-oriented view and refusal to clearly identify social and political conditions as causative factors or amplifiers of disability. With the proclamation of the International Year of Disabled Persons by the United Nations in 1981 under the slogan « full participation and equality », the social dimension of disability eventually came to be negotiated more thoroughly at the global level, with special attention to the situation of persons with disabilities in the Global South. In this context, new transnational networks and cooperation projects emerged that firmly located the issue of disability within a global civil society[18].

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[17] Against the backdrop of the post-war period and the expansion of state welfare, this development must be understood as part of a broader shift in focus, from society as a whole towards the different social groups it consisted of. See, for example, Henri-Jacques Stiker, *Corps infirmes et sociétés*, Paris, Aubier Montaigne, 1982; Frieda Zames, Doris Fleischer, *The Disability Rights Movement. From Charity to Confrontation*, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 2011 ; Katharina C. Heyer, *Rights Enabled. The Disability Revolution, from the US, to Germany and Japan, to the United Nations*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2015 ; Gareth Millward, « Social Security Policy and the Early Disability Movement. Expertise, Disability, and the Government, 1965–77 », *Twentieth Century British History*, 26 (2), 2015, p. 274–297 ; Agneta Hugemark, Christine Roman, *Kamper i handikapprörelsen. Resurser, erkännande, representation*, Umeå, Boréa, 2012.

[18] Gerard Quinn, Theresia Degener, *Human Rights and Disability. The Current Use and Future Potential of United Nations Human Rights Instruments in the Context of Disability*, New York/Geneva, United Nations, 2002.

When Vilhelm Ekensteen published *In the Backyard of the People's Home*, he addressed issues that were to play a recurring role within the Nordic disability rights movement in the decades that followed[19] and which became even more complex as they ventured into the field of development. This raises the question as to why this internationalisation came about in the first place. As indicated, part of the answer lies in the demands of Nordic disability rights organisations in the 1960s, when questions of political, legal and social equality and participation in society became increasingly important[20]. The narrative of the universal welfare state played a prominent role in this. As a cornerstone of Nordic social democracy, the post-war welfare model was based on the ideological goal to create balance and cohesion between different social groups, a change of perspective « from the working class, narrowly defined, to all oppressed, whatever their social origin[21] ». Nordic disability rights movements were therefore not so much concerned with monetary assistance or public service provision; rather, they envisioned a society in which everyone could participate equally — a « society for all » in the rhetoric of the Swedish disability rights movement[22].

Yet another, somewhat related reason lies in the Nordic countries' long-standing international commitment. Since the second half of the 20th century, Nordic actors have played an ambitious role in international diplomacy, human rights discourses, humanitarianism and development assistance[23]. In the course of the 1970s, Nordic

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[19] See Derksen, « "Eine Aufgabe der gesamten Bevölkerung" », op. cit. ; Inger Persson Bergvall, Malena Sjöberg, *Åratal - ur handikapphistorien*, Stockholm, HandikappHistoriska Föreningen (HHF), 2012.

[20] See Greta M. Cederstam (ed.), *Vägen till människovärde. Några drag ur nordisk handikapphistoria åren 1945-1985*, Vällingby, Nordiska nämnden för handikappfrågor, 1990; Bengt Erik Eriksson, Rolf Törnqvist (eds.), *Likhet och särart. Handikapphistoria i Norden*, Nynäshamn, HandikappHistoriska Föreningen (HHF), 1995 ; Snaefridur Thora Egilson et al. (eds.), *Childhood and Disability in the Nordic Countries. Being, Becoming, Belonging*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

[21] Peter Baldwin, « The Scandinavian Origins of the Social Interpretation of the Welfare State », *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 31 (1), 1989, p. 3-24, here p. 20.

[22] Derksen, « "Eine Aufgabe der gesamten Bevölkerung" », op. cit.

[23] Annika Berg, Urban Lundberg, Mattias Tydén, *En svindlande uppgift. Sverige och biståndet 1945-1975*, Stockholm, Ortfront förlag, 2021 ; Sunniva Engh, « The Conscience of the World ? Swedish and Norwegian Provision of Development Aid », *Itinerario*, 33(2), 2009, p. 65–82; Norbert Götz, *Deliberative Diplomacy. The Nordic Approach to Global Governance and Societal Representation at the United Nations*, Dordrecht, International Relations Studies Series 11, 2011.

development politics increasingly applied a partnership approach, involving not only governmental institutions and agencies, but also civil society groups and interest organisations[24]. The UN International Year of Disabled Persons in 1981 brought these developments to a head as an understanding of disability was brought to the fore that emphasised social and environmental factors as well as self-advocacy and equal rights[25]. This fitted well with the, then already quite established, self-understanding of Nordic disability rights organisations as social movements[26]. Against this background, we can also detect an increasing internationalisation of disability solidarity discourses across the Nordics[27].

Norway : *TV-aksjonen* and the vestiges of charity

A fundamental principle of Nordic disability rights activism, what Tøssebro and others have dubbed the « Nordic relational approach » to disability, was the idea that individual impairments were interwoven with and inseparable from socio-environmental conditions[28]. In order to implement legal, political and attitudinal

[24] Anders Danielson, Lennart Wohlgemuth, *Swedish Development Cooperation in Perspective,* op. cit. Sara Onsander, « Swedish Development Cooperation through Swedish and Local NGOs », *Perspectives*, Göteborgs Universitet, Center for African Studies, 2007.

[25] Derksen, « "Eine Aufgabe der gesamten Bevölkerung" », op. cit.

[26] Monika Baár, Anna Derksen, « Das Internationale Jahr der Behinderten 1981 in historischer Perspektive », in Theresia Degener, Marc von Miquel (eds.), *Aufbrüche und Barrieren. Behindertenpolitik und Behindertenrecht in Deutschland und Europa seit den 1970er-Jahren,* Bielefeld, Transcript, 2019, p. 161-184.

[27] The source material is available in the respective national archives : Swedish National Archives, « Beredningsgruppen för internationella handikappåret 1981 », *SE/RA/323494* ; Ibid., « Handikappförbundens Centralkommitté, FN : s Handikappår 1981 », 1980-1980, *SE/RA/730108/F /F 6/F 6e;* Ibid., Beredningsgruppen för internationella handikappåret 1981 (1982), *Handikappåret i Sverige. Slutrapport från Beredningsgruppen för internationella handikappåret 1981,* Stockholm, Socialdepartementet ; Norwegian National Archives, *Funksjonshemmedes år 1981. Program-erklæring og arbeidsprogram,* Oslo, Den Norske komite for funksjonshemmedes år, 1981 ; Norwegian National Archives, *Prioriter Hjelpen Til U-landenes Funksjonshemmede. Uttalelse fra 1981-årsmøtet i Funksjonshemmedes Fellesorganisasjon (FFO),* Oslo, FFO, 1983 ; Finnish National Archives, « Kansainvälisen vammaisten vuoden 1981 Suomen komitea », 1979-1982, *Ca:1– Hd:7, Ua:1-Ua:2.*

[28] Jan Tøssebro, « Introduction to the Special Issue : Understanding Disability », *Scandinavian Journal of Disability Research* 6 (1), 2004, p. 3–7.

changes, it was thus important to convey this principle, not only to experts and policymakers, but also to the broader public. A variety of strategies was applied to implement this.

The media are often considered society's most far-reaching (re-)producer of cultural and societal values, and the television is undoubtedly the main medium through which the public has been exposed to different representations of disability[29]. A prime example of harnessing the discursive power of the media for self-advocacy and solidarity purposes is *TV-aksjonen*, the TV-action, an annual show for charitable giving on the public Norwegian television channel NRK, said to be the « largest information campaign and fundraising event in the world[30] ». With an annually changing topic or good cause and led by different interest organisations or charities, *TV-aksjonen* has been a firmly anchored tradition in the Norwegian calendar since 1974.

The event consists of a fund-raising telethon with informative film clips, interviews, discussion and artistic performances. In advance of this, up to 100,000 volunteers visit « every door in Norway » in a nation-wide collection campaign in order to raise money for the respective social or humanitarian cause. Besides collecting donations, *TV-aksjonen* aims to inform the Norwegian public about current societal and political issues, both at home and abroad. It is a national effort with broad public engagement, including the royal family, government and parliament, businesses, schools, religious communities, volunteer groups and charitable organisations[31].

As has been analyzed by Svendsen and Sørheim[32] or Indrehus Furuli[33], *TV-aksjonen* reflects certain features of Norwegian culture that can in different ways be associated with the concept of solidarity: on the one hand, a collective identification as a welfare

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[29] Paul K. Longmore, « The Cultural Framing of Disability. Telethons as a Case Study », *PMLA* 120 (2), p. 502–508.

[30] Paal Adolfsen Svendsen, Aashild Sørheim, « TV-aksjonen som fenomen », *NRK*, 26 June 2008, https://www.nrk.no/tvaksjonen/arkiv/tv-aksjonen-som-fenomen-1.5954634.

[31] Ibid., Andrea Indrehus Furuli, *NRK TV-aksjonen. The Norwegian Self-Perception and World Image,* UiT Arctic University of Norway, Master thesis, 2016, p. 1ff.

[32] Svendsen, Sørheim, « TV-aksjonen som fenomen », op. cit.

[33] Indrehus Furuli, *NRK TV-aksjonen.* op. cit.

society with flat hierarchies, a commitment to equal rights, and a strong tradition of volunteering and altruism ; on the other, a self-understanding as a cosmopolitan society with a high interest in world issues, engagement in democracy and peace education, as well as international development. Although *TV-aksjonen* may at first glance be reminiscent of « traditional » charity shows or telethons with their focus on collecting donations through displays of suffering and misery, as Longmore eloquently argues[34], its public information campaigns, educational claims, and the participatory character are primarily aimed at creating public identification and solidarity, placing donors on a more equal footing with the recipients and representatives of the respective cause. Nevertheless, *TV-aksjonen* remains a contradictory event in which different notions of charity, solidarity, humanitarianism and social responsibility are closely interwoven and have been expressed to different degrees in the individual campaigns and the (media) strategies applied there.

The first disability-related campaigns in the context of *TV-aksjonen* were domestic in their scope, reflecting the growing self-confidence of Norwegian disability organisations and introducing their social and political demands alongside more established ideas of rehabilitation, health and welfare provision. The 1976 campaign, organised by the Norwegian Association of the Blind for the construction of *Hurdalssenteret*, a disability rehabilitation and sports facility, met with great public eagerness to donate, but also with sharp criticism from the ranks of the disability rights community, who rejected the, in their view, paternalistic portrayal of persons with disabilities as recipients of public charity and pity[35]. This critique was part of a longer history of Norwegian disability rights activism initiated in the early 1960s by the filmmaker and journalist Arne Skouen. He had repeatedly denounced politicians and government agencies, but also some disability organisations and disabled personalities, for trying to buy themselves out of their responsibility towards disadvantaged social groups — including, according to Skouen, systemic neglect

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[34] Paul K. Longmore, *Telethons. Spectacle, Disability, and the Business of Charity*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2016.

[35] Siri Hempel Lindøe, *Lidelse på TV. En undersøkelse av audiovisuelle fortellergrep og narrative strukturer i NRK TV-aksjonen*, University in Agder, Doctoral thesis, 2016, p. 54.

and human rights violations—with media-effective fundraising campaigns. Described as someone who placed « human solidarity » at the centre of his cinematic and journalistic work, Skouen thus played an important role in paving the way for a disability rights debate that sharply distinguished between solidarity, welfare ideals and human rights on the one hand, and charity, a seemingly unjust philanthropy and lack of state responsibility, on the other[36].

Only five years later, during the International Year of Disabled Persons in 1981, the focus of the campaign had changed. As a collaborative effort of the Red Cross, the Norwegian Association of the Blind, the Norwegian Association of the Disabled, and the Norwegian Association of the Mentally Handicapped, the campaign addressed a much wider range of disability-related topics, emphasising the aspects of self-advocacy and self-representation through interviews, discussions and film clips[37]. In response to the United Nations' call to also pay attention to global disability issues, the 1981 edition of *TV-aksjonen* for the first time also contained an international component that addressed disability in the Global South under the slogan « A New Life[38] ». How persons with disabilities lived in impoverished conditions, a lack of welfare and basic rehabilitation or educational services in countries such as Kenya, Bangladesh or Pakistan, was presented in short documentaries and interviews. It is of note that these international clips, unlike those addressing disability in Norway, almost exclusively featured contributions by Norwegian experts in development planning, rehabilitation or medical care, but hardly any local disability organisations or activists.

Moreover, the visuals repeated stereotypical images of disabled persons as passive and pitiful, concentrating on the misery of

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[36] Anna Derksen, « Disability and the Ambivalence of Charity : Public Fundraising Galas in Sweden and Norway in the 1960s », *Rethinking Disability Blog*, 22 September 2019, http://rethinkingdisability.net/984-2/.

[37] Trond Smith-Meyer, Stig Arild Pettersen, « TV-aksjonen », in *Store norske leksikon*, 2020, https://snl.no/TV-aksjonen.

[38] NRK, « Ett Nytt Liv », in *TV-aksjonen 1981*, 1981. The program is no longer accessible online ; an overview can be found here : https://tv.nrk.no/serie/tv-aksjonen/1981/FBUA09000081/avspiller. See also Benedicte Ingstad, *Utvikling—for hvem ? Erfaringer og forskning blant utsatte grupper i Botswana 1983–2012,* Oslo, Kolofon forlag, 2014, p. 79f.

living conditions by prominently depicting poorly equipped special schools and institutions, children moving about without proper wheelchairs or other technical aids, or displaying the physical effects of congenital disabilities or infectious diseases such as polio in an almost voyeuristic manner. Even if the clips' narrative tone remained largely factual throughout, the expert interviews, staff commentaries and emotionalised images effectively overshadowed the Norwegian domestic image of people with disabilities as self-confident, equal and autonomous fellow citizens. Collective identification or solidarity with persons with disabilities on the basis of either shared experiences, objectives or values, as Baldwin or Ekensteen may have understood these terms, was thereby aggravated, if not rendered impossible. Measured by the donated sum of 289 million NOK (today around 26,65 million euros), however, the campaign was nevertheless a considerable financial success[39] and a starting point for exposing the Norwegian public to global aspects of disability.

The format was repeated in 1991[40], this time with noticeable changes. The film clips and documentaries now concentrated on successful examples of self-advocacy projects established over the course of the last decade with the financial and technical support of Norwegian humanitarian and disability organisations. The focus had shifted in favour of education, employment and accommodation outside special institutions, and interview questions were increasingly addressed to local disability organisations and disabled activists, instead of Norwegian experts. Another example of this change in portrayal is a documentary on parents with intellectually disabled children in Kenya who had founded their own interest organisation and conducted various political and public information campaigns[41].

While the 1981 *TV-aksjonen* had been organised by a coalition of development and disability organisations, there was a clear distinction between the domestic level, which focused on individual life courses and narratives of persons with disabilities and their participation in

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[39] Smith-Meyer, Pettersen, « TV-aksjonen », op. cit.

[40] NRK, « Ett Nytt Liv », in *TV-aksjonen 1991*, 1991. The program is no longer accessible online ; an overview can be found here : https://tv.nrk.no/serie/tv-aksjonen/1991/FALF03001091.

[41] Ibid.

Norwegian society from an equal rights and self-advocacy perspective, and the international dimension, which at first only gave voice to Norwegian experts, uncritically reproducing images of disability as a source of passivity and marginalisation. The latter campaign may therefore be considered as a charity event in the definition that, for instance, Arne Skouen had employed when criticising earlier Norwegian donation campaigns for people with disabilities as a mere begging for money that disregarded aspects of rights or political responsibility[42], with a strong focus on the financial aspect that left little room for either appeals to international solidarity or even for *TV-aksjonen*'s educational mandate towards the Norwegian public.

By 1991, this contradiction between national and international narratives had gradually begun to narrow, reflecting changed notions about disability in the Global South that were more in line with domestic developments and also more relatable to a Norwegian audience. The campaign thus changed in two major ways : firstly, regarding the conceptualisation of international disability solidarity based on collective values of equal rights and democratic participation, and secondly, with respect to an emerging reciprocal self-interest in the form of political and societal representation of a marginalised group that might function as successful evidence of Norway's support of global civil society issues as part of their foreign policy.

Finland: Veterans, rehabilitation and humanitarianism in the *Day Work Collection*

« People with disabilities need our joint support — become involved in the day work collection ![43] ». These words by the Finnish Disabled War Veterans' Association (*Sotainvalidien Veljesliitto*) were published in the pedagogical newspaper *Koulusanomat* in 1981 as part of a multi-page, illustrated article. Addressed to school administrations and teachers, it encouraged participation in the *Day Work Collection*,

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[42] See Arne Skouen's article series « De åndssvakes vilkår », *Dagbladet*, 1968.
[43] Sotainvalidien Veljesliitto, « Vammaisten vuoden 1981. Päivätyökeräys », in *Koulu-sanomat*, 1981 [s. l. n. d.]; Finnish National Archives, « Kansainvälisen vammaisten vuoden 1981 Suomen komitea », 1979-1982, *Ua: 2*.

an annual fundraising event during which high school pupils worked for one day in a company, public institution or non-profit organisation and subsequently donated their earnings to a good cause[44]. For the UN International Year of Disabled Persons in 1981, disability was a logical choice of topic, and the Disabled War Veterans' Association — one of the country's more longstanding and influential disability organisations — took over the coordination and promotion of the event.

The *Day Work Collection* had originated in Norway twenty years previously as a participatory event to commemorate the international work of former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld and was first organised in Finland in 1967. Disability had been the annual theme multiple times, first in 1970. In other years, the collection had been organised by the Finnish Youth Association, a political and activist movement in support of anti-colonialism, peace movements and grassroots activism around the world[45]. When the Veterans' Association began to prepare the 1981 campaign, the format was thus already well-established in Finnish society. Even so, in this particular year there was a noticeable difference to previous editions because the collected donations were to be split between two different projects : the Kyyhkylä rehabilitation hospital for Finnish war veterans, and the Ndola vocational training school for disabled people in Zambia[46]. In the following section, I will discuss some of the main notions and structures behind these two projects and the ideas concerning disability and solidarity they conveyed.

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[44] In reference to the Norwegian name *Operasjon Dagsverk*, the campaign is sometimes translated into English as *Operation Day's Work* (ODW). I have instead chosen the translation *Day Work Collection*, as it refers to both Finnish terms *Taksvärkki* and *Päivätyökeräys*. While *Taksvärkki ry* is a registered association, *Päivätyökeräys* is used to refer to campaigns run by other organisations, or to the campaigns more generally. Taksvärkki ry, *About ODW Finland*, https://www.taksvarkki.fi/en/taksvarkki-odw-finland ; Lauri Siitonen, « Non-Governmental Organizations and Finland's Development Policy », in Paul Hoebink, Lau Schulpen (eds.), *Private Development Aid in Europe*, EADI Global Development Series, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2014.

[45] Taksvärkki ry, *Nuorelta nuorelle. Taksvärkki 50 vuotta*, 2017. Elina Isokangas, Helena Taittonen, *Taksvärkki ry kansainvälisyyskasvattajana*, University of Jyväskylä, Master thesis in education, Department of Teacher Education, 2003, p. 31.

[46] Finnish National Archives, « Kansainvälisen vammaisten vuoden 1981 Suomen komitea », 1979-1982, *Hd: 4, Ua: 1*.

After the Second World War, Finland had around 100,000 disabled war veterans. With the country's transformation into a modern welfare state, the already rather positive public image of this group as defenders of the freedom of the nation and its citizens further solidified[47]. As Heli Leppälä argues, the veterans' status in post-war Finland was tightly connected to the ideal of a « productive citizen », manifested in policies that were meant to facilitate their rehabilitation and labour market integration, but also shaped their own identity as hard-working citizens striving to overcome their limitations[48]. Together with the liberation rhetoric, this self-conception gave Finnish disabled veterans a solid basis from which they could make claims for public solidarity with their situation, something they also employed in the *Day Work Collection*.

In a letter to Finnish schools, the Association estimated that in 1980 around 400,000 Finnish citizens had a disability, of whom about 10% were veterans. As most of the latter were over 65 years old and thus no longer of working age but increasingly requiring medical care, modern health and rehabilitation facilities were urgently needed, preferably at the Association's own facilities in Kyyhkylä near Lake Saimaa in southeast Finland[49]. The Kyyhkylä rehabilitation hospital, as it was called then, shared a long history with the Association. Purchased in 1927, the former manor house had served as a care home for veterans of the Civil War of 1918 and as an emergency hospital during the Second World War before it was transformed into a recreation home for war invalids. From 1973 onward, a new building for medical rehabilitation and physiotherapy was constructed with funding from the *Day Work Collections* of 1975

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[47] Heli Leppälä, *Vammaisuus hyvinvointivaltiossa. Invalideiksi, vajaamielisiksi tai kehitysvammai-siksi määriteltyjen kansalaisasema suomalaisessa vammaispolitiikassa 1940-luvun taitteesta vuoteen 1987*, University of Turku, Doctoral dissertation, 2014, p. 29.

[48] Ibid. Id., « Duty to Entitlement. Work and Citizenship in the Finnish Post-War Disability Policy, early 1940s to 1970 », in *Social History of Medicine*, 21 (1), 2014, p. 144–64.

[49] Finnish National Archives, « Kansainvälisen vammaisten vuoden 1981. Suomen komitea », 1979-1982, *Hd : 4*.

and 1977[50]. Taking part in the campaign during the International Year of Disabled Persons in 1981 was thus a home game for the Association and much of the same rhetoric was used, drawing on established narratives of national solidarity with disabled veterans.

In contrast, promoting the setup of a vocational rehabilitation centre in Ndola, Zambia, as the second project of the 1981 *Day Work Collection* was uncharted waters for the Association and brought with it multiple challenges. One problem already emerged in the early stages of planning, when it became apparent that the veterans and the Finnish Youth Association had fundamentally different visions of the format and even more so the ideological basis for the campaign. Initially meant to be a cooperation between the two organisations, the Youth Association insisted on a project on international solidarity with politically disadvantaged and oppressed groups, while the Disabled War Veterans' Association favoured more apolitical topics of rehabilitation and vocational training. As no compromise could be found, the Finnish Youth Association eventually postponed its project to 1982[51].

The campaign conducted by the Disabled War Veterans' Association for the support of the rehabilitation and vocational training project in Ndola saw little trace of politically motivated, ideological motives, appearing rather as a perfunctory demonstration of goodwill in compliance with public and international expectations. Medical treatment, rehabilitation and vocational training superseded the socially and politically critical approaches of other Nordic disability organisations even in domestic discussions. Actual references to the global goals of the International Year of Disabled Persons in the campaign seem to have been inspired by general formulations and slogans published by the United Nations, rather than by genuine and intrinsic interest. Even the public call for participation seems to lack enthusiasm : « By taking part in the Day Work Collection you are

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[50] Kyyhkylä, *Manor Atmosphere by Lake Saimaa. History,* http://www.kyyhkyla.fi/en/kyyhkyla/historia/; Sotainvalidien veljesliitto, *Kyyhkylän sotainvalidien hoito- ja kuntoutuspalvelut siirtyvät syksyllä Mehiläisen Villa Marskiin Mikkelissä,* 2 August 2019, https://sotainvalidit.fi/kyyhkylan-sotainvalidien-hoito-ja-kuntoutuspalvelut-siirtyvat-syksylla-mehilaisen-villa-marskiin-mikkelissa/.

[51] Isokangas, Taittonen, *Taksvärkki ry kansainvälisyyskasvattajana,* op. cit., p. 31f.

helping people with disabilities to participate in society and improve their equality[52] ». A closer connectivity between the Finnish veterans and the pupils of the rehabilitation centre in Ndola might at most be detected in a written description of the Zambian project that is strongly reminiscent of the Association's own values of productivity as a basis for civil development :

> Zambia […] has made a significant effort to improve the status of its own citizens with disabilities, and in this sense it has set an example for other developing countries. In recent years, there has been a lot of effort in the field of special needs education and rehabilitation for people with disabilities […]. The large project in Ndola will serve all of Zambia[53].

It should be noted that the Ndola rehabilitation centre was not administered by the Association itself, which merely served as financial benefactor and promoter. Initially proposed in the mid-1970s, the centre was a cooperation between the Zambian government, the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the Zambia Council for the Handicapped, supervised by Finnish rehabilitation experts and generously co-financed by Finland as part of its bilateral aid program[54]. It was therefore not a far reach for the Veterans' Association, which had not participated in such international projects before, to jump on this bandwagon rather than establishing a completely new project abroad.

When comparing the two projects in Kyyhkylä and Ndola on the basis of the pictures illustrating the *Koulusanomat* article, what stands out most are the differences in depicting disability in Finland and Zambia and how these resemble the Norwegian *TV-aksjonen*. While the veterans can be seen engaged in various sports, demonstrating health and vitality, the students of the Ndola

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[52] Sotainvalidien Veljesliitto, « Vammaisten vuoden 1981 », op. cit.

[53] Finnish National Archives, « Kansainvälisen vammaisten vuoden 1981. Suomen komitea », op. cit.

[54] International Labour Organization (ILO), *Findings and recommendations concerning phases ii and iii of the ilo/ Finland vocational rehabilitation project (special emphasis on rural vocational rehabilitation services), technical memorandum to the government of the Republic of Zambia*, Geneva, International Labor Organization, 1983, ILO-ILO/FIN/81/ZAM/1/C.

training school are depicted in a classroom, passively following a lesson from their wheelchairs. These contrasts can partly be attributed to the differences in age and types of disability between the war-disabled veterans of retirement age and children and young people with disabilities caused by congenital disorders or illnesses, but they also replicate common imageries of humanitarian aid campaigns[55].

In promoting its own rehabilitation project through the public and medial networks of the *Day Work Collection*, the Veterans' Association expressed a certain self-confidence about its social position, from which it derived a historically legitimised claim to public solidarity. Taking their reputation as professional experts in the provision of rehabilitation and therapy services as a starting point, expanding the scope of the *Day Work Collection* to the financial support of a rehabilitation project for people with disabilities in Zambia may be obvious only at first glance. Rather, the apparent perfunctory calls for participation in newspapers and letters suggest that the Association and its veteran members faced some difficulties in identifying with disabled school students in Zambia and in convincingly enticing the Finnish public to support this cause on the basis of solidarity. An important prerequisite for the conveyance of a sense of solidarity with the school students among the broader Finnish public and the schools involved in the *Day Work Collection* is thus missing[56]. In the race for the attention of the donating population, the international dimension of the 1981 campaign appears more like an onerous fulfillment of the Veterans' Association's obligations towards the International Year of Disabled Persons as one of its main organisers

[55] Finnish National Archives, « Kansainvälisen vammaisten vuoden 1981. Suomen komitea », op. cit.
[56] This is particularly evident when comparing the 1981 campaign with other editions, as well as with the guiding principle of the Day Work Collection as stated in a publication on the occasion of their 50th anniversary : « It was started by schoolchildren and students who wanted to open doors from a closed Finland to the world and be part of the solution to global problems created by previous generations. The background was the wider movement of young people in the West—a desire to make a difference and do good. Solidarity, action on behalf of the weaker, was the guiding principle ». Taksvärkki ry, *Nuorelta nuorelle*, op. cit. See also the chapter on the solidarity campaign for the South African liberation movement. Iina Soiri, Pekka Peltola, *Finland and National Liberation in Southern Africa*, Nordiska afrikainstitutet, 1999, p. 34–43.

in Finland rather than an intrinsic — let alone, reciprocal — interest in supporting disability rights in other parts of the world. Since no information is available on the opinions of the school pupils involved, it is difficult to make concrete statements about the extent to which the respective « good cause » — in this case, people with disabilities in Zambia — played a role for them and whether they felt a special responsibility for global values and mutual understanding beyond the subtle distinctions of charity and solidarity. Politically, the notion of responsibility in this context only became more relevant from the 1990s onwards, when traditional development aid gave way to a partnership approach with increased involvement of Finnish civil society groups[57].

Sweden: A hundred wheelchairs for Nicaragua

The approach of Swedish disability organisations to international disability solidarity differed from the Norwegian and Finnish campaigns in several respects. Already in the 1970s, individual self-advocacy organisations had begun to initiate development assistance projects that were less focused on providing medical, rehabilitative or technical support, but rather sought to establish networks and exchanges with local disability organisations and activists in countries of the Global South, albeit with continued North-South disparities with regard to self-representation or formative action[58].

[57] Taksvärkki ry, *Nuorelta nuorelle*, op. cit., p. 36f. See also Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, *Guidelines for Civil Society in Development Policy*, Helsinki, 2017.

[58] Pierre Frühling (ed.), *Swedish Development Aid in Perspective. Policies, Problems and Results since 1952*, Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1986. For a recent discussion of Swedish development aid history and the different actors involved, see Berg, Lundberg, Thydén, *En svindlande uppgift*, op. cit. Highlighting solidarity and seeking close cooperation with local actors was also part of SIDA's strategy during this time, as Ole Elgström has argued, stating that the agency had fallen into what he calls a political solidarity trap : « For the whole of the 1970s—and into the 1980s—Sida was mesmerized by the idea that aid must be given on the terms set by the recipient, and that Swedish aid was an act of solidarity. The full depth of this sentiment can only be understood if reference is made again to the connection between Swedish views of foreign aid and domestic social welfare ». Ole Elgström, « Giving Aid on the Recipient's Terms : The Swedish Experience in Tanzania », in Goran Hyden, Rwekaza Mukandala (eds.), *Agencies in Foreign Aid. Comparing China, Sweden and the United States in Tanzania*, Basingstoke, Mac-Millan Press, 1999, p. 153.

Swedish organisations, for instance, assisted in the establishment and administration of local disability self-advocacy organisations or coordinated training seminars on equal opportunities, legal issues, social and political participation, or public relations[59], frequently referring to their own historical development from charitable organisations at the end of the 19th century to modern social movements.

However, considering that disability organisations in other industrialised countries at this time did not engage in international grassroots activism to this extent, although they could often look back on similar historical trajectories, solidarity based on shared experiences of disability does not sufficiently explain the rapid expansion of such projects by the Swedish disability community. This raises the questions : what were the motives behind Swedish disability development projects in the early 1980s, and what was their relationship with notions of solidarity ?

For one, a majority of Swedish disability organisations in the early 1980s regarded themselves as part of a social movement, as defined by Berger and Nehring[60]. These roots can be dated back to the societal discussions of the late 1960s and the Swedish disability organisations' first political program « A Society for All » from 1972 which demanded participation in society and policy-making. With several decades of experience in domestic activism and some noticeable legal, political and social successes, Swedish disability rights activists were motivated to apply their knowledge to assist people with disabilities in less advantaged circumstances abroad[61]. The specific orientation of Swedish development aid policy since the 1970s can be seen as a second reason. Officially neutral in geopolitical issues, Sweden had employed « norm entrepreneurship » as its

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[59] Derksen, « Disability, development and the Nordics », op. cit.; Swedish National Archives, « SIDA (1982-1983), 1.13.1 SHIA = Handikapporganisationernas Internationella biståndsstiftelse, Ansökningar, Biståndsverksamhet - bidrag till frivilligorganisationer », *SE/RA/2722/01/F 1 AC/1261*; « SIDA (1984), 1.13.1 SHIA = Handikapporganisationernas Internationella biståndsstiftelse, Ansökningar, Biståndsverksamhet - bidrag till frivilligorganisationer », *SE/RA/2722/01/F 1 AC/1262*.

[60] Stefan Berger, Holger Nehring (eds.), *The History of Social Movements in Global Perspective. A Survey*, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.

[61] Derksen, « "Eine Aufgabe der gesamten Bevölkerung" », op. cit.

foreign policy strategy, expressed, among other things, in an increased commitment to international institutions, bilateral aid, campaigns on human rights issues, decolonisation and liberation struggles[62]. This was accompanied by an increased interest in international development issues among political organisations, the media and the public, appealing in particular — as Ekensteen had already anticipated in 1968 — to civil society initiatives such as the disability rights movement.

Regarding disability, the concept of community-based rehabilitation (CBR) became particularly important[63]. Developed by the WHO in 1978, CBR employed an understanding of disability and rehabilitation that also considered social and environmental factors and was therefore quite closely situated to the demands of the Swedish disability rights movement. During the International Year of Disabled Persons in 1981, Swedish disability organisations institutionalised and further defined this approach by founding the Swedish Handicapped International Agency (SHIA) with the aim to better coordinate disability development projects across the various organisations involved, placing it under supervision of the Swedish Agency for International Development (SIDA)[64]. In the 1980s, Nicaragua was particularly interesting for Swedish disability organisations as a place where various international solidarity efforts interlaced. Sweden was among the first and most dedicated contributors of foreign aid to the country, having begun to issue bilateral support to Nicaragua in 1979 after the Somoza dictatorship had been ousted by the leftist Sandinista National Liberation Front. In the ensuing civil war, the Swedish social democratic government was a staunch supporter of the progressive societal and political goals of the Sandinistas. Throughout the 1980s, Sweden remained Nicaragua's most important provider of financial aid. This formal assistance was supplemented by a committed network of grassroots solidarity groups[65].

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[62] Christine Ingebritsen, « Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics », *Cooperation and Conflict*, 37 (1), 2020, p. 11–23.

[63] Einar Helander, « The Origins of Community-Based Rehabilitation », *Asia Pacific Disability Rehabilitation Journal*, 18 (2), 2007.

[64] Swedish National Archives, « SIDA (1982-1984), 1.13.1 SHIA », op. cit.

[65] Ann-Sofie Nilsson, « Swedish Social Democracy in Central America : The Politics of Small State Solidarity », *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 33 (3), 1991, p. 169-199.

First projects that linked disability, international solidarity, and development were initiated in the early 1980s. Due to Nicaragua's unstable situation, however, these had a rather small and improvised character. Except for a brief note in SHIA's annual report for the years 1984/85[66] about the donation of 152 wheelchairs, 34 crutches, three tricycles and other mobility aids by 40 Swedish solidarity groups under the aegis of the Protestant relief organisation *Diakonia*, Nicaraguans with disabilities did not appear as the subjects of any particular Swedish solidarity campaigns. This only began to change with the gradual stabilisation of the political situation at the end of the 1980s. SHIA gives a brief but insightful assessment of the situation of disabled Nicaraguans in its member magazine. According to the article, the pre-revolutionary Somoza dictatorship had regarded people with disabilities from a restrictive welfare perspective, treating them as a marginalised group and offering little in terms of social policies or welfare support. The situation allegedly deteriorated to the point that « at its height they became objects of charity[67] », and thus eventually deprived of the equal rights and demands for participation that were considered to be the very heart of Swedish disability rights activism. This situation, according to SHIA, had changed with the victory of the Sandinistas in 1979. Since a majority of physically disabled Nicaraguans had acquired their impairments during the war, the new government considered them to be national heroes with special entitlement to disability pensions and access to medical and technical support.

A project between the Swedish Association of Survivors of Traffic Accidents and Polio (*Riksföreningen för Trafik- och Polioskadade*, RTP) and the Nicaraguan Organisation for Disabled Revolutionaries (*Organizacion de Revolucionarios Deshabilitados*, ORD) laid the foundation for development cooperation between Nicaraguan and Swedish disability organisations[68]. As Stoll outlines with regard to German disability aid for Nicaragua, the ORD had been founded in 1980 by a group of young war-disabled Sandinistas and was seen

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[66] SHIA, « Rullstolar till Nicaragua », *Handicapaid*, 3, April 1986, p. 14.

[67] SHIA, « Projektverksamhet. Nicaragua », *Verksamhetsberättelse 1990/91*, Stockholm, SHIA, 1992, p. 37f.

[68] SHIA, « Projektering för organisationsstöd och rullstoltillverkning, Nicaragua », *Vår verksamhet 1984/85*, Stockholm, SHIA, 1985, p. 146.

as « the most distinct and most active social movement by disabled people » in the country[69], making it a prime cooperation partner for Swedish disability self-advocacy organisations. Together, RTP and ORD began to gather utilisable statistical data on the prevalence of disabilities in Nicaragua and estimated the need for technical aids. With the financial support of SHIA, two Swedish experts then assessed the options for the local production of wheelchairs[70]. Due to the country's continued political instability, however, the project « A Hundred Wheelchairs for Nicaragua » had to be postponed until 1987. When it was finally launched, the workshop manufactured custom-made wheelchairs designed for use in uneven terrain and even provided vocational training for young people with disabilities. However, « it was soon evident that only a few of the disabled managed to use the new wheelchairs in the right way[71] ».

In 1990, the RTP therefore added an educational component to the project by inviting three instructors from Sweden, two of whom were themselves disabled, to give a workshop on theoretical and practical knowledge about how to use the wheelchairs in daily life situations. SHIA considered the project to be a great success, as the participants later continued to teach their skills to other wheelchair users. The ORD was supposed to fully take over the project from its Swedish partner organisations RTP and SHIA in 1990, but as the establishment of the wheelchair workshop, its marketing and sales structures took longer than expected, the collaboration was extended by two more years. During this time, RTP and SHIA also focused on entrepreneurial performance, as « the need for wheelchairs is very great, but those who need one can almost never pay for it[72] ». Between 1987 and 1992, the workshop produced more than 500 wheelchairs, of which two thirds had been sold to the Ministry for Social Affairs, which in turn distributed them to eligible recipients. The acquisition of sponsors, the reduction of production costs, and the search for new export markets became the priority of RTP's

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[69] Jan Stoll, « The German Disability Movement as a Transnational, Entangled New Social Movement », in « Disability Movements : National Policies and Transnational Perspectives », *Moving the Social*, 53, 2015, p. 63-86, here p. 79.

[70] SHIA, « Projektering för organisationsstöd och rullstoltillverkning », op. cit., p. 146.

[71] Ibid.

[72] SHIA, « Projektverksamhet. Nicaragua », op. cit., p. 38.

work—an indication of its adaptation to the changed circumstances, which made ideological arguments recede behind the need to establish modern market structures[73].

International solidarity in this case was thus not directed to a Nordic public, nor was it performed in the restrictive format of public donation campaigns. Rather, it seems that collective self-identification as people with disabilities, shared socio-political values, and notions of self-advocacy and of state responsibility combined may have led to the emergence of a specific kind of reciprocal self-interest, namely, one that sought to further consolidate these values and notions, both normatively and practically.

Nordic disability movements and international solidarity

This article traced the idea of international solidarity in the context of Nordic disability rights activism in the 1980s. The perspective on development aid projects and fundraising campaigns of Norwegian, Finnish and Swedish disability organisations puts into focus a phenomenon in international development cooperation that may be common today, but has hitherto received only little attention in historiography, namely, the influence of non-governmental organisations and civil society groups. Comparing these projects, and in particular the various discourses they use, reveals their respective characteristics and a complex, often contradictory spectrum of underlying ideals, motives and activities. Apart from the often rather implicit rhetoric of concepts such as solidarity, charity, philanthropy or humanitarianism, the campaigns also employed various other, often closely related, discourses : for example, regarding the social aspects of disability and the resulting responsibilities of society and

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[73] Ibid., « In addition, RTP/SHIA's efforts have been focused on supporting sales rather than production, both to enable the workshop to operate more as a commercial enterprise and to facilitate the support of other organisations. [...] The rapid economic development of the country makes it unlikely that the state will provide the subsidies it has done in the past. It is therefore essential that in the next few years marketing and export sales should be stepped up in order for them to be able to manage the business by themselves with reduced subsidies ».

the welfare state—or certain national self-images and narratives, such as the internationalist orientation of the Swedish left or the role of Finnish disabled veterans in defending the nation's independence. It is therefore difficult, despite the structural similarities, to speak of an overarching motivation or discourse of these campaigns.

Baldwin's distinction between philanthropy (dependence of one party on another) and solidarity (interdependence based on collective identity, equality and reciprocity of self-interest) provides further clarity in the assessment of these projects. Such an approach allows for novel perspectives on the comparatively early activism of Nordic disability organisations in the international arena at a time when most other countries were concerned only with domestic disability issues. While the Norwegian and Finnish campaigns are reminiscent of more traditional forms of philanthropic humanitarianism, reinforcing existing dichotomies of giving and receiving, the Swedish wheelchair project in Nicaragua, with its grassroots character and contact to local actors, is a good example of international solidarity as Baldwin defines it. The concept of solidarity was consciously applied and followed a strategic interest, namely, to fulfil a two-fold moral obligation by the Swedish state in the form of the development aid agency SIDA and private actors, such as disability rights organisations and solidarity groups.

Furthermore, the analysis has shown that different historical experiences, heterogeneous identities, and socio-political affiliations of Nordic disability organisations were decisive in determining which form their international projects would take. What is striking are the variances between domestic manifestations of solidarity, on the one hand, and international support for people with disabilities in developing countries, on the other. The degree to which Nordic disability organisations saw themselves as a social movement, and thus pursued specific values and objectives, also shaped the projects' proximity to either notions of philanthropy or solidarity. However, even the strongly ideological Swedish project in Nicaragua, with its emphasis on equality and self-help ideals, remains ambiguous in regard to the extent to which we can actually speak of a *reciprocal* self-interest here. Or is it perhaps that we need to step away from the narrow definition of reciprocal self-interest as personal benefit

and in opposition to altruism ? Taking a more nuanced look at the grey areas between these two poles of philanthropy and solidarity — for instance, by looking at the structural and normative interdependencies, specific interests vis-à-vis different audiences, and shared values and goals as possible motivations for acting in solidarity — may be one way to address the challenges that disability in the field of international development assistance poses to both Nordic self-advocacy organisations and historians.

Offering a « solidarity contribution » to the victims of coercive social measures in Switzerland : The impact of a policy's vocabulary[1]

Sandrine Maulini

In an article first published in 1996, the historian Georg Kreis critically analysed the notion of solidarity, frequently mentioned as having shaped Switzerland and contributed to its cohesion. He stressed its self-serving dimension, in the sense that it rests on the acknowledgment of a community of interest within the country and, to some extent, internationally[2]. Accordingly, in modern Switzerland, the notion of solidarity frequently appears in the political arena during debates around (re)distribution of resources as an argument in favour of wealthier actors of a community making a (greater) financial contribution towards underprivileged groups — for example, in the context of major disasters, social insurance, public works, or development cooperation[3].

During recent decades, the Swiss authorities have also used the principle of solidarity as a way of dealing with critical reevaluations

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[1] I would like to thank Irène Herrmann, Renata Latała and François Courvoisier for their stimulating comments on the first version of this text.

[2] Georg Kreis, « Eidgenössische Solidarität in Geschichte und Gegenwart » [1996], in *Vorgeschichten zur Gegenwart. Ausgewählte Aufsätze*, Basel, Schwabe, 2003, Vol. 1, p. 553-569.

[3] See also Kreis, « Solidarité », in *Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse*, 2012, online: https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/043697/2012-12-19/, accessed 30 October 2020.

of the country's past. Thus, in the 1990s, they tried to rely on it to respond to serious accusations brought notably by the World Jewish Congress concerning Switzerland's actions during the Second World War, in particular, the turning away of Jewish refugees at the border and economic relations with the Third Reich, as well as, after the war, the unwillingness of Swiss banks to search for the rightful owners of Jewish assets deposited with them. Confronted with these accusations, the president of the Confederation, Arnold Koller, presented the project of a « Solidarity Foundation » to the Federal Assembly on 5th March 1997, which was intended to provide humanitarian assistance to « victims of misery and disasters, genocide, torture and other serious violations of human rights, and of course also of the Holocaust[4] ». The reference to solidarity drew attention to Switzerland's involvement in a wider community, its relationships with other states and to the fact that it had also suffered in the war[5], as the president's emphasis on the Swiss « victims » of wartime privations suggests. Above all, it was a way of addressing the issue without admitting any guilt on the part of the Swiss government, an effect reinforced by the association with the idea of humanitarianism, which implies an absence of wrongdoing on the part of the relief giver in the sufferings of the recipient. However, in 2002, the Swiss people rejected this project, which had anyway been stripped in the meantime of its reference to the Holocaust following a campaign led mainly by Christophe Blocher of the right-wing Swiss People's Party, who considered it to be a capitulation to « blackmail » from abroad[6].

Likewise, the notion of solidarity has also been present in the political discourse about state efforts to redress the harm done to the people who were subjected to « coercive social measures », i.e. out-of-home

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[4] Quoted by Thomas Maissen, *Verweigerte Erinnerung. Nachrichtenlose Vermögen und Schweizer Weltkriegsdebatte 1989-2004*, Zürich, Verlag NZZ, 2005, p. 308. About this episode, see also Elazar Barkan, *The Guilt of Nations. Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustice*, New York, London, W. W. Norton & Company, 2000, p. 88-111 — however, this was published two years before the vote on the Solidarity Foundation.

[5] On this use of the concept, see Irène Herrmann, « L'humanitaire est-il une forme de solidarité ? », in Michel Wieviorka (dir.), *Les solidarités*, Auxerre, Éditions Sciences humaines, 2017, p. 222-233 (in particular, p. 227-228).

[6] Maissen, *Verweigerte Erinnerung*, op. cit., p. 311-313.

care as children, administrative detention, or forced sterilisations in Switzerland until 1981[7]. These practices were part of a system of « social prophylaxy[8] » designed to combat poverty, maintain public order and morality, and even prevent racial degeneration according to eugenic convictions of the time. They targeted a wide range of populations, predominantly from the working class, that the authorities considered to all be socially deviant and detrimental to the collectivity : individuals at risk of being subjected to such coercive measures were, for example, single-mother families, people with alcohol addiction or mental illness, prostitutes and pimps, or individuals depending on public assistance and considered lazy. Over the past four decades, advocacy groups have been denouncing the mistreatments, detentions without proper trial, or economic exploitation endured by the people affected. They have finally compelled the Swiss authorities to recognise that these practices constitute injustices. Unlike the crisis around Switzerland's role during the Second World War, this time the movement came from within the country, and the issue seems less controversial. A first campaign for reparation was led from the 1980s by members of the Yenish Travelling Community who were removed from their families in childhood and raised away from the nomadic way of life. As a result, they received an apology from the president of the Confederation, Alphons Egli, in 1986, as well as compensation and a historical enquiry[9]. In the following years, other groups affected by similar practices engaged in a struggle to shed light on their past,

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[7] It is generally considered that these practices came to an end after the ratification of the European Convention of Human Rights by Switzerland in 1974. In order to conform with the Convention, the federal authorities introduced new legislation in 1981 regarding in-patient civil commitment which strictly regulates the practice of depriving someone of their liberty outside the field of criminal law. For more information on this reform, see Cristina Ferreira, Ludovic Maugué, Sandrine Maulini, « L'assistance contrainte dans le canton du Valais : le rôle politique de l'hôpital psychiatrique de Malévoz de l'entre-deux-guerres à 1990 », *Vallesia*, LXXII, 2017, p. 363-451; *id.*, *L'Homme-bus. Une histoire des controverses psychiatriques (1960-1980)*, Genève, Georg, 2020 (part I).

[8] The phrase is borrowed from Christel Gumy et al., *Des lois d'exception ? Légitimation et délégitimation de l'internement administratif*, Zurich, Chronos Verlag, 2019 (first occurrence p. 14).

[9] Walter Leimgruber, Thomas Meier, Roger Sablonier, *L'Œuvre des enfants de la grand-route. Étude historique réalisée à partir des archives de la Fondation Pro Juventute déposées aux Archives fédérales suisses* [1998], Berne, Archives fédérales, 2000.

seeking redress. After a long fight, they have finally been heard and, consequently, a broad reparation policy is currently being deployed in favour of all victims of coercive measures. As it did for the Yenish, the federal government has officially apologised during public ceremonies in 2010 and 2013 and implemented a range of symbolic and material measures, such as memorials, academic studies[10], access to their personal files in the archives for the people concerned, and financial measures. Interestingly, the Federal Act passed in 2016 that provides the main legal basis for this policy uses the term « solidarity contribution » to refer to the financial compensation that the acknowledged victims can request[11].

The project of a Solidarity Foundation in the 1990s crisis regarding Jewish assets was not intended to be a *reparation* gesture *stricto sensu*[12] but was supposed to exist alongside legal settlements between the banks and the claimants, as a means of easing international tensions and reaffirming the « Swiss humanitarian tradition », in the words of Koller[13]. The solidarity contribution for victims of coercive measures provided in 2016, on the other hand, is an integral part of the reparation process. Considering with Pierre Bourdieu that « by structuring the perception that social agents have of the social world, the naming contributes to the structure of this world[14] », the use of this expression is far from being insignificant. Indeed, the phrase appears at first sight extraneous to the dynamics of reparation and

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[10] In 2014, an Independent Expert Commission (IEC) was tasked by the Swiss government with conducting research on administrative detention. This commission published its results in 2019 (https://www.uek-administrative-versorgungen.ch/recherche, accessed 30th October 2020). In 2017, the Swiss National Science Foundation launched a National Research Programme on « Welfare and Coercion » to stimulate the study of all kinds of compulsory social measures. Consequently, 29 projects are currently addressing different aspects of the issue (http://www.nfp76.ch, accessed 30 October 2020).

[11] *Federal Act on Compulsory Social Measures and Placements prior to 1981 (CSMPA) of 30 September 2016*, https://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/en/home/gesellschaft/fszm/rechtsgrundlagen.html, accessed 30 October 2020.

[12] Even if it was largely interpreted that way abroad (see Maissen, *Verweigerte Erinnerung*, op. cit.).

[13] Quoted by Maissen, *Verweigerte Erinnerung*, op. cit., p. 308.

[14] « En structurant la perception que les agents sociaux ont du monde social, la nomination contribue à faire la structure de ce monde ». Pierre Bourdieu, *Ce que parler veut dire. L'économie des échanges linguistiques*, Paris, Fayard, 1982, p. 99. All translations are the author's own.

calls for a critical analysis. Examining the transfer of this concept to this specific and somewhat unexpected context, the following pages aim to show the reasons for this lexical choice and to question its political efficacy in terms of reparation. Indeed, one may ask to what extent this choice influences how current authorities seek to present themselves and the country, and equally how this impacts the position of the victims in this reconciliation process. This reflection may contribute to a better understanding of how the concept of solidarity can be a political resource, although with unintended side effects.

The pragmatic constraints of the negotiations for compensation

During the latest reparation process, the notion of solidarity was first mentioned in connection with financial measures for victims in a 2013 discussion of the Round Table that brought together representatives of the victims, the authorities, the organisations concerned, and academics in order to prepare the upcoming memory work[15]. When it came to the financial aspect of the reparation policy, the participants had to choose between four different models : compensation, moral reparation, solidarity, and hardship cases[16]. At least some of the arguments for choosing the « solidarity » option are known. Firstly, compensation and moral reparation both raised the legal problem of the statute of limitations[17], although the Federal Office of Justice (FOJ) did not completely rule out the possibility that the authorities and organisations concerned could renounce invoking this rule[18]. Secondly, according to Annegret Wigger, who

[15] The Round Table met 15 times between 2013 and 2018.
[16] « Dédommagement, réparation morale, solidarité, cas de rigueur ». « Procès-verbal abrégé de la 2ᵉ Table ronde du 25 octobre 2013 », 22nd November 2013, p. 5. All the minutes of the Round Table are available on http://www.fuersorgerischezwang-smassnahmen.ch/fr/table_ronde.html, accessed 30 October 2020. However, it has not been possible to obtain the document that presented the four different models in greater detail.
[17] Ibid.
[18] From the FOJ to the Round Table, « Notice. [Question examined: Renouncing the statute of limitations] », 17th January 2014, http://www.fuersorgerischezwang-smassnahmen.ch/fr/table_ronde.html, accessed 30 October 2020.

represented the academics at the Round Table, the money made available should be understood as a « sign of social recognition of the suffering experienced », since the representatives of victims underlined that no sum could *repair* what they had lived through[19]. Above all, as the principle of a financial measure was one of the most contentious elements of the reparation policy, the key issue for the members of the Round Table was to make their proposal politically acceptable so that it stood a chance of being implemented.

To the same end, the activists had to make significant concessions, and the representatives of victims were reminded of this imperative of political acceptability at every session of the Round Table. Indeed, in the first half of the 2010s, when the Swiss authorities were making the first steps towards recognising the injustices done, the people affected by coercive measures and their supporters were hoping to obtain considerable amounts in redress of the order of 80,000 to 120,000 Swiss francs. This expectation was largely based on international comparisons, especially with Ireland, where indemnification for the victims of abuses in educational institutions was, on average, 62,000 euros and could go up to 300,000 euros, adding up to a total budget of 970 million euros at the end of 2015[20]. However, the Swiss activists soon realised the reluctance of significant right-wing political factions to consider their material demands and had to accept compromises. As a result, when submitting its report in 2014, the Round Table refrained from specifying an amount in its

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[19] « Der Erhalt einer Geldsumme [ist] ein Zeichen für die gesellschaftliche Anerkennung des erfahrenen Leides ». Annegret Wigger, « Nothilfe, Entschädigung, Entschuldigung im Kontext von fürsorgerischen Zwangsmassnahmen und Fremdplatzierung im Zeitraum vor 1981 — das Modell des "Runden Tische". Ein Erfahrungsbericht », in Béatrice Ziegler, Gisela Hauss, Martin Lengwiler (Hg.), *Zwischen Erinnerung und Aufarbeitung. Fürsorgerische Zwangsmassnahmen an Minderjährigen in der Schweiz im 20. Jahrhundert*, Zürich, Chronos Verlag, 2018, p. 141-158 (quote p. 156).

[20] Martin Lengwiler, « Aufarbeitung und Entschädigung traumatisierender Fremdplatzierungen. Die Schweiz im internationalen Vergleich », in Ziegler, Hauss, Lengwiler (Hg.), *Zwischen Erinnerung und Aufarbeitung*, op. cit., p. 159-176 (in particular, p. 172); Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, *Expertise relative aux processus de compréhension et de réparation en lien avec les mesures de coercition à des fins d'assistance et de placement en institution ou avec d'autres mesures comparables*, Lausanne, 20 May 2014. According to Lengwiler, this « generosity » partly derives from the fact that in Ireland, the state was directly responsible for the incriminated institutions.

recommendations to the government and simply indicated that the financial measures should be « substantial[21] ».

In this dynamic of negotiation, those calling for redress had various means of applying pressure: public demonstrations, appeals to the media and to public opinion, and, in the Swiss political system, popular initiatives[22]. Such an initiative was tabled on 19th December 2014 in order to propose an amendment to the Federal Constitution providing financial reparation to victims of coercive measures, from a budget of 500 million francs, together with a comprehensive historical study[23]. As with any popular initiative, the Federal Council also had means of regaining some control and influencing the outcome of the process, which it did in this case by indirectly opposing a counter-proposal. The main reason given for this was the problem of the time needed to introduce the provisions of the initiative, if accepted by the citizens, as most of the victims were quite old and risked dying before the process was complete[24]. On the strength of this argument, the Federal Council therefore drafted a law that had a chance of being implemented rapidly if ratified by the Federal Assembly but that differed significantly from the text of the initiative. In particular, while providing several measures that supplement what was envisaged in the initiative (such as contact points to support victims or provisions on archives), the total budget for financial compensation (subsequently called a « solidarity contribution ») was reduced to 300 million francs. This reduction was based on a lower estimate of the number of living victims than in the initiative, i.e. 12,000–15,000 people instead of 20,000. With this

[21] FOJ, *Rapport et proposition de la Table ronde pour les victimes de mesures de coercition à des fins d'assistance et de placements extrafamiliaux avant 1981 du 1ᵉʳ juillet 2014*, August 2014, p. 35. About the discussion on this question, see : « Procès-verbal de la 5ᵉ Table ronde du 6 juin 2014 », 20th June 2014, p. 10, and « Procès-verbal de la 6ᵉ séance extraordinaire de la Table ronde du 24 juin 2014 », 24th June 2014, p. 5.

[22] Proposals by citizens to modify the constitution that get put to a vote if 100,000 signatures are collected within 18 months.

[23] « Initiative populaire fédérale "Réparation de l'injustice faite aux enfants placés de force et aux victimes de mesures de coercition prises à des fins d'assistance" (initiative sur la réparation) », https://www.bk.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/vi/vis448t.html, accessed 30 October 2020.

[24] « Message concernant l'initiative populaire "Réparation de l'injustice faite aux enfants placés de force et aux victimes de mesures de coercition prises à des fins d'assistance (initiative sur la réparation)" et son contre-projet indirect (loi fédérale sur les mesures de coercition à des fins d'assistance et les placements extrafamiliaux antérieurs à 1981) » [4th December 2015], *Feuille fédérale*, 87, 2016, p. 102.

budget, the sum that each recipient could hope for was between 20,000 and 25,000 francs — indeed, it was later limited to a maximum of 25,000 francs per person during parliamentary work on this bill. It was also decided that everyone should receive the same amount of money, on the grounds that doing otherwise would hierarchise sufferings and create new injustices. Either way, such a contribution was deemed to be symbolic, as the actual individual damages are considered incalculable[25]. This solution was accepted by the Federal Assembly and the committee behind the initiative, which was persuaded by the Federal Council's argument about the need to act quickly.

Interestingly, during parliamentary debates, the reduced budget for reparation in turn contributed to justifying the mention of « solidarity » instead of « compensation » or « moral reparation », since the « the fund provided for by federal law would never be sufficient for such compensation and reparations[26] », as the rapporteur in the National Council put it. This correlation between the notion of solidarity and the amount of the payments is reminiscent of the indemnification process for the Yenish : in 1993, in response to criticism regarding the « derisory amounts » of the payments made, limited to a maximum of 20,000 francs per person, the commission tasked with implementing this measure explained that « [this sum] should be considered more as a late solidarity gesture than a reparation of the harm done[27] ».

[25] FOJ, « Rapport explicatif concernant l'avant-projet de loi fédérale sur les mesures de coercition à des fins d'assistance et les placements extrafamiliaux antérieurs à 1981 (LMCFA) », [2015], https://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/fr/home/gesellschaft/gesetzge-bung/fszm.html, accessed 30 October 2020 ; Béatrice Ziegler, « Erfahrenes Unrecht und gesellschaftliche "Wiedergutmachung". "Soforthilfe" und "Solidaritätsbeitrag" für die von Zwangsmassnahmen Betroffenen. Interview mit Claudia Sheidegger », in Ziegler, Hauss, Lengwiler (Hg.), *Zwischen Erinnerung und Aufarbeitung,* op. cit., p. 73-82.

[26] « Der im Bundesgesetz vorgesehene Fonds [würde] für solche Schadenersatz- und Genugtuungszahlungen nie ausreichen ». Roberto Schmidt (rapporteur), 15.082. « Réparation de l'injustice faite aux enfants placés de force et aux victimes de mesures de coercition prises à des fins d'assistance (Initiative sur la réparation). Initiative populaire et contre-projet indirect. Premier Conseil », *Bulletin officiel de l'Assemblée fédérale*, Conseil national, 26th April 2016, p. 4. Available at www.parlement.ch, accessed 30 October 2020.

[27] « Un montant dérisoire […] qu'il faut "considérer davantage comme un geste de solidarité tardive que comme une véritable réparation des torts commis" ». « Berne verse des indemnités dérisoires pour les enfants de la grand-route », *24 Heures*, 30th March 1993.

But alongside these pragmatic considerations, the notion of solidarity has also been appealed to by deputies who supported the bill, such as the socialist Priska Seiler Graf who argued that « after such a hard life, [the victims] should at least be able to experience some well-deserved compensation before death. For [her], this is a simple act of humanity and solidarity[28] ». In this regard, one could wonder whether invoking a value that — rightly or wrongly — the Swiss population tends to take pride in could be seen as a means to facilitate the legislators' acceptance of this provision and the cantons' voluntary contributions to the « solidarity fund ». At any rate, there is an apparent ambivalence in Seiler Graf's comment and, more broadly, the legislation in the offer of solidarity by way of compensation. This approach rests on an ambiguity which, far from necessarily revealing a flaw in the handling of the problem, may actually represent a rhetorical asset for the political elites. The notion of solidarity can indeed convey a range of essential symbolic meanings and effects.

Reintegrating victims, deflecting responsibility

The common definition of the term « solidarity » can serve as a starting point for analysing the symbolic benefits of the concept in the dynamics under examination. In the way it is used here, the word refers to a « mutual responsibility » or a « moral duty, resulting from the awareness of the close social interdependence existing between men or in human groups, and which incites men to unite, to help and assist each other and to co-operate with each other as members of the same social body[29] ». The notion of community therefore appears essential, as well as the idea of interdependency.

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[28] « Nach einem so harten Leben sollten sie wenigstens vor dem Tod die längst verdiente Genugtuung erfahren können. Das ist für mich ein reiner Akt der Menschlichkeit und der Solidarität ». Priska Seiler Graf (S, ZH), « 15.082. Réparation de l'injustice », op. cit., p. 19.

[29] « Devoir moral, résultant de la prise de conscience de l'interdépendance sociale étroite existant entre les hommes ou dans des groupes humains, et qui incite les hommes à s'unir, à se porter entraide et assistance réciproque et à coopérer entre eux, en tant que membre d'un même corps social ». Centre national de Ressources textuelles et lexicales (CNRTL), « Solidarité », https://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/solidarité.

Consequently, a primary symbolic significance of « solidarity » in the case of the reparation process would be for the Swiss authorities to reaffirm that the recipients of the contributions fully belong to the collectivity. This aspect has proven crucial, as one of the main grievances expressed by those who have been mobilising is the stigmatisation and marginalisation they have suffered. The available research in this matter confirms that the individuals affected by coercive measures were treated with contempt and considered second-class citizens[30]. In this context, talking about solidarity aims to be performative and contribute to the rehabilitation of these people as equal members of Swiss society and full-fledged citizens[31]. Such an approach can also be interpreted as seeking, in return, to reinforce the adherence of the beneficiaries to the interests of the collectivity[32].

Furthermore, restoring some unity in the community appears all the more necessary as the people affected express a profound wariness of the Swiss authorities. In the Round Table, a man who was placed in out-of-home care during his childhood claimed for example « that after everything he lived through, he simply cannot trust the authorities anymore[33] ». This sort of statement shows the delicate position of the authorities when confronted with the public testimony of those who were subjected to compulsory social measures. Indeed, the latter tend to consider them, if not the perpetrators, at least responsible for the harm they endured. As a result, even if the people in positions of authority are no longer those

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[30] See, for instance, Anne-Françoise Praz, Pierre Avvanzino, Rebecca Crettaz, *Les Murs du silence. Abus sexuels et maltraitances d'enfants placés à l'institut Marini*, Neuchâtel, Alphil, 2018, p. 40-43, and Commission indépendante d'experts Internements administratifs (IEC) (éd.), *La mécanique de l'arbitraire. Internements administratifs en Suisse 1930-1981. Rapport final*, Zurich, Chronos, 2019, especially p. 365.

[31] This aspect is also present in other measures, such as the academic study of the issue. For more information on this point, see, for example, Anne-Françoise Praz et al., « *Je vous fais une lettre ». Retrouver dans les archives la parole et le vécu des personnes internées*, Zurich, Chronos Verlag, 2019.

[32] Pablo De Greiff, « Justice and reparations », in *id.* (ed.), *The Handbook of reparations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 451-477.

[33] « M. Cevey fait remarquer que, après tout ce qu'il a vécu, il ne peut tout simplement plus faire confiance aux autorités ». « Procès-verbal de la 14ᵉ séance de la Table Ronde du 13 juin 2017 », 19th July 2017, p. 12.

who were there when the incriminated measures were in force, one consequence of these coercive practices for the people affected is a lasting mistrust towards all state officials, including those currently exercising, whose legitimacy is therefore challenged[34]. Consequently, one of the main social functions of the reconciliation policy is to restore public confidence in the state as it finds itself openly blamed by the activists and, ultimately, to allow the « victim-perpetrator thinking[35] » to be overcome.

This is the crux of the matter for the authorities, and the notion of solidarity fulfills this last objective particularly well. Indeed, beyond the ambition to restore civic trust, this choice of concept conveys something decisive about their public image and their role in the process under review : it frames the financial measures very differently to the terms « indemnities » or even « damages », as the lexical contexts in which the notion appears indicate. Referring to the appeal sent to companies, organisations, and institutions in order to finance an emergency fund that predated the reparation law[36], the president of the Round Table and representative of the Federal Office of Justice (FOJ), Luzius Mader, stated that « the purpose of this letter is not only to raise funds, but to show that it is not a question of *responsibility*, but of *solidarity*[37] ». One year later, when presenting the draft reparation law, the FOJ stated that some financial measures were « indispensable in order to ensure adequate recognition of the injustice suffered by the victims and reparation for the harm inflicted ». However, the Office immediately stressed that « these payments do not constitute an acknowledgement of state *liability* or *damages* in the legal sense of the term, as claims in this respect would be time-barred. Rather, it is a matter of the

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[34] Ziegler, « Erfahrenes Unrecht und gesellschaftliche "Wiedergutmachung" », op. cit., p. 78.

[35] « [das] Täter-Opfer-Denken [...] zu überwinden ». Speech of the Federal Councillor Simonetta Sommaruga in front of the Parliament : « 15.082. Réparation de l'injustice faite aux enfants placés de force et aux victimes de mesures de coercition prises à des fins d'assistance [...] Premier conseil, suite », *Bulletin officiel de l'Assemblée fédérale*, Conseil national, 27th April 2016, p. 1.

[36] This emergency fund was created in 2014 for the victims in a precarious financial situation. It was entirely bankrolled by voluntary payments from cantons, organisations and the private sector and thus needed no legal basis.

[37] « La lettre ne vise pas seulement à réunir des fonds, mais à montrer qu'il n'est pas question de responsabilité, mais de solidarité ». « Procès-verbal de la 4e Table ronde du 21 mars 2014 », 8th April 2014, p. 6. Emphasis added.

state expressing its *willingness* to make reparation and its *solidarity* with persons who, as a result of regrettable events and certain acts of *the authorities of the time*, have suffered considerable financial loss during their childhood, youth, and throughout their lives[38] ».

The way in which responsibility and solidarity are set off against each other in these statements is revealing and somewhat reminiscent of official discourses during the Jewish assets crisis of the 1990s, when those who committed to contributing to the Solidarity Foundation underlined the humanitarian nature of their support. Thus, presenting the financial measures of the reparation process as a gesture of solidarity allows the state to move away from being held liable for the harm done to those now acknowledged as victims, which would probably have entailed significantly more substantial payments. This effect is reinforced by the distance placed between the state now and the « authorities of the time ». By doing so, the current authorities denied direct guilt for the events being condemned, an aspect that proved decisive as, « even in democratic Switzerland, where human dignity is considered an important value, guilty conscience has long acted as a brake on acknowledging local victimhood », as shown by Irène Herrmann[39]. Far from guilt, the notion of solidarity is much closer to the concepts of mutual assistance, support and/or charity[40], all three being related to the lexical field of the gift. Thus, on a lexical spectrum that extends from the notion of « compensation » at one end, associated with a directly attributable wrong and an obligation to provide reparation, to the idea of « gift » at the other, which, like humanitarian assistance,

[38] « Certaines prestations financières paraissent indispensables en vue d'assurer une reconnaissance adéquate de l'injustice subie par les victimes, et de réparer les torts infligés. Ces prestations ne sauraient toutefois constituer une reconnaissance de la responsabilité de l'État ou des dommages-intérêts au sens juridique du terme, car les prétentions en ce sens seraient frappées de prescription. Il s'agit plutôt pour l'État d'exprimer sa volonté de réparation et sa solidarité envers les personnes qui, de par des événements regrettables et certains actes des autorités de l'époque, ont subi durant leur enfance, leur jeunesse et toute leur vie durant des préjudices financiers considérables ». FOJ, « Rapport explicatif », op. cit., p. 4. Emphasis added.
[39] Irène Herrmann, « Mapping the Contexts of Victimhood : The Example of Switzerland (1860s to Present Times) », in Harriet Rudolph, Isabella von Treskow (Hg.), *Opfer. Dynamiken der Viktimisierung vom 17. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert*, Heidelberg, Universitätsverlag Winter, 2020, p. 173-186 (quote p. 184).
[40] See, for example, the synonym dictionary of the Crosslanguage Research Centre on Meaning in Context (CRISCO) : https://crisco2.unicaen.fr/des/synonymes/solidarité, accessed 30 October 2020.

implies an absence of responsibility and a voluntary undertaking, the concept of « solidarity » moves away from the first and towards the second. Although « solidarity » is not as close to the concept of « gift » as are the notions of « charity » or « humanitarian aid », for example, the inflection it represents in relation to the notion of compensation induces an ambiguity that works to the advantage of government officials. Indeed, this approach to the problem put the policy in a much more positive light in which current authorities, as well as the society they represent, could take on a gratifying role. In this configuration, they no longer appear as the « perpetrator » forced to indemnify the victims, but are able to present themselves more as « benefactors » acting out of goodwill[41] — conveniently erasing the fact that such a move had long been refused[42]. This analysis is supported, for example, by a professional employer organisation's objection to the draft law :

> The fact that the hardships endured by the people concerned deserve compassion does not detract from the fact that raising funds for particular causes is the responsibility of *charities* and not of the state. Citizens who wish to show their support are free to make financial contributions to the associations that defend the interests of victims. However, those who are not interested in this cause or who consider others to be more important should not be forced to make an act of "solidarity" out of their tax revenues[43].

[41] It was precisely this idea that the Swiss People's Party discredited during the Jewish assets crisis. At that time, the fact that international pressures were the source of the Solidarity Foundation's project gave its opponents a strong argument, of which they were deprived when opposing the financial compensation towards victims of coercive measures.

[42] In the 2000s, several calls for reparation measures failed in the Parliament. But in the years since, the mobilisation of the people affected intensified. Under increasing pressure, the federal authorities took the first steps to deal with the issue at the beginning of the 2010s.

[43] « Que les épreuves endurées par les personnes concernées méritent la compassion n'enlève rien au fait que la levée de fonds pour des causes particulières incombe aux bonnes œuvres et non à l'État. Les citoyens qui souhaitent manifester leur soutien sont libres de verser des contributions financières aux associations qui défendent les intérêts des victimes. Mais ceux qui se désintéressent de cette cause ou qui en jugent d'autres plus importantes ne doivent pas être contraints à un acte de "solidarité" par le biais du produit de leurs impôts ». From the Centre patronal to the FOJ, 28th August 2015, available on http://www.fuersorgerischezwangsmassnahmen.ch/pdf/gegenvorschlag/Stgn_Organisationen.pdf, accessed 30 October 2020.

Parts of the population thus objected to this state solidarity being imposed on citizens, and this opposition could be enabled by the absence of acknowledged culpability. This was an unintended consequence of the term chosen for the financial measures. Moreover, in this statement, the victims of coercive measures are presented as equivalent to any other suffering group eligible for humanitarian relief. Consequently, it seems relevant to also analyse the impact of this conceptual framework on the people targeted by the reparation policy and their perceptions of this 'solidarity' in order to evaluate how this approach aligns with the objective of reconciliation.

Solidarity as redress ?

The language adopted in the legislation does not only affect the authorities' image then, but also the position of the victims, who somehow move from being activists whose long-term campaign achieved success, to beneficiaries of the politics of redress, or even recipients of some form of assistance. It should be noted that there was a certain ambiguity in the way in which the popular initiative for the reparation was presented, invoking the « distress » and the « urgent need of help » of the victims[44]. Such words are obviously aimed at arousing compassion and convincing potential supporters. However, those behind the initiative did not rely only on this vocabulary. They also referred to a « reparation fund » and emphasised the « severe harm » done to the victims who suffered « abuses », « exploitation » and « humiliation[45] ». Besides, it is worth recalling that, like the Round Table, the initiative committee was a mixed organisation, made up of twelve members of Parliament, two media representatives, two academics, and only five representatives of the victims.

Even if, as far as we know, the use of the term « solidarity » was not particularly commented upon, the shift it provoked seems to have been clearly perceived by those concerned. For example, reporting a discussion he had had with the president of the Confederation,

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[44] Leaflet entitled « Initiative sur la réparation », [s.d.].
[45] Ibid.

Simonetta Sommaruga, Daniel Cevey, a representative of the victims, noted critically that when speaking about the financial measure, « [Sommaruga] used the terms "make a gesture" instead of talking about indemnification[46] ». So, although we cannot know what the numerous anonymous victims who have applied for a solidarity contribution think, at least some of their spokespersons have tended to voice criticisms. Protesting strongly against the amount budgeted for the financial measures, considered by many as an « insult », some have pointed out that « the victims are not beggars after all[47] ». Likewise, others considered that it should be the authorities' role to undertake the research necessary to identify the victims, and judged it « unacceptable that the people concerned should find themselves having to ask[48] ». Statements such as these show that the people targeted by the reparation policy are sensitive to their position in the process which is largely determined by the procedure itself and the vocabulary used by state officials in that context.

Consequently, some of them have refused the conceptual framework adopted by the legislation. Its proximity with the dynamics of the gift may explain this attitude. It is worth remembering Marcel Mauss's affirmation that « the unreturned gift makes the one who has accepted it still inferior […]. Charity is still hurtful to the one who accepts it, and all the effort of our morality tends to suppress the unconscious and insulting patronage of the rich "alms-giver"[49] ». Pursuing the reflection, Bourdieu held that « the gift expresses itself in the language of obligation : obligated, it obliges, it makes obligated […] ;

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[46] « [Daniel Cevey] dit avoir parlé récemment avec la présidente de la Confédération, qui a utilisé les termes "faire un geste" plutôt que de parler d'indemnisation ». « Procès-verbal de la 10e séance de la Table ronde du 8 juin 2015 », 22nd July 2015, p. 5.

[47] « Les victimes ne sont tout de même pas des quémandeurs ». Lisa Hilafu, « Procès-verbal de la 9e séance de la Table ronde du 21 janvier 2015 », 27th January 2015, p. 5.

[48] « Il est inacceptable que les personnes concernées doivent se retrouver dans le rôle du solliciteur ». Comments reported by Luzius Mader, « Procès-verbal de la 14e Table ronde du 13 juin 2017 », 19th July 2017, p. 20.

[49] « Le don non rendu rend encore inférieur celui qui l'a accepté […]. La charité est encore blessante pour celui qui l'accepte, et tout l'effort de notre morale tend à supprimer le patronage inconscient et injurieux du riche "aumônier" ». Marcel Mauss, *Essai sur le don : forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques* [1924-1925], Paris, PUF, 2012, p. 213-214.

it institutes legitimate domination[50] ». Consequently, at the collective level, if the redistribution of wealth provided by the state on the basis of solidarity « obviously tends, as the official interpretation suggests, to correct inequalities in distribution, it also and above all tends to produce recognition of the legitimacy of the state[51] ». However, this outcome is subject to the intended recipients' accepting the « gift » which, in the context under examination, may not always occur, as one of them has highlighted : « Not everyone will necessarily ask for the solidarity contribution. It is not because one is poor or in need that one will automatically accept *gratefully* the slightest *alms* without thinking. It is a question of freedom and dignity[52] ». Used by several people[53], the term « alms » is representative of the manner in which at least part of the « beneficiaries » perceive the solidarity contribution. Yet charity, like gifts, requires gratitude in return — a feeling that the people subjected to coercive measures in the past may be disinclined to manifest towards the institutions they consider responsible for their suffering. Thus, in terms of political efficacy, the concept of solidarity appears not entirely up to the task of reparation.

In many respects, the solidarity principle appeared as the lowest common denominator between the parties involved, making it possible for the Swiss authorities and society to meet the victims' demands and accept a reappraisal of the past and a reparation policy for what is often described as a « historical injustice ». Engaging in this process implied shouldering a *responsibility inherited* from past

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[50] « Le don s'exprime dans le langage de l'obligation : obligé, il oblige, il fait des obligés […] ; il institue une domination légitime ». Pierre Bourdieu, « La double vérité du don », in *id.*, *Méditations pascaliennes*, Paris, Seuil, 1997, p. 229-240 (quote p. 235).

[51] « Si [la redistribution] tend évidemment, comme le veut la lecture officielle, à corriger les inégalités de la distribution, elle tend aussi et surtout à produire la reconnaissance de la légitimité de l'État ». Ibid., p. 239.

[52] « Tout le monde ne va pas forcément demander la contribution de solidarité. Ce n'est pas parce qu'on est pauvre ou dans le besoin que l'on va automatiquement accepter avec reconnaissance, et sans réfléchir, la moindre aumône qui se présente ». Urs Allemann-Caflisch, in IEC (éd.), *La mécanique de l'arbitraire,* op. cit., p. 307 (emphasis added). By the submission deadline in March 2018, just over 9,000 people had applied for the solidarity contribution (Wigger, « Nothilfe, Entschädigung, Entschuldigung », op. cit., p. 148). The time limit has in the meantime been removed.

[53] See, for example, also the statements of Robert Blaser and Daniel Cevey in IEC (éd.), *La mécanique de l'arbitraire*, op. cit., p. 316 and 320.

generations and their official representatives, as shown by the practice of making public apologies. However, the payment of indemnities goes a step further, a step that raises particular difficulties even in wealthy countries such as Switzerland, as it concerns the delicate issue of the distribution of resources which are, by definition, finite and subject to competing interests. Consequently, to some extent, the acknowledgment of *direct guilt* by the institutions providing resources may seem necessary in order to make financial measures for the victims politically acceptable[54]. However, guilt can in turn constitute an obstacle to the recognition of victims, as mentioned above. In this double-edged configuration, solidarity represents the third way : invoking this principle allows the government to legitimise financial gestures in the eyes of the public and in those of political spheres which may be reluctant to make such a move, but without recognising direct guilt. This conceptual framework also avoids creating a hierarchy between victims, in contrast to a compensation *stricto sensu* which would imply a precise quantification of individual damages and, accordingly, a scaling of the amounts granted.

It is possible that the reference to the concept of solidarity results from this feeling genuinely existing within Swiss society. Nevertheless, it appears to also have an incantatory dimension, calling for a certain reciprocity from victims to which they may not be ready to agree. As a matter of fact, they did not demand solidarity, but justice. From this point of view, placing the reparation process under the label of solidarity is, in a way, tackling the problem back to front. Indeed, this approach presupposes a reconciliation that, at the same time, is precisely what it is aiming to achieve. This problem is clearly apparent in a 2014 Round Table discussion on the theme of reconciliation. When invited by a professional mediator to set up meetings in which the people affected by coercive measures could present their life stories to the institutions considered responsible for harming them, the representatives of the victims reacted negatively : « Ms. Biondi explains that in her association nobody is ready for such a process. The state must first fulfil its obligations.

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[54] This distinction between responsibility and guilt is borrowed from the legal expert Antoine Garapon : *Peut-on réparer l'histoire ? Colonisation, esclavage, Shoah*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2008, p. 70-71.

Mr. Claude is also of the opinion that it is too early to talk about reconciliation[55] ». Ultimately, in order for solidarity to be accepted, it has to occur in a context of peaceful relations between the parties, which is far from the case in this situation. For this reason, even if this principle contributed significantly to making reparations (particularly financial ones) possible, it also limits the significance of the policy, because of its proximity with the notion of gift. The particular meaning of the word « solidarity » as a synonym of generosity has been prominent in this specific context. It impacts the implementation of reparation measures, notably by affecting the nature of the relationship these measures create and by legitimising the limits placed on the material resources made available. For this reason, it is the source of much frustration on the part of the people these efforts are intended for. While the payments were supposed to crown or even close the reconciliation process, activism is currently gaining new impetus, notably around demands for further financial measures for the victims. In this dynamic, the semantic dimensions that were supposed to give political strength to the concept of solidarity, especially with respect to the image of the Swiss society and authorities, could also well have played a part in derailing the reparation process[56].

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[55] « Mme Biondi explique que, dans son association, personne n'est prêt pour un tel processus. L'État doit d'abord remplir ses obligations. M. Claude est également d'avis qu'il est trop tôt pour parler de réconciliation ». « Procès-verbal de la 8e séance de la Table ronde du 1er octobre 2014 », 27th October 2014, p. 9.

[56] This article was written in 2020.

Notes on Contributors

Olivier Christin is a historian, specialist of the early modern period. Director of studies at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris, he has worked on the question of political devotion and on the *exempla virtutis* of civic commitment. Among other works, he has published *La cause des autres. Histoire du dévouement politique*, Paris, PUF, 2022.

François Courvoisier graduated in International Relations from the University of St. Gallen in 2005. After ten years as an entrepreneur in the private sector he obtained a Master's degree in Transnational History from the University of Geneva in 2018. He is a doctoral candidate under the supervision of Prof. Irène Herrmann and Prof. Alexander Keese.

Anna Derksen is assistant lecturer in the International Research Training Group « Baltic Peripeties. Narratives of Reformations, Revolutions and Catastrophes » at the University of Greifswald and has previously worked in the project « Rethinking Disability » at Leiden University. Her research focuses on disability and eugenics in Nordic welfare states.

Irène Herrmann is Full Professor of Swiss Transnational History at the University of Geneva. She graduated both in Russian and in history. She has taught in Canada and in Russia. She has published more than 150 scientific articles, ten edited books and five monographs. Her work focuses on solidarity, humanitarianism, conceptual history in Switzerland and in Post-Soviet Russia.

Renata Latała is a Senior Researcher with the History Department at the University of Geneva. Her research focuses on cultural exchanges and intellectual networks in the 19th and 20th centuries, history of Central Europe, as well as on the intellectual history of Catholicism. Currently, she is conducting a project on public history : solidarity1980.com.

Sandrine Maulini is a historian and is currently a research associate at the School of Health Science HESAV (Lausanne). Her work focuses on the perception of social issues and vulnerable populations in Switzerland. She is particularly interested in the use of coercion in assistance practices, as well as resistances to coercive social measures and the resulting collective memory and reparation dynamics.

Andrés María Vicent holds a doctorate in Modern History from the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (2019). His research focuses on Legitimism as a transnational political culture. In a broader sense, he is interested in the global history of the Age of Revolutions. From 2022, he is María Zambrano Fellow at Universidad de Salamanca. Previously, he was Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence (2020-2022).

Virgil Wibaut-Le Pallac is an SNSF doctoral student at the University of Lausanne and works at the Walras-Pareto Centre within the Institute of Political Studies. His research is part of Prof. Harro Maas's (Unil, CWP) SNSF project, *Moral accounting matters*, which focuses on the moral use of economic instruments – graphs, accounting tables and budgets – in Geneva between 1796 and 1846.

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